- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. Petitioner's appoint ment on ad hoc basis was not being ap proved, he filed a representation which was dismissed by an order dated 15-10-93 passed by the District inspector of Schools, Allahabad. This order is being challenged in this writ petition.
(2.) SHRI S. N. Srivastava, learned coun sel for the petitioner challenges the said order on the ground that since the petitioner was appointed under the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commis sion (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 (hereinafter called as the 'first Order'), therefore, the first ground that the ap pointment has been made before the ex piry 60 days from the date of notification to be Commission cannot be sustained. He further submits that at the relevant point of time namely on 30-8-91 petitioner was appointed under unamended Section 18 of U. P. Secondary Education Services Com mission and Selection Boards Act, there fore, the other grounds on which the petitioner's case was denied has to be ig nored. On these grounds, he claims that the impugned order dated 15-10-93 (An-nexure-5 to the writ petition) should be quashed. Shri Sabajit Yadav, learned Stand ing Counsel on the other hand contends that the appointment could not have been made under the provisions of First Order. He further contends that by virtue of Government Order dated 12-7-78, reser vation is provided even if the appointment was made under Section 18 of the Act as claimed by the petitioner. After having heard learned counsel for the parties, it appears that the First order envisages three contingencies in which such appointment could be made but by virtue of subsequent amendment, the said contingencies were done away with by the U. P. Secondary Education Ser vices Commission (Removal of Difficul ties) (Second) Order, 1981 (hereinafter called as the Second Order ). Paragraph 2 of the First Order was replaced by the Second Order that the management of an institution may appoint by promotion or by direct recruitment, a teacher on purely ad hoc basis in accordance with the provisions of this order in the case of a substantive vacancy caused by death, retirement, resignation, or otherwise. However, the contingencies as provided in paragraph 5 (2) to (5) of the first order still subsists. But still such appointment can be made in view of paragraph 4 only by promotion. In case it cannot be filled by promotion, the procedure for direct recruitment is to be adopted in terms of paragraph 5 (2) to (5) which cast respon sibility on the management to keep the District Inspector of Schools informed about the details of vacancy as soon as possible. Upon such information being received, it is the duty of the District In spector of Schools to invite application from local employment exchange and also through public advertisement in at least two newspapers having adequate circula tion in U. P. It is not the case of the petitioner that paragraph 5 (2) to (5) of the First Order was complied with. On the other hand, as it appears from the fact that the notification was sent to the Commis sion on 20-7-91 and the management had appointed the petitioner on 30-3-91 and they sent the papers with regard to his appointment to the District Inspector of Schools on 10-9-91.
(3.) IN view of sub para (2) to (5) of Paragraph 5 the management did not have the right to dispense with the condition provided in sub-para (2) of para 5 and the selection has to be done in accordance with the provisions contained in said para 5 (2) to (5 ). IN the absence of specific averment that the petitioner was ap pointed after complying with the provisions contained in sub-paras (2) to (5) of Para 5, it as not possible to treat the appointment is an appointment under the Removal of Difficulties Order as was sought to be contended by Shri Srivastava. On the other hand, Section 18 of the Act requires that such appointment can be made by the management only after expiry of two months after the vacancy is notified to the Commission as is provided under Section 18 (1) (b) of the said Act. Admit tedly in the present case, the appointment was said to be before expiry of the said period. Therefore, by no stretch of im agination, the appointment has sought to be validly made in compliance of Section 18 of the said Act. For all these reasons, I do not find any infirmity in the order dated 15-10-93 impugned in the present writ petition. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is accord ingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Petition dismissed. .;