M.P. Saxena, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition arising out of allotment proceedings under Section 16 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). House No. 1697 situate in Pacci Sarai Takia Danu Sahu, Mirzapur city, belongs to one Dhaguan Das. It was mortgaged with possession with Suggi Devi, the petitioner. The house consists of one room, Osara and a rourt-yard on the ground floor and one room of the first floor. There is a staircase in the Angan leading to the first floor. On September 26, 1974 Sri Govind Shankar, opposite party No. 3, moved an application under Section 16 of the Act for allotment of the entire house alleging that hie was a tenant in it from before. As usual the Rent Control and Eviction Inspector was required to inspect the house and give his report. He reported that the entire house except the room of the shop on the ground floor was in possession of Smt. Suggi Devi and the necessity for allotment arose to Govind Shankar because she wants to evict him. Smt. Suggi Devi filed objections stating that Sri Govind Shankar is neither her tenant nor in possession of any portion of the house. According to her, he had to leave his house on account ofi quarrel with the members of his family and he approached her to permit him to live on the ground floor of this house for a short period. She agreed and in November 1973 she allowed him to occupy the room and the Orisara on the ground floor only for one month. When he did not vacate it after the expiry of this period she terminated his licence by means of a notice dated November 11, 1974. Inspite of it he did not vacate it. She also gave out that the accommodation cannot be said to have fallen vacant and cannot ba allotted. On November 1, 1974 the opposite party No. 3 gave another; application stating that his previous application dated November 26, 1974 was under Section 14 of the Act and as he was in possession of a portion of the housei as a tenant from before July 15, 1972 the same may be allotted to him. THIS application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the opposite party No. 3 is an authorised tenant. Without specifying the portion he directed that the portion in his possession shall be allotted to him. The allotment order was accordingly made. Smt. Suggi Devi filed an appeal under Section 18 of the Act as it existed at that time and it was disposed of by the learned III Additional District Judge, Mirzapur. He agreed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority but came to the conclusion that Govind, Shankar is in possession of the ground floor. Therefore, the appeal was partly allowed and the allotment order was confined to the ground floor only. The crucial point for consideration is in what capacity the opposite party No. 3 was in occupation of the ground floor and whether it could be allotted to him. The Prescribed Authority and the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that respondent No. 3 was an unauthorised tenant and could apply for allotment. It was based on the ground that he is not related to the landlady and could not have entered into possession as a licensee. It was also held that if he was a licensee, he would not have become ungrateful towards her and applied for allotment. In my judgment the approach of the learned lower authorities was absolutely wrong and suffered from manifest error of law. A heavy burden lay on, the respondent No. 3 to prove that he entered into possession of the building as a tenant. As held in the case of Ram Prakash v. Shambhu Dayal Agarwal (A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 395) tenancy, letting, or sub-letting is the creation of a contract, express or implied like contain all the essential elements of a valid contract. One of them is that the object or subject matter of the contract must be certain or capable of being made certain. A contract of tenancy must relate to specified premises. To create a tenancy or sub-tenancy the tenant or sub-tenant must be given exclusive possession of specific accommodation. The contract of tenancy must be strictly proved. In the instant case the respondent No. 3 did not file any document to show that he was a tenant of the building. None in whose presence the contract of tenancy may have been entered into came forward to file his affidavit to that effect. No rent receipt was produced. In this application for allotment dated September 26, 1974 he alleged to be a tenant of the whole house. The learned lower revisional court held that he was in possession of the ground floor only. He did not disclose in this application since when and at what rate of rent he was a tenant of it. In these circumstances the lower authorities were wrong in holding that respondent No. 3 was a tenant. The mere fact that he was not a relation of the petitioner could not relegate him to the status of a tenant nor his move for allotment of the building could necessarily be construed to mean that he was a tenant. In its absence his status could be that of a licensee alone as alleged by the petitioner. Another question which arises for consideration is whether a lie/emcee whose licence was terminated by means of a notice dated September 11, 1974 could have the building allotted. The distinction between lease and a licence has been laid down in the case of Babu Fazal Haque and others v. Lala Data Ram and others (A.I.R. 1975 Alld. 378). It lays down. "The cardinal touchstone on which the relationship between the parties who claim to be licensers or licensees or lessors or lessees must be decided; is whether the grant creates an interest or estate in the property which is the subject matter of the agreement. Delivery of exclusive possession is a relative factor but it would ha conclusive to the existence of a lease only when it is coupled with an interest in the property and not otherwise." The position of a licencee whose licence has been terminated came up for consideration in the case of Thakur Nilka Singh v. Thakur Bissa and others (A.I.R. 1964, 1964 Jammu and Kashmir 99.) in which it was held: "A mere licence does not create any estate or interest in the property to which it relates; it only makes an act lawful which without it would be unlawful. Thus the status of a licencee is essentially different from that of a trespasser of a tenant. In fact the possession of a licencee is not a juridical possession but only an occupation with the permission of the licensor. While the actual occupation remains with the licencee, the central or possession of the property is with the licensor through its licencee. There is always an element of animus essendandi in the possession of a trespasser which is completely absent in the possession of a licencee. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the moment the licence is terminated the licencee's possession becomes that of a trespasser. A licencee is a licencee whether the licence is for occupation of the premises or for casual visits or for any other purpose." In P.N. Nandey and others v. N. N. Nandey (A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 179.) it was held that as a licencee, he has got no interest in the disputed house and his possession cannot, therefore, exclude the possession of the rightful owners in the eye of law. In the case of Smt. R. M. Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer (A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 517) the Full Bench posed a question as to what could be the position if the tenant-in-chief sublets the entire tenanted accommodation or a portion thereof without having previously obtained the written permission of the District Magistrate and the landlord. Tha question also arose whether in such a case the District Magistrate would have jurisdiction to pass an order under sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the erstwhile U.P. Act III of 1947. The Full Bench observed: "A person led into possession of an accommodation not in the manner laid down be a tenant. His possession would be deemed to be that of a licencee of the tenant-in-chief inasmuch as the interest in the lease-hold property had not been transferred to him in accordance with law. The legal possession of the tenant-in-chief still surviving in him, the accommodation either as a whole or in part thereof would not be deemed to have fallen vacant or to have ceased to be occupied by the tenant-in-chief." In Madan Lal Dua v. Third Additional District, Kanpur (1977 U.P R.C.C. 52) it was held that if tenancy was subsisting even it tenant was not physically occupying the accommodation in question on commencement of the Act of 1972 and thereafter some persons was occupying it on his behalf it is the tenant and not that person who would in law be occupant of the accommodation in question as a tenant thereof. The aforesaid discussion makes it clear that the respondent No. 3 entered into possession of the ground floor as a licence for a period of one month only. His licence was terminated. In the light of the cases discussed above the respondent No. 3 had no juridical possession. It remained throughout with the licensor, namely, the petitioner. Therefore the ground floor cannot be said to have fallen vacant and it could not be allotted to the said respondent. The learned Prescribed Authority and the third Additional District Judge, Mirzapur, failed to consider the case from correct perspective and committed manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated December 12, 1974 and September 10, 1974 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Third Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, respectively are quashed. Costs on parties.;