- (1.) SUDHIR Agarwal, J. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel.
(2.) THE petitioner was transferred from civil police to armed police by the order passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jhansi Range, Jhansi on 19. 4. 1989. It is not disputed thatthe said order was carried out in 1989 and si?ce then the petitioner is working in Armed Police. THE present writ petition has been filed in 2008 and the petitioner has sought to explain laches of almost nineteen years by stating that in the year 2007 he made a representation to the higher authorities which has been rejected on 1. 3. 2008 and, therefore, he is not guilty of laches and this petition should be entertained by this Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that a constable who has worked for less than ten years can only be transferred from Civil Police to Armed Police as contemplated in para 525 of U. P. Police Regulations and any transfer contrary thereto is illegal in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Jasveer Singh v. State of U. P, 2008 (1) ESC 158 (SC): 2008 (2) ADJ 484 SC and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled for simiiar treatment. In my view, the submission is thoroughly misconceived and even otherwise does not warrant any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was admit-tedly transferred in the present case on 9. 3. 1989 by D. l. G, Jhansi Range, Jhansi. Ex facie, Regulation 525 was not attracted at alt. there is no provision which provides that a person cannot be continued in armed police beyond a particular period and nothing has been placed before this Court. So far as challenge to the order dated 9. 3. 1989 is concerned, ex-facie, the petitioner is guilty of undue delay and laches which are relevant factors in exercising equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Following the cases of Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and others, 2004 (1) SCC 347 and Chairman, U. P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2006 ( 11) SCC 464, the Apex Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others, JT 2007 (4) SC 253, observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In M/s Upton India Ltd. andothers. Union of India and others, Jt 1994 (6) SC 71 and M. R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 1995 (5) SCC 628 it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. AIR 1961 SC 993, it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa v. Pyari Mohan Samantaray and others, AIR 1976 SC 2617 and State of rissa and others v. Arun Kumar Patnaik and others, 1976 (3) SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed recently in Shiv Dass v. Union of India and others, AIR 2007 SC 1330: 2007 (1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra ). Si?ce the order impugned in the writ petition is of 1989 and has been challenged after more than 19 years,i do not find itafit case warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is guilty of undue long delay and laches which has not been satisfactory explained. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. .;