V.N.Varma - (1.) THIS revision is directed against an order dated 7-7-75 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Etawah, discharging the opposite- parties (Raja Babu and Ram Behari) in a case under Sections 399, 402 and 307 IPC.
(2.) THE opposite-parties had been committed to the Court of Session to stand their trial under Sections 399, 402 and 307 IPC. When the case was opened in the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Etawah, by the Public Prosecutor a plea was raised on behalf of the opposite-parties that there was not sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial against them and they should be discharged in accordance with Section 227 CrPC. THE First Additional Sessions Judge accepted the plea and discharged the accused by the impugned order. THE State of U. P. has come up in revision to assail the order aforesaid. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at sufficient length and have also carefully perused the impugned order dated 7--1975. Under Section 226 of the Code the Public Prosecutor, while opening the case for the prosecution, has to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Then comes the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons tor so doing as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together, it would be clear that at the initial stage of the trial, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulosly judged. It is not necessary for the Judge at that stage to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance, whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage, the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or the trial is sure to end in his conviction If there is even a strong suspicion against the accused which leads the Court to think that there is ground far presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In the instant case, on the material present on record, it cannot be said that there was not even a strong suspicion that the opposite-parties had not committed the crime. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge has himself mentioned in the impugned order that there was evidence of identification against the opposite-parties. Merely because majority of the identifying witnesses were police witnesses, it cannot be said at this stage that the evidence of identification is totally unbelievable. It is only at the final stage that the Court can be in a position to say whether the evidence of identification should be accepted or not. Therefore, as the facts of the case stood it was not proper on the part of the learned First Additional Sessions Judge to have discharged the opposite-parties under Section 227 CrPC. The order passed by him is definitely unsustainable and must, therefore, be set aside. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned order and direct that appropriate charge or charges will be framed against the opposite-parties and the trial shall proceed further in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that anything which I have said in support of this order, will in no way prejudice the case of either party at the trial. Ordered accordingly.;