M. N. Shukla, J. - (1.) THIS case the point on which a decision by THIS Bench is required is an off recurring question of law, namely, whether the Board of Revenue has an unfettered power of review under the provisions of U. P. Act 1 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The matter in the first instance came before a learned single Judge of THIS Court, who referred it to a larger Bench, that is how, we are now seized of the matter. The question arose in the following circumstances. Opposite party no. 4 Firag Uddin filed a suit for partition before the Assistant Collector, district Pratapgarh under section 176 of the Act regarding Bhumidhari plot no. 66, claiming 1/8th share therein together with petitioner no. 4 Mehdi Hasan, on the basis of a sale deed dated May 23, 1960, having purchased the land from the co-sharer, who admittedly had i/8th share in the said land. A joint written statement was filed on behalf of opposite parties nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 10 and 12 admitting the plaintiffs' claim. They, however, added that Jumal, father of petitioners nos. 1 to 3, also had a share in the holding in suit and that they had not been impleaded as parties to the suit which was, therefore, had for non-joinder of parties. Later, during the pendency of the suit the present petitioners nos. 1 to 3 applied for impleadment and were impleaded. Thereupon, they filed a written statement in which it was pleaded that the petitioners also jointly had 1/8th share in the land in suit and that Jabbar and Aslauddin (predecessors-in-interest of opposite party no. 3) had 1/8th share jointly and not separately. The plaintiffs' contention was otherwise. The trial court by its judgment dated 2nd August, 1965 decreed the suit and held that the defendants nos. 3 and 4 Jabbar and Aslauddin were entitled to 1/8th share separately. A decree was passed to the effect that the plaintiffs also with present petitioner no. 4 Mehdi Hasan had 1/8th share by virtue of sale deed. The trial court rejected the claim of the petitioners nos. 1 to 3. Against the said decree Mehdi Hasan, petitioner no. 4 and Zahoor Ahmad (petitioner no. 3) preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Commissioner by his order dated 11th May, 1966. The appellate court held that the petitioners had 1 /8th share in the land in suit, and that the plaintiff along with petitioner no. 4 was also entitled to a decree of 1/8th share on the basis of the sale deed mentioned above. The opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 preferred a second appeal to the Board of Revenue which was dismissed by its judgment dated 14.8.1969 on the ground that the case was concluded by the findings of fact. Jabbar (opposite party No. 2) and others filed a review petition before the Board of Revenue, which was allowed by Sri B. K. Misra Member of the Board, on. 4.5.1970. It is THIS order which was been impugned in the writ petition referred to as for decision. It may be noitced that although the second appeal had been decided by Sri. S. S. Sirohi, Judicial Member, the review petition was disposed of by of Sri B. K, Misra, Judicial A part from the merits of the decision rendered in review, the learned counsel for the parties have addressed elaborate arguments to us on the 48 competence or otherwise of the said order on the legal interpretation of the power of review enjoyed by the Board of Revenue. The point which has been vehemently convassed is as to whether the powers of review vested in the Board of Revenue are unbridled or they are subject to the exceptions as to bring them on par with the provisions embodied in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that even though literally and ostensibly the relevant provisions may be deemed to confer an unqualified power of review on the Board of Revenue, jet both on principles of law and on established practice of that court the power has actually been exercised so as to conform to the principles enshrined under Order 47, rule 1 C. P C. Before pronouncing on the merits of the rival contentions it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of law. We may first of all mention Rule 339 (1) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules which has been framed under the rule making power conferred by the Act. It reads as under: - "(1) Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act the provisions of sections 266, 261, 273, 274, 277 to 282 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 shall apply to the suits and proceedings specified in Schedule II of the Act and appeals, revisions and reviews arising therefrom." By virtue of the above rule, sections 273 and 274 of the U. P. Tenancy Act have been made applicable to suits and proceedings specified in Schedule II of the Act and appeals, revisions and reviews arising therefrom. Sections 273 and 274 of the U. P. Tenancy Act may be usefully reproduced: 273: "The Board on its own motion or on the application of a party to the case, may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself, or by a single member." 274: "Every other court shall be competent to review its judgment in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Iv08, and the provisions of Order XLVII of the said Code shall apply to any such review." The learned counsel for the respondents has mainly relied on the scheme of the powers disclosed from the above two sections. The argument was that the provisions of section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act confer a very wide power of review on the Board, which is not hedged in by any reservation. The point is sought to be supported by a specific reference to the language of section 274 of the U P. Tenancy Act which imports the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C. P C. in connection with the power of review conferred on courts other than the Board of Revenue. It was urged that the intention of the Legislature could be gathered from the different terminology employed in these two provisions, while on the one hand the Legislature intended to confer unqualified power of review on the Board of Revenue and hence advisedly used such language as did not ambit of any restriction on that power, on the other hand, when conferring the power of review on other courts it did not intend to make it unqualified and that is why by express language brought it in conformity with the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. It was submitted that the courts function was not to add or to substract from the words of the Statute, but to interpret the provision of law as it was found. Surely the courts cannot attempt either to enlarge the scope of the provisions of law or restrict it by varying the language of the Statute or reading into it anything or omitting to read something on considerations of equity or propriety, etc. while there can be no quarrel with the general principle of construction of Statutes submitted by the learned counsel I or the respondents, it appears to us that the point under consideration must be decided on other relevant considerations without in any manner offending against the above mentioned principles. We wish to emphasise that the question which falls for decision, viz. the power and scope of review conferred on the Board by the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, must be decided not merely on a reading of sections 273 and 274 of the U. P. Tenancy Act which were made applicable by Rule 339 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules but by taking into consideration other material provisions of the Act which also have an important bearing in THIS respect. The most significant provision in THIS regard is section 341 of the Act which runs as follows: "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under THIS Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1970, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (including section 5 thereof) shall apply to the proceedings under THIS Act. It is manifest that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act with the only qualifying words "unless otherwise expressly provided by or under THIS Act." These words merely enjoin an enquiry as to whether there is any inconsistency between the provisions of the Act or the statutory rules made thereunder and those of the Civil Procedure Code on the subject. Where there is no such repugnancy involved, the provisions of both shall operate in the same field. A perusal of the provisions dealing with the power of review would immediately reveal that there is absolutely no such inconsistency between them. Section 273 extracted above, confer a power of review on the Board without indicating the grounds on which such power may be exercised. If THIS provision stood alone in the land-scape of the law it would have to be literally construed and applied. If, on the other hand, it is supplemented by any other provision contained within the same Statute or otherwise made applicable, the principle of harmonious construction requires that both must be read together so as not to lead to any inconsistency. It would indeed cause great difficulty and may be prejudicial to the litigation parties, if a power of review existed without indication of any guideline as to the mode of exercising it. This difficulty has, however, been resolved by the Legislature by applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure under seclion34l of the Act. Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. enumerates and specifies the grounds on which the power of review may be exercised. This, therefore, serves the very useful purpose of supplementing the provisions of section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act which otherwise in THIS context would be bait and bereft of useful guidance. Where two provisions simultaneously operating in the same field are Included in a Statute, one of which is only general and literal, while the other accompanying provisions contains a guideline, one supplements the other and cannot be said to be repugnant to it. Therefore, on a reading of section 341 of the Act and section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act together, the scheme of the entire Legislation is laid bare and its irresistible implication is that the power of review may be exersised by the Board in conformity with the principles enshrined in Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. We are unable to appreciate the argument which insists on confining our attention to section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act alone. It is essential that in order to seize the exact intention of the Legislature while conferring the power of review on the Board, the two provisions must be examined in juxta-position with each other. It is one of the established canons of statutory construction that the Court must construe the provisions of a Statute harmoniously in order to ascertain the true legislative intent. All the parts of a statute must be read harmoniously so as to give effect to each and every part and not to result in rejection of any part as ineffective or futile. In fact, It has been the rule that the sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being Interdependant. Therefore, an attempt must invariably be made to reconcile them so as to avoid repugnancy. In the instant case, as we have already observed, section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act does not lead to any inconsistent result if the mandate of section 341 is also applied. In other words, when the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to proceedings under U. P. Act I of 1951, it is perfectly consistent with logic and reason and the legislative intent that while formally the power may be derived from the language of section 273, its dry shellton must be clothed with the flesh and blood which is supplied by the provisions of section 341 of the Act and with its aid those of Order 47, rule 1 C. P. C. This instead of involving any inconsistency or repugnancy makes it possible to achieve and materialise the real intent of the Legislature and ensure a just and reasonable exercise of the power of review conferred on the Board which proceeds on a dichotomy between these two material provisions of law is bound to result in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we find no difficulty in pressing into service the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. while examining the power of review conferred on the Board by section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. Learned counsel for the respondents, placed strong reliance on a Division Bench decision of THIS Court in Smt. Inda Devi v. The Board of Revenue and others(1955 A. L. J. p. 370.) but, that case is clearly distinguishable. It is an authority only for the proposition that no restrictions have been placed on the power of review conferred on the Board of Revenue in the matter of exercising that power either once or more than once in a particular matter. That was the sole question which arose for decision in that case and not the general power of review. In the instant case we are on the other hand, examining the question as to whether there is an unfettered power of review in the Board of Revenue so as to disregard the principles embodied in Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. Moreover, another very important and distinguishable feature of Division Bench decision in Smt. Inda Devi case is that the case arose out of the U. P. Tenancy Act and not under U. P. Act I of 1951. It is a point which must be clearly borne in mind that unlike the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the U. P. Tenancy Act did not make the Civil Procedure Code applicable to the proceedings under that Act. The II Schedule provided under section 243 of the U. P. Tenancy Act consists of Lists I and II, the former specifying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to suits or proceedings under the U. P. Tenancy Act and the latter referring to provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure subject to the modifications stated against each and none of the two lists includes Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. It is, therefore, obvious that the decision in the case of Smt. Inda Devi (supra} proceeded on the footing that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code had not been made applicable and hence the provisions of review contained in section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act must exclusively govern the exercise of that power. Mr. Khare's contention on behalf of the petitioners in that case for invoking the provisions of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was repelled because, as we have observed above, none of the two lists in Schedule II of the U. P. Tenancy Act included Order 47 of the Code. In view of that omission Sri Khare's contention that Order 47 of the Code must still be held applicable merely because it had not been excluded by List I of the II Schedule of the U. P. Tenancy Act, could not be accepted. It is obvious that U. P. Act I of 1951 stand on a different footing in THIS regard and does not suffer from the lacuna which existed in the U. P. Tenancy Act so far as the applicability of Order 47 of the Code was concerned. We are of the opinion that so far as possible the provisions of law should be so Interpreted as not to place an unregulated power In the matter of review because that is likely sometimes to lead to very undesirable consequences. Firstly, it cannot be disputed that finality in decisions rendered by courts Is essential in order to avoid uncertainty. Even in Smt. Inda Devi's case the Bench observed that the principle that there should be finality in the matter once decided by the appropriate courts, was very salutory. If a court is vested with unbridled power of reviewing its decisions without any guidelines, it is likely to reduce adjudications to mere outcomes of the whims of the Presiding Officers. This is bound to result in arbitration, and prejudice to the parties. This situation is also fraught with the formidable danger that the power of review may be flagrantly abused by unscrupulous litigants as a camouflage for securing a re-hearing on merits in the manner of an appeal. If, however, the power is exercised in conformity with the provisions set out in Older 47 of the Code, it would mitigate the danger of what has been aptly described in some judgment as using the provisions of review as a level for re-agitating the matters which have been disposed of". Secondly it needs to be emphasised that the remedy of review is radicially different from that of an appeal. While in an appeal all the points at issue can be canvassed a review by its very nature is intended to be confined to the rectification of apparent errors only. Elucidating the fundamental distinction between the two legal terminologies used by the Act it was observed by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1964 S. C. p. 1372 (in para 11), "a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. It would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to an error, and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." There is thus a vital distinction though not often noticed, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent." Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the consistent view of the Board of Revenue also has been that it can entertain and consider review petitions only in conformity with the provisions of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that notwithstanding these decisions of the Board the Legislature did not choose to amend section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, and, therefore, the intention of the Legislature must be presumed to be that the unlimited power of review embodied in section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act was to be retained and not abridged or curtailed. This argument suffers from a fallacy. As we have already indicated, even though with the aid of Rule 339 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules section 243 of the U. P. Tenancy Act has been made applicable, yet section 341 of U. P. Act 1 of 1951 makes provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable, subject of course, to the condition that there is no inconsistency between the two We have already dealt with THIS aspect in detail in the foregoing part of THIS judgment and since we find no inconsistency between the two provisions, the effect of section 341 of U. P. Act 1 of 1951 is to place the power of review on par with the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code, of Civil Procedure. In that view of law the observance by the Board of the principles called from the Code while exercising its power of review appears to be justified and it was not necessary for the Legislature to make any amendment in section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. Moreover, even the contention that the long and established practice of the Board of Revenue has been to entertain review applications on very wide grounds in disregard of Order 47, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code, does not appear to be well founded. It was observed as long ago as 1941 in Duni Chand, L. and others v. Ram Singh, Chand and others(1941 Revenue Decisions 252.). "it has not been the practice of THIS Court to review its own orders on account of any alleged mistake of law although Sec. 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act gives unfettered powers of review to THIS Court. The above practice is in accordance with the provisions of Order XLVII, C. P C. Lastly, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that while Civil Procedure Code provided the general law on the subject, section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act made applicable by U. P. Act 1 of 1951 to matters of review was special provision and must override the general provisions of Order 47 0f the Code. It was urged that if the Legislature had chosen to invest the Board with the special powers of review, the courts could not by any rule of interpretation restrict the ambit of the power. We are unable to accede to THIS contention. As we have already observed, U. P. Act 1 of 1951 contains both the provisions and makes them applicable to the exercise of powers of review, and since those provisions are supplementary of each other, the entire argument based on special law overriding the general law appears to be misconceived. Therefore, our conclusion is that the provisions of section 341 of U. P. Act 1 of 1951 read with Rule 339 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and section 273 of the U. P. Tenancy Act lead to only one inference, namely, that the requirement of law b that the Board should exercise its power of review in conformity with the guidelines furnished by Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Applying the above dictum to the facts of the present case we find that the impugned decision of the Board of Revenue allowing the review application of respondents nos. 2 and 3 was manifestly erroneous and illegal. The main controversy in the case was as to whether Jabbar and Aslauddin (opposite parties) held their 1/8th share each separately or jointly and whether the petitioners nos. 1 to 3 and Mehdi Hasan petitioner no. 4 had 1/8th share jointly. In its judgment in Second Appeal the Board had held that Jabbar and Aslauddin held their 1/8th share jointly and that the petitioners 1 to 3 and petitioner no. 4 also held 1/8th share jointly. The finding was based on appraisal of evidence and on the material on record and was not vitiated by any patent error. Consequently, the learned Judicial Member completely misdirected himself by disposing of the review application almost like an appeal and revising those findings and allowing the review application another apparently illegal ground, namely that in a suit for partition the petitioners nos. 1 to 3 could not agitate the claim of their shares and that they must be relegated to the remedy of a regular suit for the purpose. It is curious that in a Full Bench decision of the Board of Revenue in Smt. Sarojmati v. Smt. Yasoda(1973 Revenue Decisions 117.) the learned Judicial Member Sri B. K. Misra, speaking for the Court, had ruled that the Board could only entertain and consider review petitions in conformity with the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure but in the instant case the same learned Judicial Member set at naught the dictum of his own judgment. For these reasons we allow THIS writ petition with costs and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4-5-1970 passed by the Board of Revenue.;