S.C. Mathur, J. - (1.) The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 8-5-1986 annexure 7 passed by the District Judge, Kheri whereby the petitioners' appeal directed against the order of Trial Court dated 6-3-1986 annexure 5 has been dismissed.
(2.) It appears that the plaintiff Opposite Party No. 1 filed suit against the petitioners for injunction. It further appears that the claim of plaintiff-opposite party was that the petitioners were threatening to raise as wall over the land in suit which, if raised, would leave him without exit from his house. The Trial Court granted interim injunction to restrain the defendants from raising the wall but before this injunction could be served, the wall had already been constructed. Thereafter the plaintiff moved another application seeking interim mandatory injunction to command the defendants to open a passage in the wall so as to provide ingress and aggress to the plaintiff's house. The application was allowed by the Trial Court. The petitioners 1, 3 and 4 preferred appeal against this order of the Trial Court before the learned District Judge raising the plea that they had not been served with the notice of the application and, therefore, the interim mandatory injunction had been given in violation of the principles of natural justice. In the said appeal petitioners 2 and 5 had been impleaded as respondents. In the impugned order the learned District Judge has observed that the interim order passed by the Trial Court deserves to be maintained as without that the plaintiff will be a prisoner in his house, inasmuch as he will have no exit from his house.
(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the learned District Judge firstly on the ground that after the plaintiff had got his application for prohibitory injunction dismissed, it was not open to him to make another application for mandatory interim injunction. I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel. The earlier application had obviously become infructuous and nothing remained for its disposal of that application would not debar the plaintiff from making another application for different kind of relief.;