- (1.) S. K. Phaujdar, J. Heard Sri B. K. Srivastava for the petitioner and learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for respon dents land.
(2.) THE petitioner challenges an order of the DIOS dated 20-9-96 (Annexure 22 to the petition ). By this order, the DIOS had rejected the representation of the petitioner claiming salary for his appointment against the post of assistant teacher in the LT grade since 1-7-92. THE basic objection of the DIOS was the management had no authority to make such appointment. THE vacancy against which the petitioner was appointed occurred on 30-6-92. Informa tion thereof was dully intimated in April, 1992. THE appointment was admittedly made on 1-7-1992. It is now stated that the DIOS had wrongly opined that the manage ment had no jurisdiction to make the ap pointment. It was stated that the law that stood before 14-7-1992 did not empower the management to make an appointment. According to the learned Counsel, this law stood enacted in Section 18 of the U. P. Secondary Education Board Act, 1982 (U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982 ). This Section speaks of appointment of adhoc teachers by the management under two contingencies only, that is (1) such appointment could be made after the Commission had failed to recom mend the name of any suitable candidate for being appointed as a teacher within one year from the date of such notification and (2) such appointment may also be made if the post or such teacher has actually remained vacant for more than two months. THE notification was made in April, 1992 and the required period of one year has not elapsed. THE first contingency is clearly not ap plicable to the present set of facts. So far the second contingency is con cerned, the learned counsel submitted that the period of 2 months spoken herein must be counted from the date of notification. I may not agree, as the words used are plain, "this power of adhoc appointment by the management could be exercised if the post of the such teacher actually lay vacant for more than two months". It cannot be counted from the date of notification as such a notification could be made in an ticipation of the vacancy as well. Section 18, therefore, did not give any authority on the management to make an ad hoc appoint ment as neither of the two contingencies were present in the case at out hand. The only other clause under which the appoint ment on ad hoc basis could be made is para- graph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. Even under this paragraph it is the duty of the management only to inform the DIGS about the details of the vacancies and the rest is to be done by the DIOS only. It is the DIOS only who would invite ap plications from the local Employment Ex change, make public advertisement in two local newspapers and select the best can didate. Only when such selection is made by the DIOS, an appointment is to follow. In the present case, the appointment proceeded at the end of the management only. Under the above circumstances, I find no fault with the impugned order of the DIOS when he says that the management had lacked the authority to make appoint ment against a substantive vacancy.
(3.) IN the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. Petition dismissed. .;