N.D. Ojha, J. - (1.) THE plaintiff opposite parties instituted a suit for ejectment of the applicant from a premises which was let out to him for running a press as also for arrears of rent and damages etc. on the ground that the applicant was in arrears of rent as contemplated by clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act'). It appears from the order-sheet of the trial court that the suit was instituted on September 18, 1973. It was registered on October 10, 1973 and summons were issued to the applicant requiring him to file his written statement on November 26, 1973 and indicating that December 7, 1973 was the date fixed for issues. On December 7, 1973, namely, the date which was fixed for issues the applicant made a tender of Rs. 8,088/- which according to him represented the amount contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. A perusal of the record of the court below further indicates that in pursuance of that tender the sum of Rs. 8,088/- was actually deposited in the State Bank of India on December 8, 1973. After having made the said deposit the applicant claimed the benefit of said sub-section (4) and urged that he having made the requisite deposit he should be relieved against his liability from eviction. THE Additional District Judge who decided the suit has recorded a finding that it had not been disputed before him on behalf of the plaintiffs that the aforesaid amount deposited by the applicant covered the entire amount as required under Section 20(4) of the Act. He, however, took the view that since it had been established by the plaintiff opposite parties that the applicant had acquired in the year 1958 the land of house No. 12 \ 120 F from one Bhagirathi Devi through sale-deed and that the house stood on this land in which the applicant has been living, the case was covered by the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 20 and consequently the applicant was not entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4). He accordingly decree the suit for ejectment and also for arrears of rent and mesne profits on May 30, 1975. THE present civil revision has been filed against this decree passed by the Additional District Judge. Only one point has been urged in support of the revision, namely, that on the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge that the amount deposited by the applicant covered the entire amount as required under Section 20(4) of the Act, the applicant was entitled1 to the benefit of sub-section (4) and that the Additional District Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in taking the view that the case was covered by the proviso to sub-section (4). Having heard counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that there is Substance in this submission. Since it was not in dispute that the amount deposited by the applicant covered the amount as contemplated by sub-section (4), it is not necessary to quote that sub-section. THE whole argument is centred on the interpretation of the proviso to sub-section (4) which reads:, "Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section- (a) the expression first hearing' means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant; (b) the expression 'cost of the suit' includes one-half of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit." I may here point out that the explanation to the proviso was inserted by Section 13 of the U.P. Urban Buildings "(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976. -On a perusal of the proviso, I am of opinion that it applies only to a residential building for otherwise the use of the word 'residential' before the word 'building' in the proviso will have no meaning. If the intention was to make the proviso applicable to every building the word 'residential' would not have been used before the word 'building'. It is an established rule of interpretation that no part of an enactment is to be held as surplusage. In the instant case since admittedly the premises in question were not held by the applicant for residential purposes, his having built a residential building within the meaning of the proviso would be of no consequence. THE purposes of the proviso is clear and it is that in case the tenant has an alternative accommodation which he can use for the purpose for which he is occupying the building under his tenancy, he should not be given the benefit of sub-section (4). In the instant case, however, since the premises in question were occupied by the applicant admittedly not for residential purpose but for running a press, namely, for commercial purpose, his having built a residential building in the year 1958 would not deprive him of the benefit which he was entitled to Jip view of his having made the deposit as contemplated by sub-section (4). Another argument was addressed by counsel for the applicant, namely, that the proviso applied only to such buildings which had been constructed after the coming into force of the Act did not refer to such buildings which may have been constructed before its commencement. THE argument is plausible but I am not expressing any final opinion on the matter inasmuch as the revision can be allowed on the ground already stated above. It was urged by counsel for the plaintiff opposite parties that since November 26, 1973 was the date fixed for written statement, it would be the date of first hearing within the meaning of sub-section (4) in view of clause (a) of the explanation. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission for the simple reason that as seen above the explanation was inserted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 which was published in the U.P. Extra Ordinary Gazette on July 5, 1976. In the instant case the deposit had been made in December, 1973 i.e. long before the explanation was inserted. On account of the deposit hearing been made by the applicant a right accrued, in his favour, namely, immunity from ejectment as contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. This right could be taken away by a subsequent amendment only if it was made retrospective. In the instant case, however, a perusal of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 would make it clear that the explanation was not inserted retrospectively. By the same Section 13 the words 'tenders to the landlord' used in sub-section (4) were substituted by the words 'tenders to the landlord or deposits in court'. This was done by clause (b) (i) of the amending Act which reads: (b) in sub-section (4), (i) for the words 'tenders to the landlord' the words 'tenders to the landlord or deposits in court shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted:-" THE explanation was added by clause (b) (ii) of Section 13 which reads: "(ii) at the end, the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely ........" THE language of this clause is differently worded. Had the intention been to insert the explanation with retrospective effect the words 'and be deemed always to have been inserted 'would have been used in this clause as the words 'and be deemed always to have been substituted' were used in clause (b) (i). Accordingly, I am of opinion that the explanation which was inserted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 cannot be given retrospective operation. THE deposit which was made on December 8, 1973 in pursuance of the tender submitted on December 7, 1973 would be deemed to be a deposit on December 7, 1973. See K. P. Jain v. Om Prakash (1966 A.L.J. 108.). In this way the amount was deposited on that very date which was the date fixed for issues. This would be the date of first hearing in view of the decision of this Court in Ladly Prasad v. Ram Shah Billa and others (1976(2) A.L.R. 8) it is true that in Ladly Prasad's case (supra) the provisions of order 15 rule 5 as added by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 had come up for consideration but in my opinion there is no reason why the same interpretation to the words 'first hearing' in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act may not be given as has been given to those very words as used in order 15 rule 5 in Ladly Prasad's case. Accordingly, the applicant was entitled to be relieved against the liability of eviction from the premises in question on account of the aforesaid deposit having been made by him. Counsel for the applicant urged that even though the applicant was entitled to be relieved against his liability from eviction on account of the aforesaid deposit the plaintiff opposite parties were not entitled to be paid over the entire amount aforesaid inasmuch as the deposit included the rent even in respect of a period for which the claim had become barred by time. In my opinion there is no substance in this submission in view of the decision of this Court in K. G. Trust v. R. Chandraji (1977 A.L.J. 334) where it was held. THE word 'due' occurring in Sec. 20 (4) of the Rent Control Act of 1972 has entirely a different context. It occurs in a section which provides, not an. alternative procedure for recovery of arrears of rent, but which confers upon the tenant a right to relief against eviction. This right is founded upon the condition that the rent due must be paid. It confers no discretion on the tenant. THE provision is explicit and mandatory. Unless the condition is fulfilled, the right to relief against eviction does not accrue. This, coupled with the fact that a time-barred arrears of rent continues to remain an undischarged debt, clearly means that the phrase 'entire amount of arrears of rent due 'would include arrears of rent, recovery of which has become time-barred within meaning of clause (4) of Section 20'. Section 20(4) confers a special benefit upon a tenant of getting relieved against his liability for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 in case he makes the requisite deposit as contemplated by Section 20(4). He can get this special benefit only if he strictly complies with the requirements of making the necessary deposit. On the deposit being made the landlord loses his right to get a decree for ejectment but this provision confers a corresponding right on him to withdraw the entire sum deposited by the tenant including such rent which otherwise could not be recovered having become barred by time. Contrary view will reduce the requirement of depositing even the time barred rent to a mere formality. Can it be said that the purpose of the deposit is to relieve the tenant against his liability for eviction and then to permit him to withdraw such portion of the rent which was barred by time. This obviously could not be the purpose, for otherwise why require the tenant to deposit the time barred rent at all. Reliance was then placed by counsel for the applicant on subsection (6) of Section 20 as inserted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 which reads: "Any amount deposited by the tenant under sub-section (4) or under Rule 5 of Order XV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be paid to the landlord forthwith on his application without prejudice to the parties' pleadings and subject to the ultimate decision in the suits." It was urged that since the withdrawal of deposit under Section 20(4) has been made subject to the ultimate decision in the suit, it means that the landlord will have to refund such amount in respect of which his claim is barred by time because the court cannot pass any decree for a time barred claim. This submission too has no suostance. As pointed out in the case of K, G. Trust (supra) Section 20(4) does not provide an alternative procedure for recovery of arrears of rent but only confers upon the tenant a right to be relieved against eviction. It is thus clear that when the court permits the withdrawal by the landlord of even the time barred rent deposited by the tenant under Section 20(4) it does not pass any decree for recovery of a time barred rent, In my opinion, the withdrawal of the amount has been made subject to the result of the suit to meet different contingencies. I may illustrate one of them. Suppose the case of the landlord in the plaint is that the provisions of the Act did not apply to the accommodation in respect of which a decree for eviction is sought but the case of the tenant is that the Act is applicable. THE tenant makes the requisite deposit under Section 20(4) but ultimately it is held in the suit that the Act is not applicable to the accommodation in question. In such an event if the landlord has not already withdrawn the amount he will not be permitted to do so and if he has withdrawn it he will be required to refund the same. Consequently, I am of opinion that the plaintiff opposite parties entitled to withdraw the whole amount deposited by the applicant under Section 20(4) of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussion the revision succeeds and is allowed. THE suit for ejectment of the applicant is dismissed. THE plaintiff Opposite parties would be entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs. 8,088/- deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act by the applicant as aforesaid. THEy will also be entitled to withdraw that amount which may have been deposited either as rent or as mesne profits by the applicant during the pendency of the suit under order XV, Rule 5 C.P.C. which shall be adjusted towards the rent which accrued due after the institution of the suit at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month which has been found by the trial court to be the monthly rent payable by the applicant. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.;