- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. Mr. A. K. Misra, coun sel for the respondents, pressed his ap plication for vacating the stay order passed m the present writ petition which is op posed vehemently by Mr. M. D. Singh, Counsel for the petitioners. The vehemence in which both the counsels have argued their respective case and their laborious submissions left no stone un turned in support of their respective case on the merit itself while seeking to bring home their respective contentions. The hearing on the application for vacating interim order virtually was a full-fledged hearing on the merits and demerits of the respective case which fact was fairly con ceded by both the counsels and both of whom implored this Court to decide the main writ petition as well along with the disposal of the application for vacating the interim order and had agreed to address the Court on the merits of the case itself.
(2.) IN my view, decision on the applica tion for vacating the interim order would have the effect of deciding the case on merits itself and the argument advanced by both the counsels makes it reasonable to decide the case on merit. Thus the ques tions arise for consideration of this Court and this Court had proposed to decide the same in the manner hereinafter. The order dated 6th April, 1988 (Annexure-6) passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Joint Organisation, Meerut has since been challenged by means of the present writ petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner assails the said order on the ground of discrimina tion in violation of Article 14 of the Con stitution of India in so far as the petitioners and some other private individuals men tioned in the said order while exempting the properties of those persons refusing to exempt the properties of the petitioners from the acquisition of the land con cerned. According to the Counsel for the petitioners, the discrimination was wholly irrational and cannot be treated to be a rational classification or distinction be tween the two groups. His second conten tion was that the award having been pub lished after two years in terms of Section 11-A, the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. The learned Counsel for the respondents defended the case on the ground, first, that the award was published well within two years excluding the period during which the proceedings remained stayed by reason of the order passed by the Court, which fact he elaborated on the basis of the dates specified by him. Second ly be contended that since Section 17 (1) of the said Act was applied in the present case, Section 11-A does not have any man ner of application and even if the award is published after two years, the same does not have the effect of lapsing the acquisi tion. His third contention was that the petitioners having purchased the land long after the acquisition proceeding was in itiated and the notifications under Section 14 (1) read with section 17 (1) and the notification under Section 6 (1) were pub lished, the petitioners do not have and locus standi to assail the proceedings on that account. His fourth contention was that so far as the validity of the proceedings or the award is concerned, the same cannot be challenged by the petitioners since the same stood concluded by reason of the challenge to the acquisition thrown by the original owner stood dismissed in earlier proceedings and the petitioners having been claiming through the original owners on the ground of their stepping into the shoes of the former owner. His next con tention was that the points now raised could very well have been raised in the earlier proceedings by the original owner and the same having not been raised, the question is no more open to be raised by the transferees in view of principles of constructive res judicata. High other con tention is that there was no discrimination as alleged in the petition on the facts and circumstances of the case in the matter of exemption of some of the properties while not those of the petitioners and the same was based on rational classification and reasonable nomenclature.
(3.) IN reply, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that in the ear lier writ petition, the challenge was thrown to the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The question of exemp tion was not involved in the earlier proceedings. The award was never the sub ject-matter of challenge in the said proceedings. The persons exempted are also subsequent purchaser. According to him, Section 9 is not excluded by reason of Section 17 and possessions to be taken even when Section 17 is applied within 15 days of the notice under Section 9 and the land vests only when possession is taken and such possession is to be equal and not symbolic. Relying on Section 17 (3-A) the learned Counsel for the petitioners con tends that unless 80% payment is made before taking possession, the taking over of possession is illegal. He further contends that the Meerut Development Authority ('mda' for short) does not re quire the land for the purpose it was sought to be acquired since it is proposing to construct Hotel, Motel, Nursing Home etc. and thus the purpose having been frustrated, the exemption should have been allowed in the case of the petitioner as well. These submissions were opposed by the Counsel for respondents on the ground that it was not the award but a portion of the property was exempted by the said order from the award already made.;