V.Bhargava, J. - (1.) This is an application for a certificate under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order passed by this Court on 28th February, 1958, on a petition for issue of writs under Article 226 of the Constitution. So far as Article 132 of the Constitution is concerned, learned counsel for the applicant has not advanced any arguments at all to show that the case, which came up before this Court, or the appeal which is sought to be taken before the Supreme Court raises any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Article 132 of the Constitution is, therefore, clearly not applicable.
(2.) The application has been argued before us by learned counsel for the applicant under Article 133 of the Constitution and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was urged by learned counsel that the applicant was entitled to a certificate as of right under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution and Section 109 (b) read with Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In reply to this argument, learned counsel for the opposite party has urged that the order, in respect of which the certificate is sought, is not a judgment, decree or final order passed by this Court and, consequently, neither Article 133 of the Constitution nor Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. The point, that has principally been argued before us in these circumstances, is whether the order passed by this Court amounts to a judgment, decree or final order. There was another preliminary objection that this order was passed in proceedings which could not be held to be civil proceedings and this was an additional ground on account of which no certificate could be granted under Article 133 of the Constitution or Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure but, because of the view we are taking on the first point, we have not considered it necessary to enter into this second point.
(3.) It has not been contended before us that the order, in respect of which the certificate is sought, is or can be a decree. Reliance could only be placed on the word 'judgment' and the expression 'final order'. What is a 'judgment' was explained by a Bench of this Court in Vishnu Pratap v. Smt. Revati Devi, AIR 1953 All 647 (A), where it was held : "A judgment means an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties and not a mere interlocutory order during the pendency of a case. Every order passed by a single Judge in the exercise of his civil jurisdiction is not a judgment. What is or what is not a judgment will have to be decided in each case with reference to its effect on the rights of the parties. Even if it disposes of another point in dispute between the parties to a suit which has been raised by a separate application and which may be ancillary to the suit itself, it is not necessarily a judgment." The other question as to what constitutes a 'final order' was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Mohammad Mahmood Hasan Khan v. Govt. of U. P., 1956 All LJ 679: ((S) AIR 1956 All 457) (B). It was held that "In order to make an order a final order three conditions must be satisfied, namely : 1. that it should not be an interlocutory order. 2. that even though it is an order which disposes of the proceedings before a Court finally it should not be an order which leaves the original proceeding in the Court below alive, and 3. that there should be a final determination of the rights of the parties or the order must of its own force affect the rights of the parties." A similar principle was laid down by the Federal Court in Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, AIR 1949 FC 1 (C). It was held that to be a final order it must be an order which finally determines the points in dispute and brings the case to an end. Very recently, the Madras High Court also interpreted the expression 'final order' in Dhanalakshmi Animal v. The Income-tax Officer, 1957-2 Mad LJ 567; (AIR 1958 Mad 151) (D). It was held that an order passed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution will be a final order within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution if it finally disposes of the rights of par- ties. Where an order does not determine the right of a petitioner to the property claimed, but leaves it open to be agitated in appropriate proceedings, the order cannot be said to amount to a final order. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Count in Kapur Singh v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1957 Punj 173 (E) was also called upon to answer the question whether an order passed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution did or did not amount to a final order. It was held that "in every case the Court has to see whether the rights of the parties are finally determined by a decision so that the answer to the first question referred is that the mere fact that the Court refuses to issue a writ of direction under Article 226 does not take it out of the definition of the words --'judgment, decree or final order' but it will depend upon the facts, circumstances and the nature of decision in each case". It appears that a slightly different view was expressed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Alien Berry and Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Patna (S) AIR 1956 Pat 175 (F). In that case also petitions had been moved under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution against orders of assessment mainly on the grounds that the orders were without jurisdiction and were vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. Those writ petitions were dismissed summarily by a Bench of the Patna High Court and the certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was sought against that order of dismissal. It was held by the Patna High Court that the orders of summary dismissal of writ applications amounted to final orders though the certificates were refused on the other ground that those orders had not been passed in any civil proceedings. These are the various cases in which the words 'final order' used in Article 133 of the Constitution or Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been interpreted.;