N. N. Mithal, J. - (1.) IT is one of those unfortunate cases which should have never come to the Court if the parties concerned had acted in the best traditions of judicial behaviour.
(2.) BY means of this writ petition, certain remarks made by the appellate court while deciding a revision against the officer against whose judgment the revision had been filed are sought to be expunged. The petitioner is aggrieved by the fact that the language used by the revisional court while disposing of the revision against his order contains aspersions and disparaging remarks against him with a view to humiliate him. The duty to maintain the dignity and decorum of the court lies not only on the parties appearing before the court or the Advocates appearing for them but also on the judicial officers who occupy presiding seats in the Court. It is one of the foremost principles of judicial behaviour that the judicial officer while discharging his duty must act with utmost self restraint and composure. It is expected of him that in no circumstance would he lose his temper and give vent to such feelings either by spoken word or in writing in judicial matters. The judicial tradition lays stress that in order to command respect, the judicial officers also must behave with respect and by their conduct in the court should create an atmosphere in which they command respect without demanding it. It is, therefore, necessary both for the subordinate court and the appellate court to be very careful in what they do in public and what they do in court while deciding cases. The words they write in their orders and judgments must not be extravagant and should be well balanced and limited to the controversy awaiting decision by the court. The appellate court, while deciding appeals and revisions must always be aware of the distinction which exists between the judgment which they are called upon to comment upon and the person whose judgment it was. The personality of the Judge writing the judgment should in no case come in for comment by the appellate court. The appellate court owes a duty to confine all its comments and criticisms to the record of the case and the line of reasoning in the judgment delivered by the court below. The appellate court no doubt has a right to criticise the findings and the manner of dealing with a case by the trial court but this has to be done in a dignified manner and in a language which is sober and balanced. The language employed by it should not reflect even a trace of malice towards any of the parties or the officer who gave the judgment under consideration. The judicial officers must, therefore, observe necessary restraint in such matters and should avoid being dis-respectful in their observations either about the quality and reasoning employed in its judgment or order by the lower court, but do so in a sober, restraint and graceful manner. As far back as in 1944, in Emperor v. Ganpati Sitaram Vaidya, AIR 1944 Nagpur 136 Pollock, J. made the following observations on this point which are even more relevant today : " I wish to make it clear that this court regards it as undesirable and improper for one Judge or Magistrate to criticise another in such unrestrained language. It is unfair to the Magistrate concerned as a public indictment of this sort tends to make his position as a Magistrate difficult and must affect adversely his ability to perform his magisterial duties. It also lowers the administration of justice in the, eyes of the public. A judgment is not the proper place for such structures and the Privy Council has before now reprobated much milder criticisms as unnecessary and adding nothing to the weight of the judgment. "
(3.) THE Supreme Court also had an occasion to deal with a similar matter in THE State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nairn, AIR 1964 SC 703 and it observed as under : " It is principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice that the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by the Supreme Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisation defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before the courts of law in the cases to be decided by them. It is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. " In pointing out the above observations, all I wish to do is to remind the judicial officers to act with self control and self discipline while making remarks in their judgments and orders either about the parties, their Advocates or even the officer whose judgment is under review before them. It is unfortunate that in the case before me certain remarks have been made which, in my opinion, were neither necessary nor required for the decision of the revision. If the revisional court disagreed with the view taken by the court below, it was fully entitled to reverse the findings and to allow the revision. But while doing so, it should have used language without making any disparaging remarks against the officer concerned.;