S.K.PHAUJDAR, J. - (1.) IN this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution a tenant challenges the appellate order recorded against him under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short, the Act). The appellate order was recorded on 16.6.88 by the Addl. District Judge, Dehradun, in R.C. Appeal No. 112 of 1986. The appeal was preferred against an order of the prescribed authority passed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on 4.9.1986 in P.A. Case No. 116 of 1984.
(2.) ADMITTEDLY , the present petitioner had been a tenant in the premises in question in Dehradun. Initially, he was a tenant under Sri C.L. Gupta. The present respondent No. 2, Savita Saran, is a daughter of Sri C.L. Gupta. The father made a gift of the suit property to the daughter, Savita Saran, by the gift deed dated 7.5.1984. The daughter thereafter filed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the ground of bona fide personal necessity of herself and her family and desired that the tenant (present petitioner) be evicted from the premises. The Prescribed Authority rejected the prayer on the ground of absence of bona fide requirement, as also on a finding that the comparative hardship of the tenant was more than that of the landlord. On appeal, however, the Addl. District Judge set aside the aforesaid findings and allowed the application and directed eviction. On presentation of the writ petition, the order of eviction was stayed. The main ground on which the writ petition was moved was that Smt. Savita Saran received the property in gift from her father only on 7.5.1984 and she could not have made a prayer under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act within three years of acquiring the property. The learned Counsel laid stress on the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act to elaborate his point. He also raised a question that no notice as required under this proviso was ever served on the tenant. This was a factual plea and had not been raised on any earlier point of time. This plea may not be allowed to be raised at this stage. The learned Counsel engaged themselves on the true interpretation of the term 'purchase' as used in this proviso to Section 21. The petitioner proposed to interpret this term as any transfer inter vivos. It was argued that there was no reason to choose only one made of transfer in this proviso leaving aside all the other parallel modes. The learned Counsel for the petitioner made a reference to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (in short, the T.P. Act) to conclude that basically sale and gift are transfers of title. While in a sale there is passing of consideration, in a gift no material consideration passes hands. Gift is generally made keeping in consideration love and affection. He contended that a narrow meaning cannot given to the word 'purchase' only to mean a transaction associated with sale. He argued that the term purchase has not been defined either in the T.P. Act or under the Act and we get a definition of the term "sale" only. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court to submit that the prohibition of three years for entertainment of a release application in terms of Section 21 of the Act will apply from the date of purchase and not from the date on which the sale is registered. It was a transaction covering sale and purchase and title was transferred not through any other mode of transfer. This may not in any manner help us in interpreting the term purchase or to give any meaning to it wider than the meaning given in common parlance. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on a decision reported in 1996(1) ALR 41. It was again a case not touching the above controversy as the Allahabad High Court, in this case under reference held that in reversing an order passed by the prescribed authority the appellate Court had to reverse the findings recorded by him and if it is not done it was an error on the part of the appellate authority.
(3.) AS regards an interpretation of the word purchase the learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the text on Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell. He argued that if by the use of a clear and unequivocal word capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, however harsh or absurd or contrary to the common sense the result may be. This observation of the learned author finds place at page 20 of Maxwell's book, 1976 edition, in Chapter 1. The learned Counsel for the respondent further relied on a text on Interpretation of Statutes by Sri Jagdish Swarup. He referred to page 153 of the book, 1989 edition. Wherein the learned author had opined that the cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is that words should be read in their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider that in construing the word in the constitution conferring a legislative power, the most liberal construction should be put upon the word so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. The learned author further opined that if, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible to another meaning the Court may attach the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must attach the ordinary rule of interpretation. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit the plain words by consideration of policy behind the framing of the law.;