B.D. Agarwal, J. - (1.) LAND covering 9.02 acres situate in village Patti Kalyan Ahraura, district Mirzapur, has been acquired by the State Government. The notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the State Government on January 29, 1983, and published in the U.P. Gazette dated February 4, 1983. The notification recites also that the land is covered under section 17(1) and since the Governor was satisfied that the land is required urgently for the construction of market yard of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ahraura under the planned development schemes, the application of the provisions of section 5 -A was being dispensed with. This was followed by notification made under Section 6/17(1) on the same date, that is, January 29, 1983, and published in the gazette dated February 4, 1983. This notification also makes mention of the same public purpose and contains declaration of the State Government to the effect with a direction to the Collector to the possession. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners in these connected petitions have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Sri S.R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends at the out -set that in view of the proviso to section 11 -A of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Central Act 68 of 1984) the award had to be made within a period of two years from September 24, 1984, when the Central Act 68 of 1984 commenced and since there was no such award made, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land have lapsed. The contention is not borne out. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, counsel for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, has placed on record the award dated September 27, 1986, which is within the period of two years from the commencement of the Central (Amendment) Act, 1984. It was urged then by Sri S.R. Singh that this should not be taken as award made within the meaning of the proviso to Section 11 -A since it is not shown that there was notice issued to the petitioners within the said period of two years, which, according to him, is the requirement under section 12(2) of the Act. We are unable to agree. Section 11 of the Act makes provision for the award being made and refers to the contents required therein. According to Section 12(1) the award is to be filed in the office of the Collector and is conclusive evidence, between the Collector and the persons interested whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and the Value of the land and the apportionment of compensation among them. The requirement of notice, referred to in sub -section (2) of Section 12, is in the context of the limitation available for purposes of reference to court under Section 18. Proviso (b) to Section 18(2) lays down that the application for reference shall be made within the six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the award which ever period (sic) having been made to the persons interested is thus not a necessary ingredient for the making of the award as such. Section 11 -A is consequently of no avail to the petitioners.
(2.) IT was next urged by Sri S.R. Singh that there is no material placed before the State Government or application of mind on its part before dispensing with Section 5 -A. This also may not be said to hold good. It appears, the site for the construction of market yard was selected by a Committee, consisting of the District Magistrate, a Member of the State Legislature, Executive Engineer of the Mandi Parishad, Executive Engineer Public Works Department, Chairman and Secretary of the Mandi Parishad. District Magistrate thereafter wrote to the Director, Mandis, on February 13, 1979, and the latter agreed as appearing from his letter in reply dated March 1, 1979. The proposal for acquisition was mooted to the State Government, which found acceptance resulting into the notification, referred to above. The notification under Section 4(1)/17(4) specifies the need and refers also to the construction of the market yard proposed being a part of the planned development scheme. This forms part of the land development scheme being carried -out throughout the State. The U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, has, for its object, the amelioration of the marketing conditions and providing relief to the agriculturists in particular against various kinds of exploitation in connection with the marketing of agricultural produce. It is this object which is sought to be subserved by the construction of the market yard and this, in the opinion of the State Government, admits of no delay. We do not find non -existence of facts or non -application of mind or mala fides to justify interference with the satisfaction thus arrived at. In the affidavit filed for the petitioners, in each of these cases in support of the respective petitions, the averments with regard to the non -application of mind and absence of material have been made, it would appear, recklessly as is manifest from the verification to the effect that they are based on the personal knowledge of the petitioners. We put it pointedly to Sri S.R. Singh as to how could the petitioners have personal knowledge on the subject and waited for answer in vain. Curiously enough in the rejoinder affidavits also there appears the same type of verification. In contrast we have the counter -affidavits for the Mandi Samiti based on the record. In a catena of decisions of this Court the dispensing with of proceedings under Section 5 -A in connection with the construction of market yard for Mandi Samiti under planned development scheme has been upheld. Reference may be made in this connection to Qaiser Sibtain Khan & others v. State of U.P. & others W.P. No. 9730 of 1978 dt. 6 -9 -1979, Vishwanath Tewari etc. v. State of U.P. W.P. No. 6255 of 1978 dt. 16 -1 -1980, and Satyendra Prasad Jain etc. v. State of U.P., etc. W.P. No. 18419 of 1986 dt. 19 -1 -1987. This Court has taken the view moreover that the construction of market yard, as in the present, may be covered under planned development scheme (vide Babulal & others v. State of U.P. etc, W.P. No. 3499 of 1976 dt. 12 -7 -1977, Ramjidas & others v. State of U.P. etc. W.P. No 590 of 1976 dt. 12 -10 -1977, Som Dutt v. State of U.P., : 1976 A.L.R. 529 and Ram Surat etc. v. State of U.P., & others, : A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 166. In these cases also the dispensing with of proceedings under section 5 -A was upheld. The time taken prior to January 29, 1983, in processing the proposal approved by the Director, Mandi, on March 1, 1979 is not material. The material fact is the existence of the need and also the urgency thereof in the prevailing marketing conditions with respect to agricultural produce which it is aimed to remedy by these measures (see also State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi & others, : (1986) 4 S.C.C. 251. Lastly the submission on petitioners' behalf is that the land in question includes grove land. The noteworthy feature in this connection is that both the notifications refer pointedly to the acquisition being made under planned development scheme. As we mentioned above the project may be covered under the planned development scheme. Where this is the position Section 17(1 -A) of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended in U.P.) would be attracted. Section 17(4) Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the U.P. Act VIII of 1974 reads as under: - - In the case of any land to which, in opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub -section (1), sub -section (1 -A) or sub -section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5 -A shall not apply, and if it does so direct a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub -section (1). In view of this amendment (By U.P. Act VIII of 1974) it became possible to dispense with the provisions of Section 5 -A read with Section 17(4) even in a case where the land is not a waste or arrable. Ramjidas and others v. State of U.P. and others, W.P. No. 590 of 12.10.1977 (D.B.). It is true that the notifications in this case do not expressly make mention of Section 17(1 -A). But that is of no consequence the reason being that there is mention of the acquisition being in connection with planned development scheme. In State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that the mere omission to refer expressly to Section 17(1 -A) in the notification is not fatal so long as the Government has the power in that sub -section to take land other than wasteland arrable also by invoking the urgency clause. It was observed in this connection in paragraph 2 of the reported decision: - - It is no doubt true that in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act while exempting the application of Section 5 -A of the Act to the proceedings, the State Government had stated that the land in question was arable land and it had not specifically referred to sub -section (1 -A) of Section 17 of the Act under which it could take possession of land other than waste and arable land by applying the urgency clause. The mere omission to refer expressly Section 17(1 -A) of the Act in the notification cannot be considered to be fatal in this case as long as the government had the power in that sub -section to take lands other than waste and arable lands also by invoking the urgency clause. Whenever power under Section 17(1 -A) is invoked the government automatically becomes entitled to take possession of land other than waste and arable lands by virtue of sub -section (1 -A) of section 17 without further declaration where the acquisition is for sanitary improvement or planned development. In the present case the acquisition is for planned development. We do not find any substance in the above contention. In the result, the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ;