- (1.) C. A. Rahim, J. This revision has been directed against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge Economic Offen ces), Jhansi dated 6-2-1984 in Criminal Ap peal No. 134 of 1983. By that judgment he dismissed the appeal preferred by the ac cused-appellant against his conviction and sentence passed by the learned V Munsif Magistrate, Jhansi convicting the appellant under Section 435, I. P. C and sentenced him to R. I. for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/ -.
(2.) THE prosecution case is that in be tween the night of 18/19-3-1983 at about 1. 00am. when the complainant was sleep ing at his Khalihan accused Jamuna went there and set fire in the harvested crop which was stored in the khalihan. When the flame and smoke were emitting the com plainant woke and saw accused running away after setting fire in the harvested crop. He raised alarm whereby Prabhu (P. W. 2) and Hari who were also sleeping in the near by Khalihan followed by some other persons came there and saw the accused running away. He was chased by the complainant and the witnesses but he threatened to kill and escaped. THE fire was brought to control but by that time 12 cart load of harvested crops burnt to ashes whereby 60 maunds of wheat were damaged. THE complainant became puzzled and on the next day at about 4. 45 p. m. he lodged a first information report. During trial, to prove the occurrence, the prosecution has examined the complainant as P. W. 1 and Prabhu as P. W. 2. Sri R. B. Kher, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that there was in ordinate delay in lodging the first informa tion report for which it should not be relied. It appears that the occurrence took place at about 1 A. M. in the night and the first infor mation report was lodged on the next day at about 4. 45 P. M. , i. e. after 15 hours of the incident. Sri A. K. Singh Yadav, AGA has submitted that after the incident the com plainant was not only puzzled but he be came unconscious. The submission made by the learned AGA does not seem to be im probable as in the villages harvested crops are the price of the labour and perspiration of the entire year which when damaged before the very eyes of the agriculturist, it is quite natural that he would be puzzled which may even lead to unconsciousness. I do not consider that the explanation of the complainant which was appreciated by the Courts below cannot be believed. Learned Counsel has then sub mitted that in cross-examination P. W. 1 has stated that he was the accused setting fire though the prosecution case was that he was sleeping at that time and the said fact was not mentioned in the first information report. So the learned Judge has wrongly relied on the evidence of P. W. 1 and con victed the accused. The said point was raised in the lower Courts and disposed of with reasons. It appears that in the first informa tion report it was stated that the com plainant P. W. 1 saw that the accused was running away after setting fire. The said fact was repeated in examination-in-chief. But in cross- examination a clarification was sought whether the complainant has stated that he was the accused to set fire with match stick. The statement in the first infor mation report "aag LAGAKAR BHAG-TEY HUYE DEKHA" does not exclude that he did not to set fire. It was notstated in the first information report in detail how the fire was set by the accused but he ex plained the circumstances in cross-ex amination when it was put to him. I do not find any exaggeration or improvement as held by the Court below. It appears that the Court below relied on the evidence of both the prosecution witnesses leaving the said portion as improvement. It is true that the revisional Court should not have made any other interpretation even when that is pos sible besides the interpretation made by the Trial Court and the Court of appeal. Even if the fact remains that the complainant (P. W 1) saw the accused running from place where the fire was set and that too on the dead of night. The accused has no business in the khalihan of the complainant. If he was found to flee away from the place where harvested crops were set to fire and if he threatened complainant and the witnesses while chasing him, the circumstances indi cate that he was guilty of the offence.
(3.) LEARNED Counsel has submitted that there was no motive for setting fire. The learned lower appellate Court has discussed in details and his finding is that motive is not essential part to commit an offence, because some times motive remains in the heart of the accused and is not disclosed. In cross- ex amination of P W. 1 it was stated by him that about 15 days ago he had a quarrel with accused Jamuna. Since it was elicited in cross-examination made by defence Coun sel it cannot be said that since the said fact did not appear in the first information report it should not be taken into account. Any way motive or no motive the crux of whole thing is whether P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 can be believed. The evidence of P. W. 2 is that the accused ran away after setting fire to the harvested crops of P. W. 1. LEARNED Counsel has submitted that it is in evidence that P. W 1 raised alarm and thereafter P. W. 2 woke up and in that circumstances it would not be possible for P. W. 2 to see if the accused set fire or not. That argument has been ac cepted by the lower Court and found that if it is considered that the accused was fleeing away from the place of the occurrence and threatened not to chase him and if it is found that 14 cart loaded harvested crops of the complainant was put on fire the Court can draw a presumption from that cir cumstances that what P. W. 2 has stated was true and considering his evidence along with the evidence of P. W. 1 it can be said that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Apart from the observation of the lower Court if we look into the evidence of P. W, 1 and P. W. 21 do not find any reason for not accepting the finding of both the lower Courts. The learned revisional Court has its limitation. It cannot construe a second opinion by reassessing the evidence when both the Courts below held that in favour of the prosecution.;