M. P. Mehrotra, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit for declaration that the plaintiff continues in service of the defendant-respondent No. 1. A claim for salary has also been added. The facts in brief are these: The plaintiff was selected in June, 1964 by the Selection Committee of the defendant No. 1 for appointment to a post in the said institution. The letter of appointment stated that the plaintiff was being appointed as an assistant teacher "on trained graduate grade on one year's probation with effect from the date of the joining of his duties " The plaintiff joined his duties on 1st July, 1964 and worked for the entire academic Session 1964-6 -. On 25th March, 1965 the District Inspector of Schools, Basti called upon the Manager of the said institution to show cause why the amount mentioned therein be not deducted from the grants-in-aid because the institution had appointed after 1959 six teachers, one of whom was the plaintiff, without obtaining the Inspector's approval. The Inspector also called upon the Manager to submit the papers concerning the appointment of the said six leachers within two days of the receipt of the letter. The Manager sent the letter dated 28th March, 1965 to the Inspector and followed toe same by a reminder with 25th Ma), 1965 seeking approval for the appointment of the said six teachers. The lower appellate Court in its judgment has stated that the said letters dated 28th March, 1965 and 25th May, 1965 are not on record. THIS is incorrect. Both the said letters are on record and have been exhibited as Exs. A4 and A5 respectively. The Inspector by his reply dated 30th May, 1965 (Ex. A6) disapproved of the said appointments. Thereafter Ex. 2 was issued to the plaintiff which is the order terminating the plaintiff's services. It was sent by registered post on 12th June, 1965 but the plaintiff alleges that he received the same on 3rd July, 1965. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he was not allowed to join his duties on 1st July, 1965 when the new Session started. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit claiming the aforesaid reliefs. The plaintiff's claim was that he was a permanent employee of the institution and, therefore, the notice terminating his service was void and ineffective as the necessary approval had not been obtained from the District Inspector of Schools and in the absence of such approval, as required by law, the plaintiff could not be removed from service. Inter alia, it was also alleged that the plaintiff acquired the status of a permanent teacher because when the papers for the approval of the Inspector were submitted to the latter by the institution, the Inspector did not pass any order within two weeks end, therefore, the plaintiff stood automatically confirmed in his appointment. Further, it was alleged that the period of probation of one year expired on 30th June 1965 and as the letter terminating the plaintiff's service was served on him on 3rd July, 1965. therefore, it should be held that the plaintiff stood confirmed on the expiry of the probation period on 30th June, 1965 and the service of the notice termination of his appointment after 30th June, 1963 was of no consequence. It was also contended that the order dated 30th May, 1965 passed by the Inspector was illegal because the said authority due to his failure to pass any order within two weeks of the receipt of the letter from the institution seeking his approval disentitled himself to pass any order and. therefore, in law the plaintiff stood confirmed and the subsequent disapproval contained in the letter dated 30th June, 1965 was ineffective and void. The defence was that the plaintiff's appointment itself was not valid as no prior approval of the Inspector was obtained regarding his appointment it was further alleged that the appointment was, in any case, a temporary one and before the expiry of the period of probation, the said appointment was terminated. It was further stated that as the Inspector had disapproved of the plaintiff's appointment, therefore, the institution had to put an end to his service. The civil court's jurisdiction to try the suit was questioned in view of the Provisions contained in the Intermediate Education Act. It was denied that the plaintiff had become automatically a permanent employee of the institution as claimed by him. The Inspector's order contained in his letter dated 30th May, 1965 was not illegal or void as allged by the plaintiff. The trial Court framed the necessary issues and after trying them dismissed the suit. In the lower appellate Court the plaintiff again failed in his appeal. Now, he has come up in the instant second appeal and in support thereof I have heard Shri G. N. Verma and Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants Shri G. P. Mathur, learned counsel for the respondents has been heard in opposition. Counsel for the appellant again contended that the plaintiff appellant stood confirmed in view of the fact that the approval of the Inspector was sought by the letter dated 28th March, 1965 and within two weeks of the receipt of the said letter, the Inspector did not pass any order and, therefore by virtue of Section 16-F(2) of the Intermediate Education Act, it should be-deemed that the Inspector gave his approval to the plaintiff's appointment. Reliance was placed on the unreported decision dated 3rd September, 1973 of a learned Single Judge in Second Appeal No. 3075 of 1971, Nand Kishore Shukla v Krishak Education Society, Harihapur. It was laid down in this case that even if initially the appointment made without the approval of the Inspector may be invalid "but the same would become legal at least from the date the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was obtained. Reliance was also placed on another unreported decision dated 25th April, 1973 in Special Appeal No. 1023 of 1969, Regional Deputy Director of Education v. Managing Committee. THIS is a Division Bench pronouncement. Referring to the last sentence of Section 16-F(2) of the Intermediate Education Act, which says "The Inspector or Regional Deputy Director, Education, as the case may be, shall give his decision within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers failing which approval shall be deemed to have been accorded." It was held "The language of the provision quoted above is mandatory and if the disapproval is not given within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers then it is to be presumed that approval has been given." To the same effect is the case decided by a learned single Judge of this Court reported in Radhey Ram Sharma v. Deputy Director of Education(1976 A.W.C. 190.). In Committee of Management v District Inspector of Schools(1977 A.L.R. 43 (Summary of Cases), it has been laid down; "Section 16(f)(2) requires that papers in connection with the selection of candidates have to be forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools or the Regional Deputy Director, Education, as the case may be, for obtaining his approval. Those papers are to be accompanied by a statement showing the names, qualifications and other particulars as may be prescribed of all candidates who may have applied for selection The Inspector or Regional Deputy Director, Education, is then required to give his decision within two weeks of the receipt of relevant papers It is obvious that the outer limit of the period mentioned in the section is to be computed with reference to the date on which the relevant papers are received by the District Inspector of Schools or the Regional Dy Director, Education." Counsel next contended, in the alternative, that a party should not suffer on account of the own negligence of the other party and that the letter should not be allowed to set up a contention which has the effect of giving the benefit to such party of its own wrong or negligence. It was the duty of the Committee of Management of the institute to get the necessary approval from the Inspector by forwarding all the necessary papers and by furnishing the necessary details to the said authority and if the Committee of Management failed to do so then it could not be allowed to contend that the plaintiff's appointment was bad on account of the lack of approval of the Inspector. Reliance was placed on the following cases for this contention. In Khalil Ahmad v. A. K. H. S. School(A.I.R. 1973 All. 287.), a learned single Judge laid down as follows: - "It is true that under Section 16-F(2) the appointment of a teacher has to be approved by the District Inspector of Schools but the want of such an approval cannot render the appointment illegal, particularly, when the management has failed to seek such an approval, it is a well-settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own default. It is not open to the management to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of Regulation 11 and other provisions of the Act, merely because it has not taken the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner was in no way responsible for this omission." On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment of the courts below on the grounds stated therein. He contended that there could be no expost facto approval of the Inspector and in terms of the provisions contained in Section l6-F(1)(b) of the intermediate Education Act the approval from the Inspector had to precede the appointment. The appointment of the plaintiff was clearly illegal inasmuch as no such prior approval was obtained. As the appointment itself was illegal, therefore, it was not necessary to get prior approval of the Inspector for terminating the plaintiff's service - It is only a validity. appointed teacher who can take the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 16-G(3) of the Act which lays down as follows; - "(3)(a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service in rank or subjected to any discvimination in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. (b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management: Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, the Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. (c) ..................... (d) ....................." It was also emphasised that there was a clear finding recorded by the trial court that the appointment of the plaintiff was not under the authority of the Executive Council but was by the Manager on his own who was not entitled to make the said appointment. The appointment was, therefore, found to be invalid for this additional reason also. Reliance was placed on G. K. Inter College v. Dy. Dir. of Education(1975 A. L.R. 323.). Counsel next contended that the plaintiff did not really set out in his plaint the case of implied approval of the Inspector on account of the letter's failure to pass any order within two weeks of the receipt of the letter of the management seeking his approval. THIS point is sought to be developed in the present appeal but it has no basis in the plaint itself. Moreover, it was pointed out that even if it be deemed that by the letter dated 28th March, 1965 the management sought the approval from the Inspector to the plaintiff's appointment, such approval was sought only for the current Session and, therefore, even if there was any implied approval it could only be to the expiry of the Session concerned and not beyond it. The Session undoubtedly expired on 30th June, 1965. Counsel rebutted that there could be any manner of estoppel against his client in reference to the question as to whether the plaintiff's initial appointment was valid or invalid. The maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio possedentis would not apply in view of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 16 F of the Intermediate Education Act. Lastly, it was contended that the suit was not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain(A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 883.), and as reiterated in its subsequent decision reported in Arya Vidya Sabha, Kashi v. K. K Srivastava(A.I.R. 1976 SC. 1076.). Further, it was emphasised that no relief could be granted to the plaintiff without setting aside the order of the Inspector dated 30th May, 1965 and this could not be done in the absence of the Inspector and the State Government as a party to the suit. I have considered the rival contentions made from the Bar and, in my opinion, it is not necessary to enter into the many questions of law which have been raised. Both the courts below have held that the initial appointment itself was invalid as no prior approval of the Inspector was obtained. Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that even if the approval was not initially obtained before the appointment itself, there was nothing in law to prevent such approval being obtained subsequently and the only result, in law, of subsequent approval would be that it would be effective in reference to the future though it might not validate the initial appointment itself. THIS was what Mr. Justice R. B. Misra in the aforesaid unreported decision in Nand Kishore Shukla's case (supra) has held and it seems to me that this is the correct view to be taken. Mr. G. P. Mathur sought to contend that the Division Bench has laid down the law to the contrary effect in A. K. Pathshala v. Smt. M. D. Agnihotri(1971 A.L.J. 983.), but, in my opinion, this is not the correct position. The Division Bench in the said case was not called upon to decide whether on approval accorded subsequent to the appointment would or would not operate in reference to the future. Therefore, in the instant case, what I have to see is whether any approval was sought subsequent to the appointment and whether the same was accorded either in fact or should be deemed to have been accorded in view of the relevant provisions contained in the Intermediate Education Act. In my opinion, it is not possible to hold that such an approval should, in law, be deemed to have been given to the plaintiff's appointment on account of the alleged failure of the Inspector to pass an order within two weeks of the receipt of the letter dated 28th March 1965. As the record stands, it is not possible to hold that all the necessary formalities had been complied with or that all the necessary papers had been forwarded to the Inspector which needed to be sent to him for getting his approval. In this connection a reference has been made to Regulation in which sets out the particulars which are to be stated in the statement required to be sent under sub-section (2) of Section 16-F. However, one thing seems to be very clear that the approval which was sought was not such as is contemplated for a permanent appointment under the provision of Section 16-F. It will be advantageous to the understanding of this controversy if I set out the relevant provisions. Sub-section (1) of Section 16-F is as follows: - '16-F. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter specified, no person shall be appointed as a Principal, Headmaster or teacher in a recognized institution unless he - (a) possesses the prescribed qualifications or has been exempted under sub-section (1) of Section 16-E: (b) has been recommended by selection committee constituted under, sub-sections 12) or (3): as the case may be, of the said section and approved, in the case of Principal or Headmaster by the Regional Deputy Director Education and in the case of a teacher by the Inspector: Provided that if the Inspector is satisfied that for any institution no candidate, who possesses all the prescribed qualifications, in available for appointment he may permit the institution to employ as a temporary measure any suitable person for a period not exceeding one year. Such period may be extended with the prior approval of the Inspector: Provided also that in the case of leave vacancy or a vacancy occurring for a part of the session of the institution it shall be lawful for the Committee of Management to appoint a Principal Headmaster or teacher if information of such an appointment is immediately conveyed to the Inspector." It will be seen that the aforesaid two provisos deal with two different situations which stand in separation from a case of a permanent appointment. The first proviso lays down that when the Inspector is satisfied that no candidate who possesses all the prescribed qualifications is available for appointment he may permit the institution to employ as a temporary measure any suitable person for a period not exceeding one year. Such period may be extended with the prior approval of the Inspector. The second proviso lays down that in the case of leave vacancy or of a vacancy occurring for a part of the session of the institution it shall be lawful for the Committee of Management to appoint a Principal, Headmaster or a teacher if information on such appointment is immediately conveyed to the Inspector. Now, in the instant case - Ex. A-4, which is the letter dated 28th March, 1965 clearly shows that the approval was sought for the then current session. It is true that in the sentence it was also added that "If you are unable to approve them on permanent basis". However, this was only if the Inspector had in his discretion granted approval for the permanent appointment. The plaintiff cannot contend that on the basis of the said sentence it should be deemed that the management was seeking approval for his permanent appointment. In seeking the Inspector's approval for the then session it can only be held that his case fell either under the 8rst proviso or the second proviso of Section 16-F. In either cast the period of appointment could not stretch beyond the said session. The appointment in any case came to an end at the end of the session and there was no question of obtaining any prior approval from the Inspector for terminating the service of the plaintiff. In this connection a reference may be made to Regulation 24 of Chapter III of Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. It lays down as follows: "The services of an employee appointed as a temporary measure or in a leave vacancy or in a vacancy occurring for a part of the session shall unless extended according to law, terminate on the expiry of the period for which he was appointed or when the vacancy comes to an end whichever is earlier, and no prior notice shall be needed for such termination. Explanation ....... Unless the context otherwise requites, the word "employee" in this and the following regulations of this Chapter shall mean a teacher, a Principal or a Headmaster." Coming to the alternative argument or the learned counsel for the appellant, I again see no force in the same. The Division Bench pronouncement reported in A K. Pathshala v. Smt. M. D. Agnihotri (supra), is clear and has laid down as follows: - "We think that Section 16-G(3) will apply only to a case where the Principal or the teacher has been validly appointed in conformity with the provisions of Section 16-F. As in the instant case the first respondent had not been appointed in conformity with the said provision, Section 16-G(3) will not be attracted." A similar argument was raised before the Bench as is clear from these observations; "It is submitted that as the approval of the Regional Deputy Director, Education could not be obtained on account of the mistake of the Institution, it cannot profit by its own wrong. We are unable to accept this argument for we have already held that Section 16-G will not apply to a case where the appointment is made in breach of the provisions of Section The observations which were made by Gulati, J. in AIR 1975 All. 287 (supra) which has been extracted above were made in ignorance of the law laid down by the said Division Bench in 1971 ALJ 983 (supra). Gulati, J. subsequently followed the aforesaid Division Bench and revised his opinion as is clear from his decision reported in G.K. Inter College v. Dy. Dir. of Education(1975 A.L.R. 323.), where he observed: "In Arya Kanya Pathshala and another v. Smt. Manorama Devi Agnihotri and others(supra), it has been held that Section 16-F(1) of the Intermediate Education Act is mandatory and not directory. If a person is appointed as the Principal of an institution without prior approval of the Regional Deputy Director of Education, the appointment is in the eye of law no appointment at all. Section 16 G(3) will not apply to a case where the appointment is made in breach of the provisions of Section 16-F(1). THIS appeal accordingly lacks merit and is dismissed. In the circumstances, however, I make no order as to costs.;