D.K. Seth, J. - (1.) The order dated April 4, 1990 (Annexure- 4 to the petition) dismissing the petitioner from service, pursuant to the disciplinary proceeding, after holding domestic inquiry and the order dated August 5, 1992 (Annexure 9 to the petition) passed on appeal therefrom have been challenged by the petitioner on various grounds. His first challenge was that the appellate order did not discuss evidence despite specific orders passed by this Court earlier. His second contention is that there is no proof that the petitioner had mis-appropriated any amount or that the Corporation had suffered loss and, therefore, the charges cannot be said to have been proved. His third contention was that the fare which was in dispute was only about Rs. 9/- and, as such, is too insignificant, even assuming if the charges are proved, to attract the penalty of dismissal, though, however, the guilt may warrant infliction of minor penalty. His fourth contention was that no adequate opportunity was given to the delinquent. His fifth contention is that the Circular dated March 30, 1987 by which general amnesty was proposed in respect of all persons who were dismissed from service after 1985, was not applied, though applicable in the case of the petitioner. His last contention is that the punishment inflicted is disproportionate.
(2.) Sri Samir Sharma learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, opposing him, contended that the Circular dated March 30, 1987 has no manner of application in the case of the petitioner. Relying on various pages of the record, he points out that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner and that the charges were duly proved. He also contends that since it was established that the petitioner had failed to perform his duties, which is all grave in nature, the order of dismissal was warranted. In support of his contention he relied on an unreported judgment, to which he shall be referring shortly hereinafter. He next contends that the appellate order does not suffer from any infirmity since the same depicts application of mind of the appellate authority and it is not necessary that he should write elaborate judgment, as is required in the judicial pronouncement. He contends next that the findings are pure finding of fact, which assumes the character of concurrent finding by reason of the appellate order and no perversity having been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact.
(3.) Mr. M. D. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his respective contentions as summarised above, has relied on various, decisions to which we shall refer to at the appropriate stage. Mr. Singh led me through various documents and record and pointed out that there are sufficient material on record to come altogether to a different conclusion.;