Gopi Nath, J. - (1.) THESE are four connected civil revisions arising out of four suits filed by the applicant for the refund of the octroi imposed on sterlized sweetened flavoured milk contained in crown corked bottles. The apllicant, M/s. Crystal Dairy Products were engaged in the business of manu facturing sterilized sweetened flavoured milk which was carried on in indus trial estate Pratap Pur, Meerut. They imported milk in the Municipal limits ofMeerut. The Municipal Board levied octroi duty on the goods, though, according to the plaintiff -applicant the goods were not liable to octroi duty. The plaintiff paid the octroi duty under protest and thereafter claimed its refund. The Municipal Board, the opposite party, refused to refund the same. The plaintiff thereupon filed four suits praying for the refund of the various amounts paid, constituting the claims lodged therein. The defence delivered inter alia, was (1) that the goods in dispute were not exempt from octroi duty and (2) that the suits were barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the goods were not liable to octroi duty and the suits were not barred by Section 164 of the U. P. Muni cipalities Act. On revision by the defendant -opposite party the learned Addl. District Judge, Meerut, agreed with the trial court that the goods were not liable to octroi duty but dismissed the claim on the ground that the suits were barred by section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The main question for determination in these revisions, accordingly, is whether the suits for the refund of octori duty illegally collected on the goods which were not liable to such duty was barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act or any other provision of that Act. The findings recorded by the two courts below are that the goods were not liable to octroi duty. The duty was, accordingly, illegally levied on them and the refund was wrongly refused. The suits were filed for the refund of the amounts collected by way of octroi duty. The bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such a suit was raised by the defendant -applicant on the basis of the provisions of Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. That Section reads: "Bar to jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts in matters of taxation - (1) No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final: provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application or his own motion, to review any order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." The question is whether these provisions bar the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain a suit for refund of octroi duty illegally collected. In Munna lal v. Municipal Board, Cawnpore (A.I.R. 1936 Alld. 676 (F.B.)), it was held that "a suit brought for remission or refund of house and water tax charged by a Municipal Board for the period during which the plaintiff alleges the premises to have remained vacant and claims remission under section 151, U.P. Municipalities Act, is not barred by Section 164 of the Act". In Kunwar Jaswant Singh v. Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Meerut (A.I.R. 1940 Alld. 346), a Division Bench of this Court held that "the Municipal Committee is not entitled to charge a person with licence fee in respect of the thelas which are not plying for hire nor are kept within the Municipality. A suit for refund of the fee so paid can be entertained by a Civil Court as there is no remedy for this in the U.P. Municipalities Act." In Municipal Board, Mau Nath Bhanjan v. Raghunath Prasad (A.I.R. 1954 Alld. 121), it was held that "Section 164 does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a case where the assessment is wholly illegal and the Board has no right to assess the tax under the provisions of the Act". The Bench observed thus: ".........the question whether section 164 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a case where the assessment is wholly illegal and the Board has no right to assess the tax under the provisions of the District Boards Act was dealt with by a Full Bench of this court in District Board, Farukhabad v. Prag Dutt (A.I.R. 1948 Alld. 382 (F.B.)) and a Division Bench in Devi Prasad v. Municipal Board, Kanauj (A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 741), has held that the law was the same in cases under the Municipalities Act". Their lordships of the Judicial Committee in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. (A.I.R. 1940 P.O. 105), have held that: "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be -explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure". The decisions of this Court cited above conclude the point and we must, therefore, hold that the civil court had jurisdiction. This question again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in S. Kirpal Singh, Digga v. Municipal Board, Ghaziabad (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1416), and it was held that claim for refund of tax exempted by Government order issued under section 157 (3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act was entertainable in a Civil Court. The tax collected was found exempt and a suit filed for the refund of the tax was found entertainable by the Civil Court on the ground that the right to enforce that claim was a right of civil nature and could be enforced in a civil suit, unless the same was barred expressly or by necessary implication by the provisions of the Municipalities Act. It was held that "the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for refund of tax levied under section 128 of the Act is also not barred by express enactment or by necessary impli cation arising out of the provisions of Sections 153 (c), 160, 162 and 164 of the Act. Section 153 (c) merely provides for framing of the rules regulating the system on which refunds shall be allowed and paid. Section 160 makes pro vision for appeals relating to taxation and the authorities to which the right to appeal may be exercised. Section 162 provides for a reference to the High Court where a question of liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable doubt. Section 164 bars the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of valuation or assessment or about the liability of a person to be assessed or tax ed. But the dispute in this case does not relate to valuation or assessment or liability to be taxed or assessed. When the goods in respect of which toll was paid became the property of the Goveminent, the toll paid by the appellant became refundable and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a claim for refund of toll arising by virtue of an order under section 157(3) was not excluded. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78), the rule regard ing the entertainability of a suit for the refund of tax illegally collected was stated thus: "Where the particular ct contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies". The matter is accordingly concluded by authorities against the defendant opposite parties. The suits were clearly entertainable by Civil Court and the courts below erred in holding to the contrary. The revisions accordingly succeed and are allowed with costs.;