R. M. Sahai, J. - (1.) IS selection vitiated because one of the experts was a research guide of opposite-party is the issue raised in this petition filed by a candidate for the post of Agricultural Chemistry in a Post-Graduate Degree College ?
(2.) INFIRMITY in selection is claimed because of bias, which percolated due to participation of Sri S. K. De, Professor and Head of Agricultural Chemistry Department in Allahabad University, as one of the Experts as opposite-party no. 2 had worked under him as a research fellow from 1982 to 1986 and he had issued a character certificate to opposite-party in September, 1986. Attempt has been made to strengthen it by coincidence of selection of Sri M. P. Shukla, whose research guide was Dr. A. N. Pathak, the other expert. Reliance has been placed on Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454, Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, AIR 1976 SC 2428, Dr. Madan Gopa! Gupta v. The Agra University, through its vice Chancellor, Agra, Labour Industrial Cases, page 3 and D. K. Khanna v. Union of India, AIR 1973 Himachal Pradesh 30. Vitiation of administrative actions due to bias or likelihood of bias are recognition and extension of well established judicial norms that one should not be judge of his own case, and that justice should not only be done but seem to be done. Public policy and public interest require that if there is likelihood or substantial possibility of an action or decision being effected by participation of a person, who has pecuniary or personal interest, then it should be struck down. But the application of the principle must not be divorced from realism. It should be listed on anvil of apprehension of reasonable man and not of a person interested in getting the decision set aside. A selection by a Commission or by a Committee or any action of any authority or even Government, if it cannot withstand the test of being just and fair then it falls through. Whether this basic norm has been violated and the participation of experts or members introduced serious infirmity in the selection has to be examined in each case on its own facts. For instance, in Ashok Kumar Yadav's case (Supra) even though the candidates, who were selected, were close relatives of some of the persons, who participated in selection and secured high percentage of marks in interview, their selection was upheld as the Members had withdrawn from the Board when they were interviewed and the Hon'ble Court held that securing of high percentage was just a coincidence. This was departure from D. K. Khanna's case (Supra) where entire selection was struck down even though the Member had withdrawn when his father-in-law was appearing. But even in that case what persuaded the Himachal Pradesh High Court to strike down the selection was very close relationship. This was diluted in Ashok Kumar's case as selection was held by Public Service Commission. Even G. S. Sarana's case does not go any further than laying down that likelihood of bias vitiates selection. On fact all these decisions reiterate the principle enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. K. Kirpakar v. State, AIR 1970 SC 150. What appears to be well settled on these authorities is that participation of close relative in a selection gives rise to resonable apprehension of bias or atleast likelihood of bias. On fact, therefore, decisions relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not of any assistance. From affidavit filed by Sri De, it is apparent that he is a renounced Professor with many awards to his credit. He was suddenly informed by telephone on the date of interview that he was required to participate as an expert. Therefore, there could have been no chance of his knowing that opposite-party was one of the candidates, who had been called for interview, nor the opposite-party could have known that Sri De was going to act as one of the Experts. It can, therefore, be safely assumed that Sri De could not have been influenced by opposite-party. He is in no way related to him. The inference of likelihood of bias is based because Sri De was research guide and had issued a character certificate. Guiding a student in his research is one of the duties of a Professor. He does not do so because of any personal interest. To allege that a Professor, who was a research guide of a student was instrumental in influencing the Members is going too far. Howso-ever, the standards of morality may have gone down, but it cannot be stretched to this extent as to malign a Professor of bias for participating in selection because one of the candidate happened to be his research student. It is not intrinsically offensive. A Professor, who was a research guide or teacher, who had taught a candidate, cannot be said to have any interest in him. In Sarana's case (Supra), the High Court repelled the claim of bias even though the two experts enjoyed the hospitality of selected candidate who was the Head of Department as they could not be held in a position to influence the decision of entire selection.
(3.) EVEN the records sent from Commission rule out any apprehension that selection was not fair. The Board, which interviewed candidates, comprised of two members and two experts. Each was allotted 50 marks. The marks awarded show that the difference in the marks given by one or the other member was not more than three. For instance, if one candidate was given 22 by one of the member then the marks allotted by others varied between 22 to 25. This leaves no reason for doubt that each candidate's assessment was objective. Further, in Sarana's case (Supra), it was held that this Court should not interfere in favour of a person, who approaches this Court after having failed to be selected. From the mark-sheet, it is clear that the position of petitioner is so low that he cannot by any remote chance be selected even if the selection is quashed. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim order dated 12-12-1986 is discharged. Petition dismissed.;