SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. - (1.) PETITIONER , Daman Singh aggrieved by the order dated 18.8.2008 whereby he has been dismissed from service pursuant to his conviction by the Court of Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur in Sessions Trial No. 1331 of 1995, under sections 364-A, 365, 357 and 346 IPC, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing the present writ petition. It is the own case of the petitioner that he was initially appointed as Class IV employee in District Co-operative Bank Limited, Kanpur and promoted to the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier on 30.8.1988. He was impli­cated in a criminal case under sections 363/364/364-A/365/342/367/323/504/506/ 387/406/411/358/468/171, 120-B IPC and 25 Arms Act, 357 and 346 IPC and was tried in Sessions Trial No. 1331 of 1995, in the Court of Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar who vide judgment dated 29.6.2002 convicted him and sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for life. The peti­tioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 2654 of 2002, wherein this Court while admitting the appeal on 9.7.2002, suspended sentence during the pendency of the appeal and the petitioner was released on bail Realisation of fine was also stayed. The petitioner was issued a show-cause notice on account of the aforesaid conviction by the respondent and thereafter the impugned order has been passed.
(2.) THE sole contention advanced be­fore this Court by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that once the sentence and fine has been stayed by this Court in appeal filed against the judgment of conviction and sentence, the petitioner cannot be dismissed on account of the aforesaid con­viction since the matter is pending before the Appellate Court. However, this Court finds it diffi­cult to subscribe the aforesaid view. Regu­lation 85 (ii) of U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1995 em­powers termination of an employee if he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude and reads as under:- 85. "(ii) (a) Where an employee is dismissed or removed from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the employee has absconded and his whereabouts are not known to the society for more than three months, or (c) where the employee refuses or fails without sufficient cause to appear before the Inquiring Officer when specifically called upon in writing to appear; or (d) where it is otherwise (for reasons to be recorded) not possible to communicate with him, the compe­tent authority may award appro­priate punishment without taking or continuing disciplinary proceed­ings."
(3.) THE mere fact that sentence pur­suant to criminal case or the judgment has been stayed in appeal, in my view would not deprive the competent authority to pass an appropriate order under Regula­tion 85 (ii) inasmuch as the effect of con­viction of criminal charge involving moral turpitude is sufficient to empower a dis­ciplinary authority to pass appropriate or­der under the aforesaid Regulation. Whether the punishment enforced by the Criminal Court is operating or not, is of no relevance for exercise of power under Regulation 85 (ii) which is to be examined in respect to conduct led to conviction. In the case in hand, the conviction of the peti­tioner has not been stayed and it is only the sentence which has been stayed. Jurisdic­tion of the disciplinary authority to pass appropriate order under Regulation 85 (ii) emanates from the fact as to whether the employee has been convicted or not and has nothing to do with the question as to whether he has been sentenced or whether the sentence is executable or stayed.;