Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - (1.) THIS is an application for certificate of fitness to file appeal in the Supreme Court, Under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.
(2.) THIS petition is directed against my order dated 28 -2 -1968 by which I allowed the petition in revision and set aside conviction and sentence of the Petitioner Under Section 7/16 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Sri Parbhu Dayal having been convicted Under Section 7/16 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and awarded a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment, came up to this Court and filed a petition in revision against the order of his conviction. Amongst other grounds, the petition in revision was sought to be supported by the plea that the Public Analyst and Food Inspector who took action in the case were not duly appointed as such under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Amendment Act (Act No. 49 of 1964) and that they did not have the authority to perform duties of their respective offices in respect of an occurrence which was alleged to have taken place after the Amending Act of 1964 had come into force. On enquiry made by me from the Learned Counsel for the Respondent, it was conceded that no notification relating to the appointment of the aforesaid officers was made after the Amending Act came into force. The question raised, therefore, had to be decided on the basis that the aforesaid officers who acted in this case were officers, who were appointed under the unamended Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and were not appointed as such after Act No. 49 of 1964 came into force. A careful perusal of the provisions of the two Acts disclosed that drastic changes in the panel of Central Committee for food standard Under Section 3 of Act No. 49 of 1964 had been made. It was also clear that the Central Government had to frame rules Under Section 23 of Act No. 49 of 1964 in consultation with the newly prescribed committee. No rules had been framed by the Central Government after the amending Act came into force. 4. A similar question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Municipal Board Kanpur v. Behari Lal, 1960 AWR 229 FB. The question that was considered by the Full Bench was whether the Public Analyst appointed under the provisions of the UP Pure Food Act continued to hold the authority of that office after the enforcement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Full Bench held that even if it be the case that the appointment was saved by virtue of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the only result that would follow would be that the officer would continue to be a Public Analyst under the Pure Food Act. He could not be deemed to be a Public Analyst within the meaning of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Full Bench had also disapproved a decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Board, Lucknow v. Shyam Behari, 1960 AWR 127. 5. An attempt was made on behalf of the Respondent to exclude the application of the Full Bench decision to the facts of the instant case by urging that in the full Bench case, the fact was that the UP Pure Food Act had been expressly repealed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, while the fact of the instant case was that the Amending Act No. 49 of 1964 did not expressly repeal the whole of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. That submission could not be accepted by me as correct in view of Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of New Singhal Dal Mills v. Firm Sheo Prasad Jainti Prasad : AIR 1958 All 404 which was binding on me sitting singly. The Division Bench had taken the view that all the law governing such a question was contained in Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act and that that section dealt with the effect of repeal of Acts. Although that section did not deal expressly with the effect of (amendment of an Act, yet in the absence of any other law which' laid down the effect of amendment of an Act, it was Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which had to be looked to for answering such a question. The Division Bench had £also held that the question of effect of an amendment was not different from that of the effect of repeal of an Act. In addition to the view expressed by the Division Bench in the above case, I found that there was high authority for the proposition that any change of the scope or effect of an existing statute whether by addition, omission or substitution of provisions, which did not wholly terminate its existence whether by an Act purporting to amend, repeal, revise or supplement, or by an of independent and original in form, had to be treated as amendatory. The amendment of a statute, therefore, operates to repeal it. The mere fact that the legislature enacts an Amending Act, by itself indicate that it intended to change the original Act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. The effect of amendment, therefore, is two fold, namely to repeal and to enact. It was on such grounds that I allowed the revision petition and set aside the conviction Under Section 7/16 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Full Bench decision relied upon by me in the absence of any decision to the contrary holds the ground so far as this Court is concerned. 6. In the petition for certificate of fitness, it has been said that the decision affects a very large number of cases which have been decided on the basis of the reports of the Public Analyst during the last four years from 1964 and that the matter is of great importance both to the Nagar Mahapalika of the State and also to the persons whose revisions were pending in this Court. To my mind, that consideration alone cannot be accepted as a good ground for certifying a case of this nature to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The case must involve doubtful or at least debatable Question before it can be certified to be a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. 7. After obtaining my permission, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner added a further ground in the petition to the effect that another learned Single Judge of this Court Mr. Justice H.C.P. Tripathi in another case has not found it possible to agree with the view expressed by me in this case and that, therefore he has referred the case for consideration of the question to a larger Bench. It has been urged by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent that that consideration also makes this case a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.. The learned Single Judge expressed his inability to agree with my decision on the ground that Sections 8 and 9 of the amended Act are almost identical with those of the unamended Act so far as the power and mode of appointment of Public Analyst and Food Inspectors and their qualifications are concerned. The learned Single Judge has made use of the word "almost" before the word "identical" which would suggest that the learned Single Judge was not of the opinion that the two sets of provisions were really identical. It is true that on the surface, the requirements of the two sets of provisions are similar, but the difference lies in the substance inasmuch as the authority under which appointment under the amended Act is made is different from the authority under which the appointment is made under the old Act. I have already out the basic changes introduced in the panel of the Central Committee by the amending Act and for that reason, I do not find it possible to say that appointment of such officers under Rules framed in consultation with the Central Board as it was constituted under the unamended Act is identical with the appointment of such officer which are required to be made under Rules framed in consultation with a central Board with a different panel. I as informed that two other learned Single Judges of this Court have also taken the view similar to the view expressed by me, but it appears that those decisions were not placed before Hon. Tripathi, J. 8. I was also informed that the State Government has now issued some notification reaffirming the appointments of such officers made under the unamended Act, 1954. 9. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this Court cannot say that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. 10. The petition is accordingly dismissed.;