M. Katju, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for petitioner and Sri R. K.' Singh learned counsel for respondents.
(2.) THE petitioner was appointed as a member of the Central Industrial Security Force on 2.8.1994 and subsequent his services were terminated by order dated 26.12.95, Annexure 2 to the petition on the ground that he had not disclosed the fact while seeking appointment that he was involved in a case under Section 323/504. I.P.C. read with Section 3 (1) (10), S.C.S.T. Act. It appears that the petitioner had been acquitted in the aforesaid criminal case vide judgment dated 9.12.94, Annexure 1 to the person. Since there is now nothing against the petitioner obviously, the termination order cannot stand. Learned counsel for respondents invited my attention to decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Administrator v. Sushil Kumar, 1997 (1) ESC 179. In my opinion that case is distinguishable. In that case the petitioner has never been selected at all arid moreover his application had been rejected on the ground that he did not have desirable precedent. There is nothing in the aforesaid decision to show that his application was rejected on (sic) of being involved in a particular criminal case although he had acquitted in the case under Sections 304/32 and 34, I.P.C. In the present case, the termination order itself shows that the only ground of termination is involvement in a particular criminal case. The petitioner has been acquitted in that criminal case, and hence obviously now nothing remains against the petitioner. It is settled law that all judgments operate retrospectively (unless expertly made prospective), and hence (sic) it must be deemed that there was never any involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case. The acquittal of the petitioner washes off his involvement in the criminal case retrospectively. That being so, no basis for the impugned order dated 26.12.95 remains. The petition is consequently allowed. No order as to costs.;