- (1.) G. S. N. Tripathi, J. This is a peti tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directed against the order dated 3-5-97 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Ghaziabad (Annexure 1 to the petition), whereby he was declared the petitioner to be a "goonda" and has or dered that he should be externed for a period of 6 months from the district of Ghaziabad and the appellate order dated 17-11-97 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, whereby he has dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was time barred and the explanation given for explaining the delay, did not appear to be correct.
(2.) THE facts are very brief. THE Senior Police Superintendent, Ghaziabad reported on 15-9-96 to the District Magistrate that the O. P. (petitioner Mahipal) is "goonda" as defined under Section 2 of the U. P. Control of Goonda Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). THEre are three cases pending against him one under Section 25, Arms Act and the second under Section 307, IPC and third one under Sections 323/504, IPC. Aggrieved by the order dated 31-5-97, the petitioner appealed before the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, who passed the order impugned holding that the appeal was time-barred. Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Con stitution. In between, allegedly, the petitioner violated the order of extern-ment on 2-8-97 and he was sent to Jail on the same date for committing an offence punishable under Section 10 of the Act.
(3.) FEELING aggrieved, this petition has been preferred and reliefs have been sought that the aforesaid orders passed by the District Magistrate and the Commis sioner be set aside and the petitioner be set at liberty by the C. J. M. concerned. Under Section 2 of the Act, the word 'goonda' has been defined as below: " (b) "goonda" means a person who- (i) either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or at tempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences punishable under Chapter XVI, Chap ter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860); or (ii) has been convicted under the Suppres sion of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956;or (iii) or has been convicted not less than thrice under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910; or (iv) is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community. " For our purpose, clause (iv) is relevant. The District Magistrate acted upon the report of the SSP, who had al leged in his report dated 15-9-98 that the petitioner is a criminal and "goonda" by committing several acts as noted above in total defiance of law and has no respect for maintaining peace. In response to show-cause notice sent by the District Magistrate, the petitioner filed his reply. He has alleged that he is a peace loving person and not a criminal. The three case under Sections 25 Arms Act, 307, IPC and 323/504, IPC have not resulted in the con viction of the petitioner as yet. Therefore, the report of the police is biased and it should not be accepted. But he did not deny that he was involved in three cases noted in the report of the SSP. 6. Of course, the petitioner may be convicted in the aforesaid cases or may not be. But that was not the problem at stake before the District Magistrate. What was at stake was that general law and order situation and public peace had been dis turbed and people were not prepared to depose against the petitioner in any criminal acts on account of fear and terror created in the locality. Under these cir cumstances, the District Magistrate could be subjectively satisfied that the petitioner is a "goonda" as noted in the definition of the word under Clause (iv) specifically. Hence this Court cannot revise or super vise the satisfaction recorded by the Dis trict Magistrate. Of course, had there been the case in which no case had been launched against the petitioner or a case of very vegetarian nature, for which fine or simple imprisonment has been provided, the District Magistrate could ignore that. But whether the ground was sufficient or not, for acting under the Act, is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, and this Court cannot say at this stage that there was absolutely no material before the District Magistrate to form such an opinion. This Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit as an appellate court over the orders passed by the District Magistrate and Commissioner. So, I do not agree with the learned Counsel's contentions that there was no material before the District Magistrate for personal satisfaction, to act under the Act. This way, the order dated 31-5-97 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Ghaziabad does not suffer for want of jurisdiction or void of illegality or impropriety.;