- (1.) HEARD counsel for the parties. The petitioner applied for eligibility certificate under section 4-A of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (briefly, "the Act") for a period of three years with effect from March 20, 1990, that is, the date of first sale. The eligibility certificate was granted by the respondent with effect from July 20, 1992 instead under the provisions of the Act saying that the petitioner failed to fulfil all the conditions on the date of first sale, inasmuch as there was no registered lease deed on March 20, 1990.
(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that an unregistered lease deed was executed on January 1, 1990 and thereafter a registered lease deed came to be executed on March 23, 1990. In the registered lease deed of March 23, 1990, the date of commencement of the period of the deed was not mentioned and, therefore, a supplementary deed was got executed on January 11, 1992. It is said that in the supplementary deed it was clearly stated that the registered lease deed of March 23, 1990 would commence from January 1, 1990. This is how the contention of the petitioner is that there was a proper registered lease deed on March 20, 1990, that is, the date of first sale. In the impugned order dated October 21, 1993, annexure 16 to the writ petition, rejecting the review application, the Divisional Level Committee (for short, "the Committee") rejected the contention of the petitioner saying that if there were any lease deed of January 1, 1990, then that would have been referred to in the registered lease deed of March 23, 1990. The case of the petitioner is that the lease deed of January 1, 1990 was produced before the notary and that was duly notarised on the same day and thereafter the petitioner paid rent by a crossed cheque dated January 31, 1990. Such contention has not been considered by the Committee in the impugned order and the Committee was swayed only by the reasoning that the deed dated January 1, 1990 was not referred to in the registered deed of March 23, 1990. Simply because the deed dated January 1, 1990 was not mentioned in the registered deed of March 23, 1990, no legal inference can be drawn that lease deed of January 1, 1990 was never executed. No doubt, reference to the deed dated January 1, 1990 in the subsequent deed of March 23, 1990 would have been a very good evidence to show that the deed dated January 1, 1990 was got executed, but absence of such reference does not exclude the possibility of the deed dated January 1, 1990 being executed. When the petitioner raised the contention that the deed dated January 1, 1990 was duly notarised by the notary and the rent was remitted by a crossed cheque, the Committee ought to have considered the same to come to the conclusion whether the deed dated January 1, 1990 existed. Another contention of the petitioner is that though the date of commencement of the lease was not mentioned in the registered lease deed dated March 23, 1990, the date of commencement was elaborated in the supplementary lease deed dated January 11, 1992 and if the deed dated March 23, 1990 and the supplementary deed dated January 11, 1992 are read together then that would show that the lease commenced with effect from January 1, 1990. This aspect has also not been considered by the Committee.
(3.) COUNSEL for the petitioner further urges that it is not necessary to get a single deed executed and there can be more than one lease deed to establish the lease. It is also urged that this question came up before this Court and was decided. Be that as it may we are not going into the legal effect of the two deeds being executed and we leave it open to the Committee to consider when such contention is raised before it by the petitioner. As the Committee failed to consider the vital questions, we have no option but to remit the case back to the Committee for reconsideration. On these facts, the petition succeeds and is allowed; the impugned order dated October 21, 1993, annexure 16 to the writ petition is quashed. The case is sent back to the Divisional Level Committee - respondent No. 2, who will decide the review application afresh in the light of the observations made above within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced by the petitioner before the Committee, who undertakes to produce the same within 10 days from today. Until decision on the review application, as aforesaid, the interim order dated January 13, 1994 will remain operative. If the petitioner fails to take steps, as aforesaid, then the stay order will stand discharged. Petition allowed. .;