D.S.Sinha - (1.) THIS Writ petition is directed against the order of the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Banda, dated 21-3-1985, whereby he rejected the revision of the petitioners under section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, holding it to be barred by time.
(2.) THE order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation, which was impugned in the revision, was passed on 31-7-1981 and the revision, giving rise to the instant petition, was filed on 18-12-1981. THE revision was accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, supported by an affidavit sworn by Data Ram, petitioner no. 8, in this writ petition. In para 2 of the said affidavit cause for delay in filing the revision was stated to be lack of knowledge of the effect of the order. It was stated that the deponent was away to Gorakhpur and when he came back from Gorakhpur on 9-12-1981, on leave, only then he could know that the chaks of the revisionists (petitioners before this Court) had been ' spoiled '. On coming to know of this fact the deponent immediately applied for the certified copy of the order of Settlement Officer Consolidation and the same was delivered to him on 14-12-1981. He reached Banda for the purpose of filing revision on 18-12-1981 because during the period between 14-12-1981 and 18-12-1981 he was making arrangement for money and thereafter he fell ill on account of fever. The Assistant Director of Consolidation after hearing the parties and examining the record came to the conclusion that the explanation set-forth in the application and affidavit filed for condonation of delay was not worthy of reliance. He, therefore, declined to condone the delay in filing the revision and rejected the same as barred by time. Before this court Sri Raja Ram Shivahare, learned counsel for the petitioners, strenuously contended that the order of the Assistant Director of Consolidation was erroneous inasmuch as he took a very technical view of the matter as it was well settled that while judging the sufficiency of cause in the matter pertaining to condonation of delay the courts ought to take liberal view and in support of his contention the learned counsel referred the following decisions : 1975 RD 270, 1981 RD 27, 1982 ALJ 590, 1984 RD 258, 1987 AWC 839, AIR 1983 SC 355, AIR 1984 SC 1401, AIR 1985 SC 606 and AIR 1969 SC 575. In the instant case it has been found as a matter of fact that the revisionists were present in the court of Settlement Officer Consolidation on 31-7-1981 when the appeal was heard and the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation, impugned in the revision, was passed in their presence. In these circumstances it Cannot be said that there was lack of knowledge of the order. From a careful reading of the affidavit, filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it transpires that it was not the case of the petitioners that they were not aware of the order. What was pleaded in the affidavit was that the petitioners were unaware of the effects of the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation. This plea -has been held to be unbelievable.
(3.) THE sufficiency of the cause and reality of the cause are two different things. In case where the court is called upon to adjudicate upon the sufficiency of the cause it may take liberal view in the matter and that is what the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners lay down but where the court is called upon to adjudicate upon the truthfulness of the cause the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners may be of no avail. Here the Assistant Director of Consolidation declined to condone the delay on the ground that the cause shown on behalf of the petitioners was not believable and in doing so he did not commit any error. The limitation runs from the point of knowledge of the order itself and not from the point when one comes to understand the effect of the order. The plea of the petitioners to the effect that they could not file revision within the prescribed period because they came to understand the import of the order dated 31-7-1981 on December 9, 1981, therefore could not constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.;