GURDAYAL SARAN PRASAD Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE DEHRADUN
LAWS(ALL)-1997-7-24
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on July 31,1997

GURDAYAL SARAN PRASAD Appellant
VERSUS
DISTRICT JUDGE DEHRADUN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) J. C. Gupta, J. Heard the petitioner's counsel as well as Sri Shakti Swaroop Nigam for the respondents.
(2.) BY means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of the Additional District Judge dated 1-7-81 whereby petitioner's suit for ejectment and mesneprofit has been dismissed. Undisputedly petitioner filed suit for rent and ejectment after serving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Proper ty Act on respondent No. 3 whereby her tenancy was terminated. The trial Court decreed the suit for rent as well as for eject ment. The revisional Court, however, set aside the judgment of the lower Court so far as it related to the decree of ejectment. The only point for consideration in this writ petition is whether the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Proper ty Act served by the petitioner on the respondent was a valid notice. The revisional Court has taken the view that since it was admitted to the petitioner-landlord himself that during the life time of his mother, he (plaintiff) realized rent from the defendant/tenant on behalf of his mother and after her death, he realized the rent for himself as well as for his brothers and sisters, the plaintiff was not the sole owner-landlord of the disputed accom modation and he alone was not entitled to terminate the tenancy of the defendant by sending a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and with these findings suit for ejectment has been dismissed. It is also borne out from the judg ment that the notice of termination was not sent by the brothers and sisters of the plain tiff nor the notice in question was alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff on behalf of other co-lessors namely, plaintiffs brothers and sisters. In the suit also none of the plaintiff's brothers and sisters were im-pleaded as parties. In the case of Tara Chand v. Vishambhar Nath, 1981 ARC 688; it was held that the notice should be given by all the landlords and they should all join in the suit. That will apply not only to a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Proper ty Act but also to a notice under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. If notice did not fulfil this requirement the same was not valid to bring suit for ejectment. In another case of Hira Lal Jasrapuri v. IHrd Additional District Judge, Gorakhpurand others, 1982 (1) ARC 117; it was held that unless the other co-landlords were impleaded as defendants in the suit filed by one of the co-landlords alone, even a decree for arrears of rent could not be passed. In that case reliance was placed on the decision in P. K. Tandon v. Smt. Ganga Devi Rathor, 1969 ALJ 405. Similar view was also expressed in the case of Ganga Narain and another v. IXth A. D. J. , Kanpur and others, 1984 (1) ARC 342.
(3.) FROM the petitioner's side reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court decision in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak and others, AIR 1977 SC1599. This case was also referred before the revisional Court and the revisional Court has rightly distinguished this case, inasmuch as the definition of the word 'landlord' as given in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 materially differs from the definition as given in Section 2 (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act the said Section defines 'landlord' as under: "landlord means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would use and receive the rent, or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant. " The word 'tenant' was also defined to mean any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable. It was in the context of the above two definitions that the Supreme Court took the view that the co- heirs of a deceased-landlord constituted a body of the landlords and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them repre senting them all, was collecting rent for all practical purposes he was the landlord of the tenant. The position under the U. P. Act is, however, different because of the dif ferent language used while defining the word 'landlord in Section 3 (j) which runs as follows: "landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such persons. " Where a word or expression has been defined in a statute, the Courts have to read and accept its meaning as contained in the definition itself. It cannot add or substract any word to or from the meaning nor can it assign a meaning different from the one used in the definition on the ground of general understanding of the term.;


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