- (1.) S. R. Singh, J. Writ Petition No. 2368 of 1997 has been filed canvassing the legality and propriety of the order dated 10-9-1996 passed by the Labour Court, IV Kanpur thereby allowing the application moved by 4th respondent-K. D. Singh under Section 33- C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Another petition No. 15401 of 1997 dove-tailed to the aforestated petition, stems from proceedings instituted to en force obedience to the order which is the subject-matter of impugned in writ petition No. 2368 of 1997. Hence these two petitions have been lumped together and are being heard and decided as a composite case.
(2.) THE matrix of the case of respon dent-workman is that after induction as Sales representative, his salary was pegged at Rs. 535/- in the pay scale of Rs. 510-678 and later on, it was jacked up to Rs. 1400/- per month in the scale of Rs. 1400-2600 as a result of another revision in the scale. On his representation, the respondent workman was given selection grade in the pay scale of Rs. 1940-2900 with effect from 1-8-1987 vide order dated 10-1-1994. THE said order was passed by the Managing Director of the petitioner-Corporation. In his application under Section 33-C (2) the respondent staked claim to difference of salary already paid to him in the scale of Rs. 1400 2600 arid the salary he became entitled in the selection grade of pay as a result of the order dated 10th Jan. 1994, which is ex cerpted below for ready reference. @hindi The application claimed in being allowed by the Labour Court by means of the impugned order. Sri A. Kumar Mishra, appearing for the petitioner began his arguments, urging that in proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court was not competent to delve into the question as to whether the workman was entitled to be given the salary in the selection grade of Rs. 1940-2900/- and sans any adjudication by the Tribunal it was beyond the competence of the Labour Court to go into and allow the prayer referred by the respondent-workman under Section 33- C (2) of the Act. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not loaded with any substance or merits. The genesis of the claim of the respondent-workman for the difference be tween the salary paid to him and the one allowed to him by order dated 10th Jan. 1994 is traceable to an order of which the author was the Managing Director of the Corporation, thereby allowing the repre sentation preferred by the workman. By this reckoning, the order of the Managing Director dated 10-1-1994 was in existence on the date the Labour Court allowed the application. In this perspective, the Labour Court did not usurp the jurisdiction which it was not clothed with in law. The case was not one where the workman may have asked for a right to be granted to him by the Labour Court. It was a claim rooted in right ladled out by the employer vide order, dated 10th Jan. 1994. As such, the exercise of power by the Labour Court in the matter under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Dis putes Act cannot be demurred to. That apart, a perusal of the impugned order denotes that the technical pleas initially raised, were abjured during the course of arguments before the Labour Court.
(3.) IT was next contended by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the order dated 10-1-94 has since been over- ridden by order dated 20-1-1997. I am afraid, the order dated 20-1-97 cannot be taken notice of by the Court in that the application under Sec tion 33-C (2) was already allowed on 10-9-96. The reason is that the High Court while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution cannot, on the basis of any subsequent events, over reach the finality attaching to the order under Section 33-C (2 ). In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by L. Rs. [jt 1997 (4) SC 425], it has been held that the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 226/221 of the Constitution cannot interfere with an order by taking into account the events which might have happened subsequent to passing the order by a competent Court. The principle laid down therein would apply to the facts of this case in the context of 9-D Act as well. On the date the application under Section 33- C (2) was filed as well as on the date it was allowed by the Labour Court, the order dated 10th Jan 1994 was very much in existence and the order dated 20-1-1997 came to be passed during the pendency of the writ petition No. 2368 of 1997 which was presented in the Registry of the Court on 17-1-97. The Labour Court, in my opinion, was justified in allowing the ap plication filed by the workman under Sec tion 33-C of the Act. In the result, the petitions filed by the Employer-Corporation are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. .;