Anshuman Singh, J. - (1.) -
(2.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 18-9-1986 passed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, allowing the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) filed by respondent no. 1. Before the admission of the writ petition counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. With the consent of the parties and as provided under the second proviso to rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court the petition is being disposed of at the admission stage. The facts giving rise to the present petition lies in a narrow campus. Respondent no. 1 claiming himself to be landlord of the accommodation in dispute filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for release of the accommodation. The said application was contested by the petitioner and the main contest was that respondent no. 1 was not the landlord and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. The parties adduced their respective evidence and the Prescribed Authority by order dated 7-10-1983 rejected the application of the respondent. He recorded categorical finding of fact that the respondent had failed to prove himself to be the landlord of the accommodation in dispute and consequently no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Apart from this he also recorded a categorical finding that the need of the landlord respondent was neither genuine nor bonafide
(3.) BEING aggrieved against the aforesaid order the respondent preferred an appeal before the District Judge. It is admitted to the parties that during the pendency of the appeal the respondent filed an application annexing therewith two documents to be admitted as additional evidence. The petitioner filed objection to the said application. It is also admitted to the parties that the application was not disposed of and it was ordered to be placed at the time of hearing of the appeal. It is relevant to mention at this stage that the documents filed by the respondent which he wanted to be admitted in additional evidence had direct bearing on the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent as the application of the respondent for release of the accommodation in dispute was not held to be maintainable on that ground. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the question whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was a vital question involved in the appeal before the appellate court. The II Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur by order dated 18-9-1986 allowed the appeal of the respondent and while allowing the appeal he relied on the documents filed by the respondent as additional evidence and on the strength of those two documents he reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant and held that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner feeling aggrieved against the said order has approached this Court in the instant writ petition. I have heard Sri Rajendra Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. P. Ansari, learned counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the Additional District Judge committed an error in relying on the documents which were not admitted as additional piece of evidence but have been mentioned only in the impugned order in holding that the respondent was the landlord of the accommodation in dispute without affording any opportunity of rebuttal to the petitioner. There is no manner of doubt that the documents relied upon by the appellate authority, which it treated as additional evidence, were relevant peace of evidence and go to the very root of the controversy involved between the parties. Counsel for the respondent has candidly admitted that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of rebuttal but he asserted that since the petitioner had filed objection to the application filed by the respondent for adducing additional evidence there was no further necessity of affording any opportunity to the petitioner to file documents, if any, in rebuttal. To strengthen his argument counsel for the respondent relied on the provisions of section 10 of the Act which have been made applicable to section 22 of the Act. Section 10 (2) of the Act provides : "The appellate authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order, or remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and may also take any additional evidence and pending its decision, stay the operation of the order under appeal on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit." The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the appellate court has unfettered power to admit any evidence irrespective of the strict rules observed in Civil suits and in support of this he has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Wasi Ahmed v. A. D. J., Agra, 1984 ALJ 75= 1983 AWC 875 in which it has been held that the appellate authority can accept the additional evidence in view of the provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act. In my opinion on a plain reading of section 10 (2) of the Act there can be no manner of doubt that the appellate court while acting under section 22 of the Act has power to admit additional evidence and this proposition has not been rebutted by the counsel for the petitioner nor it is open to him to challenge the same. The real issue, in my opinion, involved in the instant case is whether the appellate court after admitting any additional evidence is required to give an opportunity of rebuttal to the other side against whom the additional evidence is sought to be relied upon or it can rely on the said additional evidence without affording any opportunity of rebuttal. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently urged that since section 10 (2) of the Act does not provide for affording opportunity of rebuttal the appellate court is not required to afford any opportunity. I am unable to subscribe to the view advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice apply to judicial and quasi judicial proceedings as well as to the administrative proceedings and any order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be legally sustained. I am also of definite view that the legislature could have never intended to arm the appellate authority with an arbitrary power of admitting additional evidence and to place reliance on the said evidence without affording any opportunity of rebuttal to the party against whom it was sought to be relied upon though no specific provision has been incorporated in section 10 (2) of the Act. Since the principle of natural justice is sine qua non in judicial proceedings, it appears that the legislature rightly did not incorporate a specific provision that once the appellate court admitted additional evidence the other party has to be given opportunity of adducing evidence in rebuttal. The case of Wasi Ahmed (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the respondent also strengthen the view taken by me and does not lend support to the contention raised on behalf of the respondent inasmuch as in that case the facts were that the appellate authority after admitting additional evidence had directed the cross-examination which satisfied the test underlying the principle of natural justice. In the instant case till the date of disposal of appeal no order was passed on the application filed by the respondent allowing the same. The petitioner could not have anticipated that the said documents would be relied upon by the appellate authority and as such he was supposed to have adduced evidence in rebuttal unless a specific order admitting the additional evidence was passed which in fact was never passed.;