- (1.) AMARBIR Singh Gill, J. This writ peti tion is by the owner/land-lord of a house situated in Mohalla Nayee Basti, Sitapur City. The petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 3- 9-84 passed hy the Prescribed Authority, copy of which is Annexure 2 and judgment dated 30-7-87 of the 1st Additional District Judge in appeal; con firming the decision of the Prescribed Authority, where by the application moved under Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972), moved by the present petitioner was dismissed.
(2.) PETITIONER filed an application for eviction of tenant, opposite party No. 3 Smt. Phoolmati Rastogi from the tenanted house in her occupation on the plea that the premises were required for personal use and occupation after demolition as the disputed premises have become dilapidated and got to be demolished for which the requisite re-construction map has been passed by the Municipal Board, Sitapur. It was also claimed that the present accommodation. with the applicant consists of only two rooms, which is not sufficient for the family, which consisted of seven members. His son has got married and the relations between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law remain strained and the requirement is, genuine one. The application was con tested, wherein the tenant/opposite party denied if there was any bona fide require ment for more accommodation or if the premises on rent was dilapidated and re quires demolition besides that the tenant has no other means or other house in the town. The Prescribed Authority after con sidering the case held that the requirement was not honafide and the portion of house under tenancy was fit for residence and re quires no demolition. The Appellate Court as well held that the house in question con sists of more than one Unit and if the Unit under the occupation of tenant is still not dilapidated one, land-lord can re-construct the dilapidated portion of the house. Be sides, the accommodation with the ap plicant was found to be sufficient and the requirement not bona fide one. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri H. S. Sahai has contended that the present accommodation with the petitioner consist of only two rooms over the shop, wherein he along with his family members, which has seven members, is living and after the marriage of the son the requirement became more genuine because of the strained relations of his wife with his daughter-in-law, who are residing in the same house. It was also contended that the condition of the house has been admitted to be dilapidated and if the part of the house has become unsafe, the entire building has to be demolished. It appears that the petitioner/land lord did not disclose the true extent of present accommodation with him because it has come on record that apart from the two rooms already in occupation of the land lord, the adjoining house had also been pur chased earlier to the present applicant, which consists of two big rooms, two covered courtyards, covered verandah, kitchen, latrine which along with two rooms can be termed sufficient accommodation for the family of the land-lord. It is no doubt, contended by the learned counsel fpr the petitioner that the adjoining house which has been purchased by the land-lord is not fit for residence, but no such foundation was laid in the application for eviction, muchless disclosing the availability of this accom modation to him. No material has been produced to show if the additional accom modation available to the land-lord was in any manner unfit for human habitation. The plea of the petitioner that he required the premises in occupation of the tenant for his personal use and occupation after its demolition stands belied on the record of the case and has also been considered so.
(3.) ONCE the court finds that the land lord has sufficient accommodation with him and he has no genuine need or requirement to ask for release of the accommodation in occupation of the tenant by eviction of the later, there appears to be no reason to fur ther consider, if the premises in occupation of the tenant were in dilapidated condition and required demolition. Even on this aspect as well the learned Prescribed Authority had the added advantage of his personal inspection of the premises in oc cupation of the tenant and he has specifical ly found that the portion in occupation of the tenant Smt. Phoolmati Rastogi was still fit for human habitation and the other por tion which was in dilapidated condition can be re-constructed. As has been argued, it appears that the building, a part of which is on rent with the opposite party, consists of two Units, facing two roads and the Municipal Committee has also given two numbers for the same and in case the other Unit is separable or separate and is in dilapidated condition, the land-lord can re construct the same after demolition. There is no evidence produced by the petitioner that both the portions are so connected that the alteration or re-construction of one is likely to disturb or endanger the other por tion, which is in possession of the tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in Phool Chand Prasad and another v. Ilnd Additional Dis trict and Sessions Judge, Azamgarh and another 1982 Allahabad Rent Cases 766, in which it has been observed that if a portion, which is not dilapidated, is a small portion of the entire structure and the rest of the building is in a dilapidated condition, then the entire building will have to be treated as dilapidated. However, the facts of the present case are somewhat different. As has already been referred to above, the Prescribed Authority on his inspection has observed that East Unit of the house is in dilapidated condition whereas the portion in the occupation of the tenant, is not (sic) and the land-lord if so desires, can re-con struct the other Unit. In the cited decision of Phool Chand Prasad etc. etc. (supra) the factual position was that the entire house including half of back portion of the shop in question was in dilapidated condition and in such circumstances it was observed that the shop in question should have been released on the ground that the portion in not dilapidated condition was a small part of the building. As already observed above, in this case the very application of the petitioner mentions the tenant to be in occupation of southern unit of the house and the other Unit was in occupation of another tenants shows that both Units are separable from each other. The learned counsel for the petitioner, otherwise has not referred to any legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact of both the authorities below. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29 the finding of fact is not to be disturbed while exercising writ jurisdiction, more so even no infirmity in the finding could be referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is, thus, no merit in this petition.;