- (1.) B. M. Lal, J. By this second writ peti tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner Natraj Chhabigrih seeks an order, direction or writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice dated 5-11- 1996 and 20-12-1996 (Annexure 4 and 7 to the writ petition) and also seeks a suitable order, direction or writ declaring the proviso to Section 3 (A) (1) of U. P Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE actual controversy involved in this petition is concluded by the Full Bench decision of this Court passed on the writ petition filed by the same petitioner being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 805 of 1995, Natraj Chhabigrih v. State of U. P, decided on 22-3-1996 [since repected is 1996 (2) JCLR 968 (A11) (FB)], whereby considering the validity of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A of the Act in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Full Bench of this Court held that this provision is intra vires and is a valid piece of legislation and overruled the earlier decision rendered by the Division Bench in Kamla Palace v. State of U. P, dated 10-7-1995 : [ Since reported in 1995 (2) JCLR 710 (A11)]. In this petition, the petitioner has raised the main question that the decision of Full Bench rendered in Natraj (supra) ear lier petition of present petitioner, is entirely incorrect and it requires to be reconsidered by the larger Bench of Five Judges. We are afraid. Such arguments are not open to be advanced before the Division Bench in respect of the Full Bench decisions, as the Full Bench is the higher Court than the Division Bench. The expres sion 'higher Court' has been used by their lordships of Apex Court in reference to the Full Bench. In U. P. Rashtriya Chini Millad-hikari Parishad Lucknow v. The State of U. P. JT 1995 (5) SC 475 : 1995 (2) LBESR 332 (SC) where the correctness of Division Bench decision of this Court was taken to have been doubted by the Full Bench and in this context their Lordships of Apex Court ruled that 'once the correctness of a judg ment is doubted by the higher Court, the judgment no longer remains the law of the land and is treated as non-est. We are refer ring Chini Mill's case (supra) just to show that the Full Batch is 'higher Court' than the Division Therefore, the expres sion 'higher Court' should not be confused with the expression 'appellate Court'. Thus, as a necessary corollary the Division Bench is higher Court than the Single Judge Court, and the Full Bench is higher Court than the Division Bench and therefore, correctness of Division Bench decision cannot be doubted by Single Judge Bench and that of the Full Bench decision cannot be doubted by the Division Bench and accordingly judi cial propriety demands that the Division Bench decision should not be referred to larger Bench by Single Judge Bench and the Full Bench decision should not be referred to still larger Bench by the Division Bench. It is only for the Benches of coordinate juris diction to refer the decisions of equal Benches to the larger Benches, in case they doubt its correctness.
(3.) HERE it is necessary to make clear that it is not that this view is being taken by this Court for the first time in this case rather this view is settled since long by this Court as well as by the Apex Court in plotnera of decisions some of which are being referred hereto below. In T. P. Thakkar v. R. M. Patell (AIR 1968 SC 372) their lordships of Apex Court had ruled as under: "it has been held time and again that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct the judgments of Courts of Co ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason for the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law. " Similarly in Assistant Collector of Central Precise v. Dunlop India Ltd. , AIR 1985 SC 330, their lordships of Apex Court observed: ". . . . . . as was said in Cosset and Company Limited v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that 'in the hierarchical system of Courts which exists in our country, "it is necessary for each lower tier" including the High Court, 'to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. ";