JAGDISH SAHAI,J. - (1.) (1959) AIR 1959 MP 187 (V 46) : 1958 MPLJ 246, Rukhmanibai v. Kishanlal Ramlal 10 Judgement This civil revision is directed against an order passed by Sri Abu Saad, II Additional District Judge, Meerut, on 14-4-1965, in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), setting aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Varanasi, granting to Smt. Sarla Devi, applicant before us, the expenses of the proceedings and maintenance pendente lite. The learned single Judge before whom the revision application came up for hearing has referred the following question of law to us for decision:- "Does an appeal lie against an order passed on an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act ?" The question, therefore, is whether the appeal before Sri Abu Saad was competent under the provisions of Section 28 of the Act.
(2.) SECTION 24 of the Act reads:- "Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independant income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioners own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the Court to be reasonable." Section 28 of the Act reads:- "All decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force: Provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only." Section 28 of the Act provides for two things; firstly that all orders made by the court in any proceeding shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction and secondly all these orders may be appealed from. It is not disputed that the order passed under Section 24 of the Act if not complied with shall be enforced as an order of the Court. The words "may be appealed from........." clearly make all orders appealable. There is nothing in the Act to show that an order passed under Section 24 of the Act is excepted from the scope of the words mentioned above. (underlined (here in ) by us) It has been contended that under Section 21 of the Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to all proceedings and, therefore, whether or not an appeal would lie must be culled out from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 21 of the Act reads:- "Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." All that Section 21 of the Act provides for is that the proceedings under the Act shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words the provision requires that the procedure to be followed in proceedings under the Act would be the one contained in the Civil Procedure Code. A right of appeal is a substantive right and is not a mere matter of procedure. The use of the words "shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" in Section 21 of the Act clearly indicate that it is the procedure only which is to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 28 of the Act confers an unqualified right of appeal. The words used "and may be appealed from" in Section 28 of the Act clearly give a person aggrieved the right to file an appeal. In our opinion, therefore, an order passed under Section 24 of the Act is appealable at the instance of a party aggrieved.
(3.) THE words "under any law for the time being in force" occurring in Section 28 of the Act, in our opinion, only mean that the appeal shall be governed by the provisions contained in the Act which deals with forums of Civil appeals in that area. The necessity for using this expression arose because of the circumstance that in different States there are different statutes in respect of Civil appeals. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide the forum to which appeals would lie from decrees or orders. All that it does is to confer a right of appeal under certain circumstances. The forum to which an appeal would lie would be determined by the particular Act which applies to the State in which the appeal arises. For instance, for the purposes of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and Bengal it would be the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act which would determine the forum to which the appeal would lie. Similarly in Mysore State, it is the Mysore Civil Courts Act, in Madras State, it is the Madras Civil Courts Act and in Bombay State, it is the Bombay Civil Courts Act which would be the "law for the time being in force." The Legislature has used the words aforesaid because different States have different Acts dealing with forum for civil appeals. In our opinion, therefore, the second part of Section 28 of the Act makes every decree or order passed under the provisions of the Act appealable as of right, but the appeal would be regulated and governed by that particular local civil Act which rules in the State in which the appeal arises.;