LAKSHMI SUGAR AND OIL MILLS LTD Vs. UNION OF INDIA
LAWS(ALL)-1978-12-23
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on December 19,1978

LAKSHMI SUGAR AND OIL MILLS LTD, HARDOI Appellant
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Hari Swarup, U. C. Srivastava, JJ. - (1.) LEARNED counsel for the parties are agreed that the petition may be finally heard and disposed of today. The petition is directed against the order of the Central Government issued under section 3 (2) (b) of the Sugar Undertaking (Taking over of Management) Ordinance, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the ordinance). By the impugned order the Central Government has in purported exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance declared that the management of the petitioner sugar undertaking shall vest in the Central Government for a period of three years commencing on and from the third day of December, 1978. The petitioner has also challenged the consequential order of the same date appointing respondent no. 2 take over possession of the undertaking in accordance with section 4 (4) of the Ordi nance. The undertaking has been taken over on the ground that the petitioner has not paid in full the price of the sugar-cane purchased in the sugar year 1977-78 and the arrears of cane price due were in excess often per cent of the total price of sugar-cane purchased by the undertaking in the sugar year 1977-78. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Central Government under the ordinance had no power to take over the management of the undertaking on the ground of the arrears of the cane price for the previous year viz. sugar year 1977-78. The determination of this question depends on the interpretation of condition (b) contained in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance, which runs as under : "(1) Where the Central Government Is satisfied- (a) ................................. 12 Lakshmi Sugar & Oil Mills v. Union of India (Alld. B.C., L.B.) A.L.R. (b) That on any date in any sugar year (hereinafter in this clause referred to as the current sugar year) any sugar undertaking has, in relation to the cane purchased, before that date, for the purchase of the undertaking arrears of cane dues to the extent of more than ten per cent of the total price of the cane so purchased during the immediately preceding year". According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the arrears mentioned in this clause are the arrears of cane price which became due during the current sugar year and not during the past year, while the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that this clause refers not only to the arrears of cane price which may fall due this year but also the arrears of cane price in respect of the cane purchased during the previous year. 'Sugar year' has been defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Ordinance as under : "sugar year" means the period of twelve months commencing on the 1st day of October and ending with the 30th day of September next following." In clause (b) the term 'on any date in any sugar year' read with what is mentioned in the brackets following the words, makes it clear that this date must fall within the current sugar year, which will mean that it must be some date during the period commencing 1st of October, 1978 and ending 30th " September, 1979. The arrears of cane price have to be in respect of the sugar cane purchased during this year up to this date, which will mean the price of the sugar-cane purchased from 1st day of October, 1978 till the date of notice. In the present case, the notice was issued on November 18 and the order was passed on December 1, 1978. It relied on the unpaid dues of the last sugar year. The arrears of sugar-cane price of the last year was not relevant for action under clause (b) The last year's purchase of sugar-cane was material only for determining ratio of the current arrears with the total price of cane purchased last year. If the arrears of cane price in the current sugar year in excess often per cent of the total price 'of the sugar-cane purchased during the immediately previous year, clause (b) will get attracted and it will be open to the Central Government to take action, but unless that condition arises, clause (b) cannot be resorted to. There is no assertion in the notice issued to the petitioner or in the order passed under section 3, sub-section (2) (b) of the ordinance to the effect that the price of the sugar-cane purchased during the current sugar year is in arrear or the unpaid price is in excess of the ten per cent of the total price of the cane purchased during the previous sugar year. It was thus not open to the Central Government to take action against the petitioner by applying clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance. The impugned orders therefore must be held to have been passed in contravention of law. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has stated that in view of the Court's accepting his contention on the point mentioned above, he does not press any other point. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order issued by the Central Government under section 3(2) (b) of the Ordinance dated December 1, 1978 and the consequential order issued under section 4(4) of the Ordinance, are quashed. As the orders declaring the undertaking as having vested in the Central Government and the order directing the taking over of its possession are being quashed, let a consequential direction be issued to respondent no. 2 hand over the possession back to the petitioner. Costs on parties.;


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