JUDGEMENT
K. C. Agrawal, J. -
(1.) THIS petition is directed against a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Kanpur, dated 16-5-1977. By the said judgment, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 4-3-1976 and sent back the case to the Prescribed Authority for deciding the application filed by respondent No. 1 under Sec. 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on merits."
(2.) AN application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was filed by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner for release of a portion of house No. 24/9 A situate on the Mall Road. Kanpur on the allegations that her husband Dwarka Nath Tandon, who was previously employed in a private firm, had left the service, and that he required the premises in dispute for opening his own shop. She alleged that she was having a monthly income of Rs. 100/- from rent of the shop in dispute, and that the same was wholly insufficient to maintain her family. The respondent No. 1 further claimed that the petitioner was carrying on the business of readymade garments in another shop in the name of his wife, which was also situated on the Mall Road.
The application was contested by the petitioner. He denied that the need of the respondent No. 1 was bona fide and genuine. The petitioner claimed that the application filed by the Respondent No. 1 was not maintainable as she was not the exclusive or sole owner of the property in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant. He claimed that this proDerty initially belonged to the family of Laxmi Narain and Banwari Lal. This family sold the property to Rameshwar Prasad & others by means of one sale deed and another portion of it to Nandan Babu through another sale deed. Thereafter, Rameshwar Prasad and others sold their share to the respondent No. 1, whereas Nandan Babu sold his share to Variam Singh. As no partition ever took place between the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1 and Variam Singh, these two persons were the joint owners of the property and the application filed by respondent No. 1 for release of the shop in dispute was not maintainable.
The Prescribed Authority held that the property was joint and as Variam Singh had not been impleaded in the application, the application filed by respondent No. 1 was liable to be dismissed. The Prescribed Authority did not go into the merits of the case. Against the aforesaid order, the respondent no. 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Kanpur The appeal was transferred to the Additional District Judge, who allowed the same by the impugned order dated 16-5-1977. Aggrieved by the said order, Gulab Rai, the tenant, has filed this petition.
(3.) SRI K. M. Daval. counsel appearing for the petitioner, invited my attention to the documents which were filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as well as on behalf of the petitioner, and urged that the Additional District Judge gave the finding of exclusive ownership of the property in dispute in favour of the respondent No. 1 by misreading some documents and ignoring others. He took me through the various annexures filed along with the writ petition, counter-affidavit, and the re-joinder-affidavit. These annexures are the documents which had been filed by the parties before the Prescribed Authority in support of their respective cases. After interpreting these documents, learned Additional District Judge held that Vijai Rani Tandon was the owner of the portion of which the petitioner was the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-, and that Variam Singh had no concern with the same. The finding arrived at by the court below is one of fact. Even if it is based on wrong inferences drawn from the evidence of the parties, it is not open to this Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction to interfere with the same.
In Bahutmal Rai Ghand Oswal v. Laxmi Bai R. Tarte, AIR 1975 SC 1297, the Supreme Court held that while deciding a writ petition against the judgment of a subordinate authority the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is of a limited character, and that the same is confined to seeing as to whether the subordinate authority acted within its jurisdiction and had not committed any manifest error of law. The Supreme Court while dealing with the case further held that the High Court overstepped the limit of its power when it interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the district court as a court of fact. The High Court could not claim to interfere with the finding reached by the district court even on the ground that the district court had misread a part of the evidence and ignored another part of it. Placed at the highest, the argument of the learned counsel is the same which was negatived by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. In fact, I have gone through all the documents, but I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Additional District Judge misread the documents filed by the parties.;
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