- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. Petitioner's ad hoc ap pointment was cancelled by order dated 29th April 1995 which is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition on the ground that the Managing Committee had no power to make ad hoc appointment. Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that by reason of U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board (Second Amendment) Act 1992 (U. P. Act No. XXIV of 1992), the power to make ad hoc appointment by the Committee of Management was taken away through amendment in Section 18 of the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commis sion Selection Board Act, 1982, by substitu tion of new Section 18 which had vested the power to make ad hoc appointment in a Committee. According to Mr. Khare, the said Act came into force on 14th July, 1992. In the present case the proceedings for recruitment having been initiated on 31st August 1991 viz. a date before coming into operation of the said Act No. XXIV of 1992. The restriction imposed cannot affect the right of the Committee of Management since there is nothing in the said Act to indicate even by necessary implications that the provisions of the said Act would be operative retrospectively. Relying on the decision in the case of A. A. Calton v. Direc tor of Education and another A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 1143, he contends that unless there is expressed provision, the existing right can not be affected by a subsequent legislation, the same can affect such right if retrospectivily is apparent by necessary implications or it is inferred from the intention of the legislature to be retrospectively operative. He refers to paragraph 5 of the said judg ment and contends that the process for selection commenced from the date of call ing of application for a post up to the date on which the Director becomes entitled to make the selection which is an integrated one and at every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of one or the other candidates. There being nothing in the Act No. XXIV of 1992 to infer any intention of the Legislature to give it a retrospective effect and there having been nothing to decipher any such intention by necessary implication not to say of ex pressed provision. The right of the manage ment cannot be taken away and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
(2.) MR. Yadav, learned Standing Coun sel on the other hand contends that after promulgation of Act No. 24 of 1992, the Committee of Management had been deprived of the power to make such ad hoc appointment as such it would operate on the date when the appointment is being made. In order to appreciate the rival con tentions it is necessary to record certain facts. Admittedly, U. P. Act No. XXIV of 1992 came into force on 14th July 1992 and if the selection process starts before the said date, in that event inspiration might be drawn from the decision rendered in the case of A. A. Calton (supra ). Mr. Khare, learned counsel submits that by virtue of decision rendered in the said case, the right of the management continues even though the appointment is made after 14th July 1992, since according to him the process is an integrated one therefore, it having begun on 31st August 1991 and completed some time in 1993, the entire process is one and the same creating rights in favour of one or the other. The fact remains that the adver tisement was made in Amar Ujala on 31st August 1991 which is enclosed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. It is alleged in the writ petition that it was published in two newspapers but no copy of the second newspaper publication was enclosed. From Annexure-8 which is a representation made by the petitioner, it appears that the first advertisement was issued in Amar Ujala on 31st August 1991 and the second advertise ment was issued in Aaj on 5th December 1992. The application of the petitioner was received in the office on 21st December, 1992 and the appointment was given on 5th February, 1993 and the petitioner had joined on 10th of February, 1993. Though it is contended by Mr. Khare that the selection process started right from 31st August, 1991 viz. with the first publication and the second publication being requisite in terms of the relevant rules by which publication in two newspaper is required, the same is one and single process. It is very difficult for this Court to accept the said proposition. If it was a process for selection if it is required to be published in two newspapers, the same ought to have been published simul taneously. There might have been dif ference in two dates and the same might have been a reasonable difference but not of 14 months. Then again as it appears from the fact of the present case, the selection process did not start with the first publica tion. Inasmuch as in the first publication the date of receiving the application was fixed on 8th September 1991. The application was not submitted on the date fixed by the first publication. The second publication through which different dated must have been fixed for submission of applications cannot be said to be continuation of the earlier publication, but it is an incomplete advertisement published. It is the case of the petitioner that he has submitted his applica tion on 21st December, 1992 pursuant to the advertisement published in Newspaper Aaj on 5-12-1992. Moreover, there having been two advertisement, the selection process can be said to have been started only when last advertisement is published. Since two advertisements are required and two advertisements have been sought to be com plied with. Only after the advertisement is complete, the invitation for application is initiated and the selection process starts from the last date of such publication, there fore, the selection process has started after 5th December 1992 which is the period sub sequent to 14th July, 1992, when the Management did not have any authority by reason of the amending Act. From the fact it is apparent and can not be safely presumed that the selection process was not initiated though advertisement was issued on 31st August, 1991 and no steps were taken till second advertisement was published on 5th December 1992. The fact that the second advertisement was issued and the selection process was started thereafter clearly indi cates that the selection started only after second advertisement. The fact in the present case are wholly distinguishable with that of decision rendered in the case of A. A. Calton (supra) on which reliance has been placed, thus the ratio decided in the said case cannot be attracted in the facts and the circumstances of the present case, par ticularly when selection process had started after 14th July, 1992. In that view of the matter, I do not find any infirmity in the order impugned. The writ petition thus fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .;