- (1.) Heard Sri Om Prakash Mishra, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State on the application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 11.5.2012 by means of which the accused-respondents Zakir and Washim Akram have been acquitted in Session Trial No. 871 of 2009 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 402, 467, 468, 471 IPC; accused Respondents Zakir and Washim Akram have been acquitted in Session Trial No. 872 of 2009 under Sections 411 and 414 IPC; accused-respondents Washim Akram has been acquitted in Session Trial No. 873 of 2009 under section 25/4 Arms Act; accused-respondent Punit Sharma has been acquitted in Session Trial No. 719 of 2010 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC; accused-respondent Punit Sharma has been acquitted in Session Trial No. 132 of 2011 under Sections 411 and 414 IPC; accused-respondent Punit has been acquitted in Session Trial No. 720 of 2010 under Section 25 Arms Act.
(2.) Keeping in view the contention as raised by learned A.G.A. at the bar of this Court and keeping in view of the grounds taken in the memo of appeal, the court proceeds to examine the matter of the case, the findings as recorded by the lower court with the purpose of verifying as to whether the findings are based on evidence on record or not. The finding and the observation of the Court are being extracted hereinbelow:
(3.) Reference may be made to the recent judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Bannareddy & Ors. vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors, 2018 5 SCC 790, wherein the Apex Court has held as under: 11. Before we proceed further to peruse the finding of the High Court, it is relevant to discuss the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal. It is well settled principle of law that the High Court should not interfere in the well reasoned order of the trial court which has been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High Court should give due regard to the findings and the conclusions reached by the trial court unless strong and compelling reasons exist in the evidence itself which can dislodge the findings itself. This principle has further been elucidated in the case of Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 11 SCC 186, para 13, wherein this Court observed that: "The High Court will interfere in appeals against acquittals, only where the trial court makes wrong assumptions of material facts or fails to appreciate the evidence properly. If two views are reasonably possible from the evidence on record, one favouring the accused and one against the accused, the High Court is not expected to reverse the acquittal merely because it would have taken the view against the accused had it tried the case. The very fact that two views are possible makes it clear that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and consequently the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. 12. It is not in dispute that the presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened against the acquitted accused by the judgment in his favor. [Vide Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh vs. Republic of India, 2011 2 SCC 490 in para. 94]. 27. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the prosecution was not able to establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the High Court should not have re-appreciated evidences in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities. No specific assertion could be proved regarding the role and involvement of the accused persons. Further, certain actions of the victim-respondents themselves are dubious, for instance admitting themselves later in a Multi-speciality hospital without proper cause. It has further come to our notice that respondents have already compromised and have executed a compromise deed to that extent, though the same is not the basis for our conclusion.;