Salil Kumar Rai, J. - (1.) Heard counsels for the petitioner and respondent No.1. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are represented by the Standing Counsel.
(2.) The petitioner and respondent No.1 are brothers, both being sons of one Arjun Singh.
(3.) During the consolidation operations held in the village, there was a dispute between family members and agnates of Arjun Singh regarding different agricultural holdings situated in the village and objections were filed under Section 9-A (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1953'). Subsequently, a compromise was entered into between different parties to the dispute and it was prayed before the Consolidation Officer that objections may be decided in terms of compromise. The relevant paragraphs of the compromise which affect the petitioner and respondent No. 1 are reproduced below:- Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. The aforesaid compromise was signed on 22.6.1981. It is relevant to note that the said compromise was signed by respondent No.1 and Sri Arjun Singh but was not signed by the petitioner. However, a perusal of the relevant extract of the compromise reproduced above shows that the petitioner and his property were also part of the compromise. The aforesaid compromise was verified by the Consolidation Officer and an order was passed directing that revenue records be modified in terms of the compromise. The order of Consolidation Officer was transcribed on the relevant records including CH Form-23 and consequently the petitioner was recorded a co-tenure holder with respondent no. 1 in Khata Nos. 35 and 52 situated in Village Narottampur and Khata No. 50 situated in Village Paniyara. The aforesaid alterations were made in the records on 21.7.1981. The said fact would be evident from CH Form-23 which has been annexed as Annexure No.2 to the writ petition. Subsequently on 22.6.1985, respondent No.2 filed an application under Section 42-A of the Act before the concerned Consolidation Officer i.e. respondent No.4 stating that the name of petitioner was erroneously typed in paragraph No. 3-Ka of the compromise and the petitioner was not entitled to be recorded as a co-tenure holder along with respondent No.1 in Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50. It was stated that the petitioner had not signed any compromise dated 22.6.1981 and had also not filed objections during the consolidation operations even though respondent No.1 was recorded as the sole tenure holder of aforesaid Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50 and, therefore, merely on the basis of compromise the petitioner was not entitled to be recorded as a co-tenure holder with respondent No.1 in Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50. The Consolidation Officer i.e. respondent No.4 vide his order dated 28.6.1985 allowed the application of respondent No.1 and directed that the name of petitioner be deleted from the revenue records relating to Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50. The aforesaid order was passed by the Consolidation Officer ostensibly under Section 42-A of the Act and after issuing notices to the petitioner and Sri Arjun Singh and after recording their alleged statements admitting the case of respondent No.1. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a recall application on 2.6.1992 before respondent No.1 praying that the order dated 28.6.1985 be recalled claiming that he came to know about the aforesaid order on 1.6.1992 and alleged that no notices on the application of respondent no. 1 were issued either to him or Sri Arjun Singh and respondent No.1 had got the alleged statements of petitioner and Sri Arjun Singh, whereby they had allegedly admitted the case of respondent no. 1, recorded through an imposter and thus the order dated 28.6.1985 was obtained by fraud. The application dated 2.6.1992 filed by the petitioner was dismissed by respondent No.1 vide his order dated 29.5.1995 holding that the same was highly belated and beyond time. Against the aforesaid order dated 29.5.1995, the petitioner filed an appeal before Settlement Officer of Consolidation i.e. respondent No.3 which was registered as Appeal No.2932 and also filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act before respondent No.2 which was registered and numbered as Revision No.595/888/111/705/ 1114. While the aforesaid Revision No.595/888/111/705/1114 was pending before respondent No.2, the respondent No.3 vide his judgment and order dated 27.1.1996 dismissed Appeal No. 2932. Against the judgment and order dated 27.1.1996 passed by respondent No.3, the petitioner filed a Revision before respondent No.2 under Section 48 of the Act which was numbered as Revision No. 594/889/110/820/1267. Revision Nos. 595/888/111/705/1114 and 594/889/110/820/1267 were connected and heard together by respondent No.2 who vide his judgment and order dated 10.5.2001 dismissed Revision Nos. 595/888/111/705/1114 and 594/889/110/820/1267. The respondent No.2 dismissed Revision Nos. 595/888/111/705/ 1114 and 594/889/110/820/1267 on the ground that the petitioner had not filed any objections against the entries in the revenue records relating to the basic year wherein respondent No.1 was recorded as the sole tenure holder of Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50 and therefore petitioner could not be recorded as a co-tenure holder of the aforesaid plots/khatas on the basis of any compromise entered into between different parties. The other ground stated by respondent No.2 while dismissing Revision Nos. 595/888/111/705/1114 and 594/889/110/820/ 1267 is that the petitioner had not made any attempt before the Consolidation Officer to get his alleged signatures on the statements, allegedly recorded before the Consolidation Officer in the proceedings which culminated in the order dated 28.6.1985, verified by experts. In their impugned orders, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have also held that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer was within his jurisdiction as the Consolidation Officer had exercised his powers under Section 42-A of the Act. The orders dated 28.6.1985, 27.1.1996 and 10.5.2001 passed by respondent No.4, 3 and 2 respectively are under challenge in the present writ petition. [4] It has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 28.6.1985 passed by the Consolidation Officer was without jurisdiction as the application dated 22.6.1985 filed by respondent No.1 was not maintainable under Section 42-A of the Act and the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to modify their orders passed in any proceedings under Section 9-A (2) of the Act after the said proceedings had become final. It has been contended by counsel for the petitioner that respondent nos. 3 and 2 in their orders dated 27.1.1996 and 10.5.2001 have wrongly held that the application filed by respondent no. 1 was maintainable under Section 42-A of the Act and the order passed by Consolidation Officer was within his jurisdiction. The counsel for the petitioner contended that for the aforesaid reasons the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and the writ petition is liable to be allowed. Rebutting the contention of counsel for the petitioner, counsel for respondent No.1 has argued that as the name of petitioner No.1 was erroneously recorded in the compromise application dated 22.6.1981 and was a mere typing error therefore the consolidation authorities had the power to modify their orders under Section 42-A of the Act. It has been contended by counsel for respondent No.1 that the recital in paragraph No.3-Ka of the compromise deed to the effect that the petitioner shall also be recorded as a co-tenure holder with respondent No.1 in Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50 is an error which is apparent on the face of record as the petitioner had not filed any objections under Section 9-A of the Act to the entries in the revenue records of the basic year relating to Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50. Counsel for respondent No.1 has argued that the orders dated 28.6.1985, 27.1.1996 and 10.5.2001 passed by respondent No.4, 3 and 2 respectively are according to law and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. [5] I have considered the rival submissions of counsel for the parties and perused the records. [6] The issue in the present writ petition is regarding the scope of Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 and whether the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are within their jurisdiction and within the scope of Section 42-A of the Act, 1953. Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 is reproduced hereinbelow :- "42A. Correction of clerical or arithmetical errors. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion, or on the application of any person interested, correct the same." In order to exercise powers under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 the Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer of Consolidation should be satisfied that (i) there is a clerical or arithmetical error, (ii) the said clerical or arithmetical error should be apparent on the face of the record and (iii) that the said error should exist in any document prepared under any provision of the Act, 1953. "42A. Correction of clerical or arithmetical errors. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion, or on the application of any person interested, correct the same." In order to exercise powers under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 the Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer of Consolidation should be satisfied that (i) there is a clerical or arithmetical error, (ii) the said clerical or arithmetical error should be apparent on the face of the record and (iii) that the said error should exist in any document prepared under any provision of the Act, 1953. [7] It would be appropriate to refer to certain judgements of this Court dealing with the ambit of Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 and the Supreme Court dealing with the powers of the Courts while correcting the alleged clerical or arithmetical errors in their judgements. [8] This Court in Smt. Hajur Kaur Vs. Sardar Ranjeet Singh,2009 108 RevDec 20 has held that Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 is equivalent to Section 152 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as, 'C.P.C.') which also provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgements, decrees or orders or errors arising from any accidental slip or omission by the Court. [9] Meaning of clerical or arithmetical mistake was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Master Construction Company (P) Ltd Vs. State Of Orissa And Another, 1966 3 SCR 99. In its aforesaid judgement, while dealing with Rule 83 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, the Supreme Court held that an arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation while clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing and the mistake could be attributed to the Judge himself. In the said judgement the Court also held that an error apparent on the face of record would not depend for its discovery, on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (at Page No. 102 of the reports) is reproduced below :- "Rule 83 provides a summary remedy within a narrow compass. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under this rule is limited and is confined only to the correction of mistakes or omissions mentioned therein. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation; a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. There is another qualification namely, such an error, shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the court. The obvious instance is a slip or omission to embody in the order something which the court in fact ordered to be done. This is sometimes described as a decretal order not being in accordance with the judgment. 'But the slip or omission may be attributed to the Judge himself. He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be the Judge's inadvertence or the, advocate's mistake. But, however wide the said expressions are construed, they cannot countenance a re-argument on merits on questions of fact or law, or permit a party to raise new arguments which he has not advanced at the first instance. If that, was. the scope of Rule 83, the question is, whether the Commissioner's order is within its scope." "Rule 83 provides a summary remedy within a narrow compass. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under this rule is limited and is confined only to the correction of mistakes or omissions mentioned therein. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation; a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. There is another qualification namely, such an error, shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the court. The obvious instance is a slip or omission to embody in the order something which the court in fact ordered to be done. This is sometimes described as a decretal order not being in accordance with the judgment. 'But the slip or omission may be attributed to the Judge himself. He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be the Judge's inadvertence or the, advocate's mistake. But, however wide the said expressions are construed, they cannot countenance a re-argument on merits on questions of fact or law, or permit a party to raise new arguments which he has not advanced at the first instance. If that, was. the scope of Rule 83, the question is, whether the Commissioner's order is within its scope." [10] Subsequently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dwarka Das Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, 1999 AIR(SC) 1031, while dealing with the ambit of Section 152 of C.P.C., deprecated the tendency of the Civil Courts to liberally construe and exercise their powers under Section 152 of C.P.C. and thereyby modify, alter or add to the terms of original judgment, decree or order. In the aforesaid judgement, the Supreme Court held that Section 152 of C.P.C. contemplates only correction of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate passing of effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The relevant extract from paragraph No. 6 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced below:- "Section 152 C.P.C. provides for correction of clerical arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The correction contemplated are of correcting only accidental omission or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, how erroneous that may be." "Section 152 C.P.C. provides for correction of clerical arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The correction contemplated are of correcting only accidental omission or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, how erroneous that may be." [11] Similarly, the Supreme Court again in Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph Coelho, 2001 4 SCC 181 also held that under Section 152 of C.P.C., and in the garb of correction of clerical and arithmetical errors, the Courts do not get the power to have a second thought over the matter and to find that a better order or decree could or should be passed. It was held by the Supreme Court that while exercising their powers to correct clerical or arithmetical errors, the Courts should not re-consider the merits of the case. The relevant extract from paragraph No. 14 of the Judgement of Supreme Court which incorporates the above axiom is reproduced below :- "As a matter of fact such inherent powers would generally be available to all courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 C.P.C. may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding. In a matter where it is clear that something which the Court intended to do but the same was accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it would only advance the ends of justice to enable the Court to rectify such mistake. But before exercise of such power the Court must be legally satisfied and arrive at a valid finding that the order or the decree contains or omits some thing which was intended to be otherwise that is to say while passing the decree the court must have in its mind that the order or the decree should be passed in a particular manner but that intention is not translated into the decree or order due to clerical, arithmetical error or accidental slip. The facts and circumstances may provide clue to the fact as to what was intended by the court but unintentionally the same does not find mention in the order or the judgment or something which was not intended to be there stands added to it. The power of rectification of clerical, arithmetical errors or accidental slip does not empower the court to have a second thought over the matter and to find that a better order or decree could or should be passed. There should not be re-consideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake does not permit its rectification in exercise of Courts inherent powers as contained under Section 152 C.P.C. It is to be confined to something initially intended but left out or added against such intention." "As a matter of fact such inherent powers would generally be available to all courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 C.P.C. may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding. In a matter where it is clear that something which the Court intended to do but the same was accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it would only advance the ends of justice to enable the Court to rectify such mistake. But before exercise of such power the Court must be legally satisfied and arrive at a valid finding that the order or the decree contains or omits some thing which was intended to be otherwise that is to say while passing the decree the court must have in its mind that the order or the decree should be passed in a particular manner but that intention is not translated into the decree or order due to clerical, arithmetical error or accidental slip. The facts and circumstances may provide clue to the fact as to what was intended by the court but unintentionally the same does not find mention in the order or the judgment or something which was not intended to be there stands added to it. The power of rectification of clerical, arithmetical errors or accidental slip does not empower the court to have a second thought over the matter and to find that a better order or decree could or should be passed. There should not be re-consideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake does not permit its rectification in exercise of Courts inherent powers as contained under Section 152 C.P.C. It is to be confined to something initially intended but left out or added against such intention." [12] In Smt. Meera Bhanja Vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, 1995 AIR(SC) 455 the Supreme Court while explaining the meaning of the phrase error 'apparent on the face of record' in relation to the powers of writ courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power of Review as provided in Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. held that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. In Paragraph No. 8 of the aforesaid judgement, the Supreme Court held as under :- "8...Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxmi Narayan Hegde and Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale , wherein K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the power of the superior Court to issue such a writ." "8...Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxmi Narayan Hegde and Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale , wherein K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the power of the superior Court to issue such a writ." [13] In Shobhnath Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation,1989 RevDec 45 this Court held that Section 42-A of the Act does not envisage investigation into question of title and in Sukhan and Another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2003 95 RevDec 717 this Court held in paragraph No. 8 of the aforesaid judgement that the accidental, slip or omission i.e. clerical or arithmetical error in the judgement must be attributed to the Judge himself. [14] A reading of the aforesaid judgements show that under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, as the case may be, are empowered to correct only a mistake of calculation or a mistake in writing or typing and the aforesaid error should be evident by mere looking at the record and should not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Further, the aforesaid provision does not empower the concerned Consolidation Authorities to re-investigate questions of title or rehear the merits of the case and modify, alter or add to the terms of the original judgment. Most importantly, the clerical or arithmetical error should be attributed to the Judge (in the present case the concerned Consolidation Authorities) himself and should relate to any document prepared under any Provisions of the Act. Consequently while exercising their powers under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953 the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer are not empowered to permit any person to correct, modify or amend any document or record prepared or produced by the said person in any case and subsequently modify, their orders either consequent to such corrections or otherwise. [15] Through the impugned order dated 28.6.1985, the Consolidation Officer has modified the previous order which finalised the proceedings in terms of compromise dated 22.6.1981 and has, in effect and for all purposes, corrected the compromise application dated 22.6.1981 filed by the parties in the case. The compromise application dated 22.6.1981 was not a document prepared under the Provisions of the Act and any alleged error in the aforesaid document cannot be attributed to the Consolidation Authorities. Further, a perusal of the impugned order as well as pleadings of the parties and records annexed with the writ petition and different affidavits filed in the case show that while dealing with the application filed by respondent No. 1, ostensibly under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953, respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 had entered into an inquiry in the title of the petitioner regarding Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50 as the prayer of respondent No. 1 for correction of the original order passed by the Consolidation Officer was made on the basis that the petitioner had not filed any objections before the Consolidation Officer regarding entries in the Revenue records and he was not a co-tenure holder of the plots included in the aforesaid Khatas. It is evident that while passing the impugned order dated 28.6.1985, the Consolidation Officer has altered and modified his previous order dated 22.6.1981, a power which he did not have under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953. [16] There is another aspect of the case. The compromise dated 22.6.1981 was admittedly not signed by the petitioner. However, the shop of the petitioner was made a part of the compromise and the petitioner was divested of his ownership over the said shop through the aforesaid compromise and, in lieu of, was given rights over certain plots including co-tenureship over Khata Nos. 35, 50 and 52. The aforesaid compromise was initially not binding on the petitioner. However, petitioner did not object to the said compromise and allowed the said compromise to be implemented thereby loosing his right over the shop which was under the exclusive ownership and possession of the petitioner. The said compromise was signed by agnates of petitioner, respondent No. 1 and other tenure holders who apparently claimed their rights in the properties recorded solely in the name of respondent No. 1 and had filed their objections under Section 9-A (2)of the Act, 1953. Through the compromise, the said tenure holders may have relinquished their claim over the plots recorded solely in the name of respondent No. 1 in the Revenue records in lieu of petitioner relinquishing his claim over the shop which was under his exclusive ownership and possession. The act of the petitioner in allowing the compromise to be implemented and thereby abandoning his claim over the shop which was in his exclusive ownership and possession may have persuaded the agnates of petitioner and respondent No. 1 to relinquish their claim over Khata Nos. 35, 52 and 50 of which the respondent No. 1 was recorded as the sole tenure holder in the Revenue records. In that view of the matter, any alteration or modification in the said compromise could not have been allowed by the Consolidation Authorities without the consent of all the parties to the compromise and without taking evidence on the issue. Further, the aforesaid could have been done by the Consolidation Authorities only in regular proceedings under the Act, for example in an Appeal filed against the order dated 22.6.1981 passed by Consolidation Officer accepting the compromise, and not in any proceedings instituted under Section 42-A of the Act, 1953. However the Consolidation Officer, through his impugned order, has modified the compromise without the consent and signatures of all the parties to the compromise. [17] In view of the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 28.6.1985 passed by Consolidation Officer as well as orders dated 27.1.1996 and 10.5.2001 passed by respondent Nos. 4 and 3 upholding the aforesaid order are illegal and without jurisdiction and are hereby quashed. [18] Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs.;