S.N. Dwivedi, J. - (1.) THE Respondents 1 to 4 preferred a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. It appears that they filed the claim beyond time. Accordingly they also made an application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal allowed that application after hearing the parties.
(2.) FEELING aggrieved with this order, the Appellant has filed this first appeal from order. But no such appeal lies. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that an appeal will lie from the order under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sub -section (1) of section HOD provides that subject to the provisions of Sub -section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal" may prefer an appeal to the High Court within 90 days from the date of the award. Sub -section (2) provides that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 2,000/ - . It is evident from the language of section 110D that an appeal is provided for against an award of the Claims Tribunal. In the case before me there is no award of the Tribunal as yet. The claim of the Respondents is still pending before the Tribunal. Counsel for the Appellant has relied on B. Govindarajulu Chetty v. M.L.A. Govindaraja Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1966 Mad 332 : : 1966 A.C.J. 153 in support of his contention. In that case the Claims Tribunal had dismissed the claim of the claimants. The question then arose whether an appeal lay from the order of Claims Tribunal dismissing the claim. It was held that the order dismissing a claim is included in the word "award" under Section 110 -D. It is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the question decided in that case, because it does not arise before me. But obviously that decision is no authority for the proposition that the order of the Claims Tribunal condoning the delay will also be included in the word "award". While the order dismissing the claim terminates the proceedings, the order condoning the delay does not do so. The proceedings still remain pending before the Claims Tribunal. Accordingly I am unable to hold that there has been an award in the present case.
(3.) COUNSEL for the Appellant has also relied on G. Gopalaswamiw G. Navalgaris, A.I.R 1967 Mad 403 That case is also distinguishable from the case before me. In that case a claim was filed beyond time. The Tribunal refused to accept the application. And then an appeal was filed. While holding that an appeal lay, the Court said: I am unable to accept this contention, for the order of the Tribunal refusing to entertain an application puts an end to the claim and decides the application once for all against the claimant. I have already pointed out that in the case before me the proceeding has not terminated but is still pending before the Claims Tribunal. Counsel for the Appellant seeks to rely on the following remark of the Court: When the Tribunal decides to entertain an application after the expiry of sixty days or refuses to entertain an application, the decision is judicial in character and is an award. So far as the latter part of the remark is concerned, it is not necessary for me to express any opinion thereon; but as regards the former part of the remark I find it difficult to agree.;