M.L. Chaturvedi, J. - (1.) This is a landlord's second appeal against an order passed by the learned District Judge of Saharanpur in proceedings arising out of an Encumbered Estates Act case.
(2.) An application under Sec. 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act was filed by Smt. Chanderwati and Smt. Makhni, widows of one Har Prasad. Har Prasad had died leaving some debts and the application under Sec. 4 was made by the widows. This application was filed on the 2nd September 1935 and in due course it was sent to the Special Judge. The Special Judge invited claims by the creditors and the respondent and other creditors filed their written statements. A decree was passed in favour of the present respondent for Rs. 10,000/- was passed as far back as the 20th May 1938. On the 13th December 1941 Smt. Bishan Devi, one of the daughters of Hari Prasad, filed an objection under Sec. 11 of the E. E. Act claiming some of the properties shown in the application as belonging to her. This objection was opposed on behalf of the present respondent and it was dismissed on the 18th July 1942. The further proceedings under E. E. Act went on and after the lapse of nearly 10 years, the other daughter of Har Prasad came on the scene. Her name is Smt. Bimlawati and she along with her minor son Kamal Kishore filed another objection under Sec. 11 of the Act claiming some of the properties. This objection was filed on the 21st April 1952 and it was dismissed on the 17th March 1953. On the 24th March 1953 the appellant Smt. Chanderwati filed an application under Sec. 20 of the Act for quashing the entire proceedings. This application was opposed on the ground that the objection under Sec. 11 was filed in collusion with the only object that the appellant may have an opportunity of having all these proceedings, conducted during the course of 18 years, quashed. The Special Judge, 2nd grade, who was trying the case, held that the claim of Smt. Bimlawati and her son was not proved to be mala fide and he also held that the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sahu Raghunath Das v. Daya Sarup, 1950 A.L.J.R. 309 applied to the facts of this case. He thought that on a proper interpretation of this decision the application under Sec. 20 filed by the appellants should be allowed and he ordered accordingly. The respondent, who is a creditor, went up in appeal against the order of Special Judge and the learned District Judge allowed the appeal on a finding that the claim filed by Smt. Bimlawati and her son was not a bona fide claim and therefore would not confer a fresh right on the appellants to file an application under Sec. 20 of the E. E. Act. He held that the case reported in Ranbijey Bahadur v. Ramadhin, 1949 A.L.J.R. 335 applied to the facts of the case and not the Full Bench case referred to above. He accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the application made by the appellants under Sec. 20, E. E. Act.
(3.) The appellants have come up in second appeal to this Court against the order of the learned District Judge. A second appeal does lie under Sec. 45 (2) (2-a) of the E. E. Act, but it lies only on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that every time an objection under Sec. 11 has been dismissed, the landlords get a fresh right of applying under Sec. 20 of the Act for quashing the entire proceedings. So far this contention of the learned counsel is supported by the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Sahu Raghunath Das cited above. The words used in Sec. 20 are "any claim" and the Full Bench has held that a landlord has a right to apply under Sec. 20 of the E. E. Act for quashing the proceedings under that Act within 30 days of an order passed under Sec. 11. But the Full Bench had not at all considered the question whether Sec. 20 would give a right to the landlord to apply for quashing all the proceedings simply because he had got a mala fide or false objection filed by the relations. Before the Full Bench the question was of genuine objection filed in ordinary course. The Full Bench was not concerned at all with the case of objections which had been filed mala fide. The case really in point is the previous case of Ranbijey Bahadur. In this case a Bench of this Court has laid down that the claim, on the dismissal of which a right to apply under Sec. 20 of the Act applies, must be a bona fide claim. If a person prefers a claim who has no interest in the property and puts in claim with the collusion of the landlord, such a claim cannot be considered to be a claim of the nature mentioned in Sec. 20 of the Act. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, which is also binding upon me. The authority of the decision has in no way been weakened by the subsequent Full Bench case of Sahu Raghunath Das. The view of law taken by the lower appellate court was thus perfectly correct.;