Anshuman Singh, J. - (1.) THIS petition under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer that respondent Sri Uma Shanker Bajpai, the then Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, should be punished for disobeying the order passed by this Court.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to the present petition briefly are that the petitioner was suspended by the respondent by an order dated 3-10-1985 while he was posted as Station House Officer, Police Station Manda, district Allahabad. THE petitioner challenged the aforesaid order of suspension in this Court and obtained an ex-parte interim order on 7-10-1985. By the said order the operation of the order dated 3-10-1985 was stayed and the petitioner was ordered to be paid his salary. It has been alleged that the copy of the interim order passed by this court was served on respondent on 8-10-1985 but the respondent did not comply with the order of this court. THEreupon the petitioner filed this petition in this court on 21-1-1986. THE learned single Judge before whom the petition was presented issued show cause notice to the respondent before issuing notice to the respondent on the contempt petition. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent on 26-2-1986 denying the allegations contained in the petition. Counsel for the petitioner was granted one month's time to file a rejoinder affidavit on 5-3-1986. THE case was listed on various dates but inspite of time granted on several occasions no rejoinder affidavit was filed till 24-10-1986 when the case was listed before me for admission. On that date the case was ordered to be listed as part heard on Tuesday next and thereafter the case was adjourned on some ground or the other some times either at the instance of the counsel for the petitioner or at the instance of the counsel for the respondent. At the time of hearing of petition a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the counsel for the respondent that the petition is barred under section 20 of the Act as one year period has expired from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Thereafter counsel for the petitioner took time to meet the preliminary objection and the matter was adjourned on several dates. I have heard Sri D. P. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri K. N. Tripathi learned Gounsel for the respondent, on the preliminary issue raised on behalf of the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Smt. Bano v. Ram Autar Gautam, 1986 AWC 1039. Learned counsel for the petitioner inspite of time granted has not been able to cite any authority in which a contrary view has been taken. I find myself in full agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Smt. Bano (Supra) and the facts of the instant case cannot be distinguished on any account.
(3.) THE main thrust of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this case is that since the petition was presented in this Court on 21-1-1986 which was within one year from the date of passing of the interim order and this Court while issuing notice has already applied its mind, therefore, the bar of section 20 would not be attracted in the instant case. Before expressing my opinion and also before deciding the question of limitation it would be desirable to refer to the relevant portion of the order dated 21-1-1986 passed by the learned single Judge, which reads :- ".........THE notice issued shall indicate that the application will be listed before this Court on 3-2-1986 for considering the question as to whether notice should be issued or not ". Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that since this Court issued notice to the respondent on 21-1-1986 it shall be deemed to have applied its mind to the facts of the case and the issuance of the : notice would amount to taking of cognizance. From a perusal of the order passed by this Court I am not inclined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the Court had applied its mind on 21-1-1986 while issuing notice. When a contempt petition is filed before the Court there are three options open ; firstly if the Court is satisfied on the allegations contained in the petition that a prima facie case has been made out the Court may issue notice to the contemnor to show cause as to why he should not be punished for disobeying the order alleged to have been disobeyed ; secondly if the Court is not convinced that any prima facie case is made out it may issue a show cause notice to the alleged contemnor as to why the petition for contempt should not be admitted ; and lastly may dismiss it straightway. It has been urged on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner that it is not necessary that the Court should use the world ' admit ' and then ' issue notice ' and even if the Court has not used the word ' admit ' and issued notice the Court shall be deemed to have applied its mind to the facts and the same amount to taking of the cognizance. It may be true that in some cases while the Court issuing notice may omit to mention the word ' admit ' and use the words ' issue notice ' but the order passed in the instant case by the learned single Judge emphatically indicates that he issued notice to the respondent to show cause whether it was a fit case for issuance of notice or not. In view of the said fact I am of definite view that the Court was not satisfied even for issuance of notice to the respondent that why clear words were used " whether notice should be issued or not ". In the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrishna Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 2255 which has been relied upon by the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Scot. Bano (Supra) it has been held that " it is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt ". In view of the said fact the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt is form the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt. In view of the aforesaid discussion there can be no manner of doubt that the period of limitation as provided in section 20 of the Act is to be determined on the date when the proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. In the instant case the order dated 21-1-1986 does not amount to initiation of proceeding by this Court. THErefore, the period of limitation as provided in section 20 has to be counted on the date when this court decides to initiate proceeding against the respondent. Since in the instant case more than a year has passed from the date on which the respondent is alleged to have disobeyed the order passed by this Court the initiation of proceeding would be clearly barred by section 20 of the Act in case the notice is issued on the contempt petition asking the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for disobeying the order of this court. I am also clearly of the view that the order dated 21-1-1986 is not an order of admission of the contempt petition. THErefore, the period of limitation has to be taken into account at the time of admission of the contempt petition. In view of the facts stated earlier I am of definite view that since one year has already expired from the date on which the respondent is alleged to have committed the contempt of this Court, it is not permissible to initiate contempt proceeding against the respondent. Since I have already held that initiation of proceedings for contempt against the respondent today would be against the provisions of section 20 of the Act, I consider it futile to judge the case on merits. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.;