- (1.) B. S. Chauhan, J. The instant writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 2-1-1997 passed by respondent No. 1, contained in Annexure-3 to the writ petition, by which the application of the petitioner under the provisions of Section 28-A of the Land Ac quisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), has been rejected.
(2.) THE factual gamut of the case reveals that petitioner was tenure holder of the agricultural land bearing plot Nos. 387 and 308 situate in the Revenue Estate of village Bilari, Tehsil Handia, district Allahabad. THE said plots of the petitioner had been notified along with a large area of land belonging to other tenure holders under Section 4 of the Act, vide notification dated 1-6-1985. In respect of the same, after com pleting the procedural and legal require ments, respondent No. 1 made an award on 20-5-1986 under Section 11 of the Act. While making the said award, the land covered by the said notification under Sec tion 4 of the Act had been divided into various categories according to its quality and had been assessed at different rates varying from Rs. 10, 276. 17 to Rs. 20, 757. 87 per Bigha. Petitioner did not prefer any ref erence under Section 18 of the Act. How ever, some other persons, namely, Chandi Prasad and others filed reference No. 38 of 1991 under Section 18 of the Act and the same was decided vide reference award dated 24-12-1991 by the learned Additional District Judge, Allahabad, which is con tained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Ir. the said reference award the land of the applicants therein had been assessed at a much higher rate, i. e. Rs. 38, 500 per Bigha. In the writ petition it has been men tioned by the petitioner that he was residing in Bombay and after coming to his village on 15-8-1996, he came to know that market value of the land had been assessed at a much higher rate under the reference award dated 24-12-1991 and, thus, he filed the ap plication under Section 28-A of the Act before respondent No. 1 on 5-9-1996, which is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ peti tion. In the said application also the petitioner has mentioned that the petitioner was residing in Bombay for last 20 years and he came to know of the refer ence award only on 15-8-1996 when he came to his village and as he had not preferred any reference under Section 18 of the Act, the filed the application under Section 28-A of the Act he also filed an affidavit before respondent No. 1 in support of the said application, wherein the same fact-situation had been narrated by the petitioner on oath. However, he mentioned in the affidavit that his family members were looking after the compensation case regarding the land in dispute. Respondent No. 1, vide impugned order, dated 2-1- 1997, rejected the applica tion of the petitioner being time barred as the limitation for filing such an application provided under the said Act was only ninety days and the application had been filed after the lapse of about five years. Hence this writ petition. Heard Shri S. K. Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Siddharth Verma, for the petitioner and Shri S. G. Has-nain, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents.
(3.) THOUGH the petitioner did not file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter called the Limitation Act), before respondent No. 1 along with his application under Section 28-A, it had been the main thrust of the arguments of Shri S. K. Verma, learned Senior Advocate that the application of the petitioner ought not have been rejected by respondent No. 1 only on the ground of delay. Even if such an application had been there, the only question which requires con sideration by this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are attracted in the proceedings before respondent No. 1 under Section 28-A of the Act. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that the Act would be applicable only in case of suit, appeal and applications before the Court. Thus, the consequential question may be whether the Land Acquisi tion Collector can be termed as a court for the purpose of provisions of Section 3 of the Act. Shri Hasnain has placed reliance upon the proviso to Section 28-A which reads as under: "provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. ";