Dr. R. R. Misra, J. - (1.) THESE two writ petitions filed by the same petitioner and involving a common question of law are directed against a common order dated 7-6-1984 passed by the Deputy Sugar Commissioner, Meerut. The appeals filed by the petitioner were beyond the prescribed period of limitation for filing the appeals and as such the appellate authority, the opposite party no. 1, dismissed the appeals of the petitioner as time-barred on the view that there is no provision under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for condonation of delay. The said order has been assailed on behalf of the petitioner on the ground that the aforesaid view taken by the appellate authority is erroneous in law.
(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows : " 29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. " In this section it is noteworthy that there is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the aforesaid provision contained in Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act) is concerned. In the old Section 29 (2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 there was a provision to the effect that for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provision of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was excluded in a clear and specific term. A reading of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reproduced above, however, shows that for the purposes of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Obviously, Section 5 is included between Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act. The aforesaid provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to special or local law while by virtue of provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 are specifically made applicable to special or local law. Undoubtedly, the provision of U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act are a special or local law within the meaning of words used under the aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the order of the appellate authority, dated 7-6-1984, suffers from a manifest error of law. It is held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are clearly applicable to the appeals filed under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act.
(3.) IN the result, both the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 7-6-1984 passed by the appellate authority, opposite party no. 1, (Annexure No. '4' to the writ petitions) is hereby quashed with a direction to consider the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay and decide the same in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.;