GANGESHWAR PRASAD,J. - (1.) JUDGEMENT These connected writ petitions, which raise among other questions the question of the vires of the (J. P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act XIII of 1959, came up for hearing before this Full Bench upon a reference made by G.C. Mathur, J.
(2.) THE facts leading up to the petitions may be briefly stated. Certain plots of land in District Naini Tal are in occupation of the petitioners, the plots in occupation of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3755 being situate in village Nagla Tarai Tahsil Khatima while those in occupation of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 3756 being situate in village Rahpura Tehsil Kaichha. It is admitted that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 does not apply to the areas in which the plots are situate and they are governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 Proceedings for the eviction of the petitioners from the aforesaid plots were started under the provisions of the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act XIII of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act unless described otherwise to avoid confusion). The Public Authority constituted under the Act issued notices to the petitioners under Sec. 3 of the Act calling upon them to show cause why orders of eviction be not passed against them in respect of the plots in their occupation. The petitioners filed objections contending, inter alia, that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution and that in any case they had acquired rights of hereditary tenants in the plots and were, therefore, not liable to eviction under the provisions of the Act. The objections were, however, rejected by the Public Authority and orders of eviction were passed by him against the petitioners. Appeals against the orders of the Public Authority were then preferred by the petitioners to the District Judge Naini Tal under Section 5 of the Act. After hearing elaborate arguments on behalf of the parties on the objections raised by the petitioners, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the Act was intra vires, that the petitioners were in unauthorised occupation of the disputed plots and had not acquired rights of hereditary tenants therein, and that they were liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act. He, accordingly, affirmed the orders of the Public Authority and dismissed the appeals. The petitioners, thereupon, filed these petitions, praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Public Authority and those of the District Judge arid also praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to the petitions not to interfere in any manner with the possession of the petitioners over the plots in dispute. Broadly speaking, the contentions put forward before us on behalf of the petitioners were the same as those advanced before the District Judge; first, that the Act is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and is, consequently, void; and secondly, that, by virtue of their possession for the requisite period, petitioners became hereditary tenants under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 long before the commencement of the proceedings taken against them under the Act, and the plots were, therefore, not public land as defined in the Act and no proceedings with respect to them could he taken thereunder. There is, however, one vital difference in the basis on which the constitutionality of the Act was attacked before us. The ground of attack before the learned District Judge that the Act discriminates between occupants of Government land on the one hand and those of private land on the other, but, before us, the constitutional vice imputed to the Act was that it discriminates amongst persons in occupation of Government land inter se by leaving it to the unguided and unfettered choice of the State to take ordinary legal proceedings in the civil or the revenue Court against some of them and to resort to the more drastic provisions of the Act against others.
(3.) BEFORE considering the validity of the ground on which the constitutionality of the Act was challenged before us it seems proper to refer to certain facts connected with the history of the Act. The first legislative attempt to achieve the objects of the Act was the enactment of the Government Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953. That Act was declared unconstitutional by a Division Bench of this Court in Bir Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1960 All LJ 52. The basis of the decision in the above case was that the necessity for speedier process of eviction from Government land of unauthorised occupants which, according to the preamble, was the reason behind the enactment, could not just in the placing of trespassers of Government land in a separate class to be dealt with differently, when there was nothing in the Act to suggest that Government land was immediately required for any public purpose. In consequence of that decision the legislature enacted the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act XIII of 1959, which repealed the earlier Act of 1953 and expressly stated in its preamble that Government land was immediately required for purposes detailed therein. Later, however, in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Manna Lal v. Collector of Jhalawa, AIR 1961 SC 828 and Navrattanmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704, the decision in Bir Pratap Singhs case, 1960 All LJ 52, was reconsidered in Sucha Singh v. Administrative Officer Afzalgarh Colonization Scheme Bijnor. 1963 All LJ 311 : (AIR 1963 All 528) (FB), by a Full Bench of this Court which overruled Sir Pratap Singhs case, 1960 All LJ 52, and held that the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 was constitutional. It was also noted by the Full Bench in its judgement that the constitutionality of the Act of 1959 was not challenged before it. Some amendments, which are not material for the question under consideration, were introduced in the Act by the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recover) of Rent and Damages) Amendment Ordinance 1965 which was subsequently replaced by the U.P. Act V of 1965. Since the aforesaid amendments were introduced subsequent to the taking of the proceedings against the petitioner and the passing of the impugned orders they may for the present be ignored. Now, neither in Bir Pratap Singhs case, 1960 All LJ 52, nor in Sucha Singhs case, 1963 All LJ 311 : (AIR 1963 All 528) (FB), was the constitutionality of the Act of 1953 challenged on the score of discrimination inter se between unauthorised occupants of Government land, and the sole question raised and determined in those oases was whether the aforesaid Act was void for being discriminatory between trespassers of Government land and those of private land. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Manna Lals case, AIR 1961 SC 828 the Full Bench, in Sucha Singhs case, 1963 All LJ 311 : (AIR 1963 All 528) (FB), held that just as the Government can be constitutionally differentiated from other people in respect of claim to money so also the Government can be differentiated in respect of claim to recover possession over land illegally occupied. In view of the above Full Bench decision Sri S.C. Khare, the learned counsel for the petitioners, did not seek to challenge the constitutionality of the Act on the ground of discrimination between trespassers of Government land and those of private land, and he confined his attack to the narrower ground that the violation by the Act of Article 14 of the Constitution consists in its discrimination among unauthorised occupants of Government land, and thus in its differential treatment of persons similarly situated. In support of his argument the learned counsel, placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1581, by which the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act 31 of 1959 was struck down on an identical ground, and he urged that the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act of 1959 bears such a close resemblance to the Punjab Act that it must also be condemned as unconstitutional.;