- (1.) S. P. Srivastava, J. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner chal lenging the order dated 20-1-90 passed by the District Judge, Allahabad, dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and rejecting the appeal as time barred.
(2.) THE brief facts for the purposes of the present writ petition are that on 30-4-88, the competent authority declared 148. 78 sq. meters of land as surplus land and directed proceeding under Sections 9 and 10 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred in short 'the Act', to commence for taking possession of the land declared surplus. It is stated that the order dated 30-4-88 passed by the competent authority was sent to the petitioner by means of Form-3 which was delivered to the petitioner on 2-8-88. It has been stated by the petitioner that the order dated 30-4-88 passed by respondent No. 2 was com municated to the petitioner by registered post and the same was received by the petitioner on 2-8-88. THE petitioner imme diately applied for certified copy of the judg ment on 6-8- 88 and the same was delivered on 22-12-88. It is stated that after receiving the certified copy, the petitioner contacted his lawyer for filing an appeal who told that limitation for filing the appeal was up to 16-1-89 but the appeal was filed by him on 10-1-89. THErefore, the appeal was well within time. THE petitioner has also stated that the appeal was reported to be beyond time by 254 days. THErefore, the petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the said appeal. It is further stated that no counter-affidavit Or objection was filed against the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, filed by the petitioner, even then respondent No. 1 dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limita tion Act which is illegal. A counter-affidavit has been filed in this case on behalf of the State. In para 10 of the counter- affidavit, reply of para 11 of the Writ petition has been given. In para 11 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated as under: "that it is stated that the intimation about the order dated 30- 4-88 passed by the opposite party No. 2 was communicated to the petitioner by registered post and the same was received by the petitioner on 2-8-88. The petitioner immedi ately applied for a certified copy of the aforesaid judgment on 6-8-88 and the same was delivered on 22-12-88. " The reply given by the State in the counter-affidavit is as under: "that in reply to the contents of paragraph 11 of the writ petition, it is stated that the case was taken up on 29-4-1988 and the counsel for the petitioner signed the order sheet, wherein it was stated that the case was adjourned for 30-4-1988 and on 30-4-1988 the impugned order was passed. Thus the petitioner had knowledge of the order and he ought to have applied for certified copy of the judgment but however, in compliance with Rule 5 of the Rules framed under the Act the petitioner received the intimation of the aforesaid judgment on 2-8-1988 and he applied thereafter. "
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has urged that the appellate authority has held that 30-4-88 shall be treated to be a date of Knowledge of the petitioner as on 29-4-88 both parties were present and argu ments were heard on merit and 30-4-88 was fixed for orders and the order-sheet dated J 29-4-88 bears the signature of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the law requires that appeal under Section 33 of the Act shall be filed within 30 days of the date on which the order is communi cated to the tenure-holder. His further con tention is that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after expiry of the said time if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in filing the appeal in time. His contention is that the date of communication is the relevant date for counting the period of limitation for filing the appeal and as the petitioner ad mittedly received communication on 2-8-88, the period of limitation will start from 2-8-88 and not from 29-4-88 when the mat ter was argued and 30-4-88 was fixed for judgment. Section 33 of the Act is relevant Section in which appeal is filed under the Act, which is quoted herein under: "any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under this Act, not being an order under Section 11 of an order under sub-section (1) of Section 30, may, within thirty days of the date on which the order is communi cated to him, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereafter in this section referred to as the appellate authority); Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appel lant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. " From the above Section it is clear that the date of communication is the relevant date. The point for consideration in the present case is whether the date on which learned counsel for the petitioner argued the case and signed the order-sheet noting down the date of order shall be treated to be the date of communication of the order to the petitioner as provided under Section 33 of the Act or the date on which the petitioner actually received the information through registered post from Ceiling Office i. e. 2-8-88. He is admitted in the counter- affidavit of the State, the mode of service of the notice has been indicated under Rule 5 etc. and the communication was made to the petitioner through registered post. The word 'communication' has not been defined in the Act itself, therefore, the dictionary meaning can be looked into. The word 'communication' has been interpreted by this Court in case of Om rakash v. State of U. P. through Collector, Shaharanpur and others, reported in 1989 A. W. C. page 1496. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted herein under: "the expression "communication" has not been defined statutorily. In case on such definition or meaning is available, the Dictionary meaning can be looked into with a view to look into the meaning in common parlance. In such matters the court has to be careful as a word is explained in the Dictionary in different sense. That meaning has to be selected which is relevant. Webster's Third New International Diction ary defines word "communicate" as follows: to make known, inform a person, to convey the knowledge or information of- According to Collings Cobuild, English Language Dictionary, the word "communicate" signifies, if you communicate another persons, it means to give them information. If you communi cate an idea or feeling, it means to make them aware of it. Communication is the activity or process of giving information to other people. " According to Reader's Digest Great En cyclopaedic Dictionary, the word 'communication means imparting news, information given. The aforesaid meaning of word 'communicate' may be. applied as required by Sec tion 33. If an order has been passed that has to be communicated to the person concerned i. e. the petitioner has to be informed. The information about the order has to be given to that person concerned. ";