VIDHYA SABHA LEDUKA Vs. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR FIRMS SOCIETIES AND CHITS
LAWS(ALL)-1987-4-18
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on April 01,1987

VIDBYA SABHA, LEDNKA, JAUNPUR THROUGH ITS SECRETARY SHRI SATYA DEO ARYA Appellant
VERSUS
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR, FIRMS SOCIETIES AND CHITS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

B. D. Agarwal, J.- - (1.) THE short question, which this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution gives rise, is whether the application made by the petitioners for renewal of registration of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, could be refused as it has been done in this case by the Assistant Registrar on ground that the renewal had not been applied for prior to January 31, 1986. THE Society was admittedly registered on January 23, 1951. THE application for renewal was made on 26th March, 1986. THE order rejecting the renewal is dated August 7, 1986 (vide Annexure II to the petition) made by the Assistant Registrar, Varanasi.
(2.) SECTION 3-A was introduced by the U. P. Amendment Act 52 of 1975, with effect from October 10, 1975. In short, section 3-A contains provisions in respect of renewal of registration of a society covered under the said Act. The provision made with effect from October 10, 1975, was that in case the certificate of registration had been issued prior to the commencement of this Amendment Act, the same was to remain in operation for a period of two years with effect from the commencement of the Amendment Act and there was provision made in sub-section (5) of section 3-A to the effect that renewal of such a society could be applied for within one year from the date of the expiry of the renewed term and also that in case no such renewal was applied, the society shall be deemed to become unregistered. There is no dispute that no renewal was applied for in respect of this society within the period contemplated under the U. P. Amendment Act, 1975, that is, within October 10, 1975. The U. P. Amendment Act 26 of 1984 came into force on April 30, 1984. The proviso to subsection (1 of section (3-A ?) as introduced by the U. P. Act 52 of 1975 was as under: "Provided that a certificate issued before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act), shall remain in force for a period of two years from the date of such commencement". The U. P. Amendment Act 26 of 1984, has substituted this proviso by providing as under ; "Provided that a certificate issued before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter in this SECTION referred to as the said Act), shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of such commencement on payment of difference of the fees specified under sub-section (3) and the fee already paid". From the above it will be observed that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3-A remains the same as before except with a provision with respect to the payment of difference of fees has been inserted later with which we are not directly concerned herein. The submission raised on behalf of the respondents, to which learned Additional Chief standing Counsel also subscribes, is that the application of this proviso should be confined to cases where the renewal of the society had been got done subsequent to the commencement of the U. P. Amendment Act 52 of 1975. The argument advanced is that in relation to a society, which was to be deemed as unregistered because of such renewal not having been applied for as provided under sub-section (5) of section 3-A it is not to be understood as provided for renewal to be got done by making application within five years from the date of the commencement of the U. P. Amendment Act, 1984. The argument is not without force. But then in considering the same, regard is to be had to the context as also the express language used and the object behind the amendment introduced by the 1984 Act. The proviso as substituted by the 1984 Act in the first place makes no distinction in respect of societies to which the same may be made applicable. It does not say that the proviso will not apply to a society which was not got renewed within the period intervening between the enforcement of the U. P. Amendment Act, 1975 and the commencement of the U. P. Amendment Act, 1984. On the contrary the language used is in reference to a certificate issued "before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1984' meaning thereby that it covers within its span all such societies in relation to which the certificate of registration may have been issued at any time prior to April 30, 1984, when the 1984 Amendment Act commenced. We put it specifically to the learned counsel for the respondents as to which are the cases to which the proviso would apply in case the interpretation given were that it would not attract a society wherein renewal was not applied for within that intervening period and to this we are unable to have a satisfactory answer. There is some incongruity, no doubt, as a result of existence of sub-section (5) and the Amendment Act made by the 1984 Act being not expressly given retrospective effect. But this can be resolved satisfactorily, in our opinion, upon a true interpretation in the light of the entire context. From section 3-A, as introduced initially with effect from 10-10-1975, it would appear that the extension given to the said certificates of registration was for a period of two years only and in view of sub-section (5) renewal could be applied for within another one year of the expiry of this period of two years. Legislature seems later to have considered this period of two years as too short and, therefore, the Legislature by substituting the proviso through 1984 Amendment Act substituted five years in place of two years meaning thereby that the position obtaining in all other respect remains the same except that instead of two years the life of the society in relation to which there was registration at any time prior to April 30, 1984, is extended to five years instead of two years. It remains open consequently in such a case to seek renewal within one year from the date of the expiry of the extended term of five years. The settled cannon of interpretation is that it should be such as subserves the object of the Legislature and fulfils the purpose rather than negatives the same unless the language used be such as may not admit of any other construction. But in this case that may not be said to be so. The intention of the Legislature as appearing from the language used in re- enacting the relevant portion of section 3-A by the U. P. (Amendment) Act, 1984 would appear to be to impart a new lease of life to societies, which had been registered at any time prior to the commencement of this Act, but in which case the renewal could not be had earlier for some reason or the other. The statute has to be read as a whole; the construction placed should be such as does not render otiose or renders any part thereof, redundant. In case the interpretation suggested for the respondents were to be adopted the proviso to section 3-A (1) would be rendered meaningless and that suggestion may not be accepted under a compelling situation which in this case does not exist. The other contention raised for the respondents before us has been with respect to the petitioners not having deposited the required differential in the fee etc. This, in our opinion, is subsidiary-the reason being that in case time is still surviving for the renewal to be applied for and obtained, the differential in regard to the fee may be made good even at this stage.
(3.) FOR the respondents it was submitted also that on August 21, 1986 the respondents have got registration made of the society in the same name. The submission is that since there has been this registration done, the petitioner may not get the renewal made of the society on their application. In our view the question that arises is whether renewal was duly applied for and whether the same could be declined on ground that it had not been timely applied. The question of a fresh registration coming in the way arises only in case it were to be found that no renewal could be had by or on behalf of petitioners. In considering the application made for renewal under section 3-A the Registrar concerned may, no doubt, take into account what is provided under sub-section (2) of section 3 including whether the persons applying for renewal are competent in this behalf. In the light of the discussion made above the impugned order dated August 7, 1986 made by the Assistant Registrar, Varanasi Division, Varanasi (respondent no. 1) is quashed. The Assistant Registrar, Varanasi Division, Varanasi (respondent no. 1) is directed to consider the application made for renewal dated March 26, 1986 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made therein.;


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