- (1.) AMITAVA Lala, J. State Government has filed this writ petition challenging the order impugned dated 18th February, 2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad in Original Application No. 502 of 2007 (Vijay Varshney Vs. The Union of India and others) on the ground that the dispute relates to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter in short called as the 'act, 1988') and filing of the first information report (hereinafter in short called as 'f. I. R. ') in consequence thereof. Hence, consideration of the cause by the Central Administrative Tribunal as per the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter in short called as the 'act, 1985') is beyond its competency.
(2.) ACCORDING to the respondents, the proceeding/s may be of criminal nature in pursuance of filing of F. I. R. but it concerns service of an employee which squarely covers under Section 14 of the Act, 1985. Section 14 of the Act, 1985 speaks about the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect of the 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' and 'all service matters'. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is not only confined to recruitment and all service matters but also concerning to recruitment which is, otherwise, wide in nature. According to us, the rule of ejusdem generis is that where particular words are followed in general, the general words should not be construed in their widest sense but should be held as applying to objects, persons or things or the same general nature or class as those specifically enumerated, unless, of course, there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. For example, in case of any lapse on the part of an employee two sets of proceedings can simultaneously run, i. e. one is departmental proceeding and the other is criminal proceeding. But both are independent in nature. If one is exonerated under one law, he can not be said to be exonerated from both as a matter of course but under the proceeding available as per law. In other words, one can be exonerated by following the process independently under both the laws. When particular words pertaining to a class of genus are followed by general words, the latter, namely, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This is known as the rule of ejusdem generis reflecting an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words. This principle applies particularly in five types of disputes i. e. when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general terms follow the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. This principle is clearly specified in 1996 (1) SCC 95 (Housing Board of Haryana Vs. Haryana Housing Board Employees' Union and others ). Both in 2002 Lab. I. C. 4 (Smt. Babli and another etc. Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others) and 2003 Lab. I. C. 1043 (Union of India Vs. R. K. Pathania) it has been held how far an administrative tribunal can go. In the first case i. e. Housing Board of Haryana (supra), jurisdiction of the tribunal in respect of the claim for allotment or regularisation of government accommodation was considered, which, according to the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunal to decide the issue unless such claim is shown to be a condition of service. The tribunal can not assume the jurisdiction where eviction action is taken for unauthorised occupation. Similarly, in the second case i. e. Smt. Babli (supra) the question of overstaying of a government officer and what would be the damage about overstaying in a government quarter was considered and it was held that resolving of such dispute is outside the purview of the administrative tribunals. The administrative tribunals were formed under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 03rd January, 1977. It categorically states that the tribunal will adjudicate disputes and complaints with regard to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services. This power was given to the tribunal curtailing the jurisdiction of the writ Court of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to minimise the load of service jurisprudence. Initially the order could have been challenged before the Supreme Court but by virtue of the judgement and order of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125, now it can also be challenged in the Division Bench of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Thus, the Central Administrative Tribunal is the Court of first instance.
(3.) IT is true to say that the power of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is enormous in nature, which has been curtailed by virtue of Article 323-A of the Constitution and given to the Central Administrative Tribunal, but sky is not the limit to construe as such. As the power is high, preservation of the power is higher than that. Unnecessarily the jurisdiction of the tribunal can not be widened to interfere with it. The Central Administrative Tribunal can not assume its competency to frustrate the action, if any, under the later Act i. e. the Act, 1988. Section 14 of the earlier Act i. e. Act, 1985 is independent of such Act. Moreover, when later Act was implemented, the legislature was fully cautious about the applicability of the Act, 1985. Hence, intention of the legislature of the subsequent Act can not be frustrated in the manner as proposed under the order impugned. Moreover, any order to be passed by the Court under the Act, 1988 is appealable and revisable as per the power conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court. Therefore, such power can not be regulated by the Central Administrative Tribunal by the Act, 1985. Hence, in totality the order impugned dated 18th February, 2008 can not be sustained and is hereby set aside. Interim order passed by this Court on 30th July, 2008 stands confirmed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, however, without imposing any cost. .;