K. N. Seth, J. - (1.) IN this petition by the landlord two questions arise for consideration: (1) legality and propriety of rejection of the release application moved by the landlord and (2) validity of the allotment order in favour of respondent No. 3. There is no dispute that the petitioner is the landlord of house No. 293 situate in Mohalla Satha, Bulandshahr. A part of the building was in the occupation of one Rajeshwar Prasad as a tenant who vacated it some time in June 1975. The portion vacated by him was -let-out by the landlord to one Mohar Singh Karula without intimating the vacancy to the District Magistrate as required by law. Respondent No. 3 on December 27, 1975 made an application for allotment of the portion vacated by Rajeshwar Prasad. The Rent Control INspector submitted a report, after inspection and enquiry, that the accommodation was vacant and available for allotment. A vacancy was notified end applications were invited for allotment. On February 12, 1976 Mohar Singh Karula, to whom the house had been rented out by the landlord, gave an application for allotment. The landlord made an application for release of the accommodation in his favour on the ground that he required it for his personal use. IN the alternative he prayed for alloting it to his nominee Mohar Singh Karula. A further objection was raised that Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable as the building was not more than ten years old. The District Magistrate rejected the prayer of the landlord for release of the accommodation in his favour and allotted the premises to respondent No. 3. The landlord preferred an appeal which later on was converted into a revision. The allottee alone was impleaded as a respondent to that appeal revision. The learned Additional District Judge maintained the order of the District Magistrate and dismissal the appeal revision filed by the landlord. As regards the prayer for release of the accommodation in his favour the learned District Judge held that in view of clause (iv) of Section 16(1)(b) which provides that very application under that section shall be a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord, the appeal was not competent as the District Magistrate had not been impleaded as a party to the appeal. On facts also the learned Judge rejected the claim of the landlord for release of the accommodation on the finding that the need of the landlord for any additional accommodation had not been established. It is not necessary to enter into the controversy whether the appeal, in the absence of District Magistrate as a party, was competent or not. On fact I feel that the release application of the landlord has been rightly rejected. The plan of the building annexed to the petition indicated that the landlord has sufficient accommodation under his occupation. It was not the petitioner's case that after vacation of the disputed accommodation by Rajeshwar Prasad the need for Additional accommodation had sprung up. The fact that he let out the accommodation to Mohar Singh Karula falsefies the assertion that the lindlord needed the accommodation bona fide for his personal use. The application for release has been rightly rejected and no interference is called for. Challenging the validity of the order of allotment in favour of respondent No. 3 learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Section 17(2) was attracted to the case and no order of allotment could be passed in favour of respondent No. 3 when the landlord objected to it. IN this connection reference was made to the objection of the landlord wherein he had pleaded against allotment in favour of respondent No. 3 on the ground that there were no family connections with him and his good habits and way of living were entirely different. It was urged that in view Section 17 (2) the District Magistrate was bound to accept the nomination made by the landlord and further that no allotment could be made in favour of a person who did not meet with the approval of the landlord. IN support of the stand that Section 17 (2) was attracted reliance was placed on the explanation appended to Section 17(2) by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 which provides that where a building in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes adjoins (whether horizontally or vertically), the building sought to be allotted, and (a); there is a common entrance to or a common passage fur both the buildings or (b) the two buildings share the sanitary conveniences or other amenities (not including electric connection), then not withstanding that the two buildings are independently fit for residential purposes, they shall be deemed to be part of each other for the purposes of this sub-section'. This explanation was introduced when the appeal revision was pending before the District Judge. IN the matter of allotment which was pending before the learned District Judge the court was bound to take into consideration the law as it then prevailed. The site plan clearly indicates that there is a common entrance and a common passage for the accommodation occupied by the landlord and the accommodation available for allotment. That makes the provision of Section 17(2) applicable. IN the present case there were only two applications for allotment. The landlord indicated his choice for Mohar Singh Karula, the person whom he had illegally let in when the premises were vacated by Rajeshwar Prasad. The District Magistrate, however, allotted it in favour of respondent No. 3. During the pendency of the appeal before the District Judge Karula voluntarily vacated the premises. There appears to be no dispute that when the District Magistrate did not allot the premises to Karula no fresh nomination was made. IN fact there was no choice left with the landlord to make another nomination. Nomination could be made only from amongst the persons who had made applications for allotment of the premises. I am not inclined to accept the contention put forward by the petitioner that after his nomination in favour of Karula had been rejected, fresh opportunity should have been furnished to the landlord to make another nomination. Firstly, it does not appear to be the intention of the legislature that when allotment is not made in favour of the nominee of the landlord a fresh opportunity should be afforded to make another nomination. Secondly, in the present case there could be no occasion for another nomination as there were only two applicants for allotment. The contention of the petitioner that the District Magistrate was bound to allot it only in favour of the nominee of the landlord and in case that did not find favour with him he had no jurisdiction to allot it to any one else appears to be too far fetched. If such an interpretation is put on Section 17(2) that would defeat the scheme behind the Act. It cannot be disputed that the accommodation in question had fallen vacant in the eye of law and the District Magistrate had acquired jurisdiction to make an order of allotment in respect of that accommodation. Section 17 (2) does not give a power of veto to the landlord to defeat the right of the District Magistrate to allot the premises as that power would certainly be defeated by the landlord by either refusing to make a nomination or making a nomination in favour of a person who ultimately declines to accept the accommodation. IN my opinion the provision of law is complied with if the landlord is afforded an opportunity to make his nomination, but the power to pass an order of allotment cannot be challenged on the ground that since it was not allotted in favour of a person nominated by the landlord or it was not accepted by the nominee in case the allotment was made in his favour that took away the power of the District Magistrate to make a valid order of allotment. Coming to the facts of the present case there is no dispute that while the appeal was pending before the District Judge, Karula voluntarily vacated the premises. Obviously he is no longer interested in it. There being no other application for allotment, the order in favour of respondent No. 3 could not be challenged on the ground that he had not been nominated by the landlord. As observed earlier, the power of the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment is not taken away by Section 17 (2) altogether. IN the present case it has become impossible to allot it to the nominee of the landlord as the nominee himself has ceased to have any need for the accommodation in question. I find no merit in the contention that the order of allotment could not be made in favour of respondent No. 3 as the landlord had shown dislike or disinclination for him. The allegations made against respondent No. 3 appear to be not only irrelevant but too flimsy and vague to deserve any serious consideration. The mere fact that there was no family connection with him or that his food habits and way of living were different could not condemn him as an unsuitable person for being allotted the disputed accommodation. The landlord is not clothed with a power to condemn an applicant for allotment on whimsical and irrelevant grounds. No other point has been pressed before me. The petition has no merit and is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.;