SANJAY MISRA, J. - (1.) HEARD learned Counsel for the petitioner and perused the records. None appears on behalf of the respondents.
(2.) THE petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 17.11.1995 (Annexure 4-A to the writ petition) whereby the respondent No. 1 has declared successful the officers mentioned therein for promotion from Scale I to Officers Scale II w.e.f. 17.11.1995. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the reprimand given to the petitioner by the order dated 22.8.1994 could not have been considered while considering the promotion of the petitioner particularly when the candidate mentioned at SI. No. 14 of the impugned order Sri Ajay Kumar Khatri (respondent No. 3) was junior to the petitioner and was granted promotion. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the reprimand order against the petitioner could not be considered while considering his promotion also in view of the fact that in the case of another employee by the name of Chottey Lal he was also given a reprimand, however, in spite of the same he was granted promotion. As such, he states that the impugned order insofar as the promotion of respondent No. 3 Sri Ajay Kumar Khatri is concerned requires to be set aside. He further states that the respondent No. 3 has got certain relations with the Chairman of the Bank and therefore, also his promotion requires to be set aside since the petitioner has been superseeded for extraneous considerations. The aforesaid submission has been raised and it has been alleged that the impugned order promoting the respondent No. 3 is based on prejudice and bias as also is malafide insofar as the supersession of the petitioner is concerned. He also states that a minor punishment of reprimand could not be taken into account and further only three years previous record of the employee is to be considered for promotion in the present case. According to him, the respondents have denied the promotion to the petitioner only on the ground of the order of reprimand given to him. Having considered the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner and perused the record, it will be seen that the penalties which can be imposed upon an officer of the bank as has been provided in the Kashi Gramin Bank Staff Services Regulations is also a reprimand. While considering the promotion of an employee, the record of the past three years is required to be considered and in case a minor punishment has been given, the same is also a part of the service record and there is no bar in law for not considering such punishment awarded to an employee while considering his case for promotion. Admittedly, the criteria for promotion as applicable in the present case is on the basis of seniority plus suitability. The respondents have in the counter affidavit clearly stated that the order of the disciplinary authority reprimanding the petitioner was passed on 22.8.1994 and the promotion has been considered and a final order releasing the list of employees granted promotion to Officers Scale II w.e.f. 17.11.1995 has been issued on the same date. The respondents State that although the order is appealable, under Regulation 31, however the petitioner has chosen not to avail the remedy provided under the Regulations and approached this Court directly. For the purpose of promotion, it is clear that an assessment has to be made of the work of the employee and it has to be determined as to whether he is fit and suitable to be promoted. In a case where there is an order of reprimand, such order is also to be taken into consideration if it was given within three years of such consideration. Admittedly, the order of reprimand which is part of his service record was passed on 22.8.1994 and the consideration for promotion was made on or before 17.11.1995 which is within a period of three years. Such reprimand existed on the service record of the petitioner which is also a consideration for assessment of the work of the petitioner to adjudge his suitability. The respondents have also relied upon a circular dated 1.11.1987 for the very same purpose. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of reprimand was passed relating to an incident of 1986 and therefore, it is beyond the period of three years cannot be accepted since admittedly the order was passed on 22.8.1994 and that was the order available on the service record which was also to be considered while considering the promotion of the petitioner. Once the authority has found the petitioner to be unfit or suitable to be promoted, this Court in its writ jurisdiction would not reassess the service record of the petitioner and make its own assessment to the exclusion of the disciplinary competent authority. A perusal of the entire writ petition indicates that the averments are with respect to the justification that the order of reprimand should not have been passed. Such order of reprimand is not under challenge before this Court and therefore, insofar as the impugned order promoting the respondent No. 3 is concerned, the same has not been successfully challenged by the petitioner in this petition.
(3.) CERTAIN allegations of malafide prejudice and bias have also been averrred in this writ petition against higher authorities of the Bank. In the array of parties no such person against whom the allegations have been made is arrayed on a party. In order to consider allegations of malafide, prejudice or bias there should be specific and detailed averments made. In this petition the averments on the said allegations are totally vague and the Court on the basis of such vague averments cannot record a finding on such allegations. The law is settled that onus to prove malafide is on the person who alleges it. Malafides alleged must not be vague and the person against whom it is alleged must be made a party. In the absence of the above two requirements the said allegations cannot be considered by the Court in this writ petition.;