Mahavir Singh, J. - (1.) BY this writ petition, the petitioner, who is Head of the Department of Entomology in the Kisan Degree College, Simbhaoli, district Meerut, has prayed for a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of the Chancellor, respondent No. 1 dated July 4|15, 1974, by which he set aside the order of the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal and declared respondent No. 2 to be senior to him. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Head of the Department of Entomology in the Kisan Degree College, Simbhaoli, district Meerut, with effect from August 1, 1960, and that the respondent No. 2 Sri C.B. Singh was appointed as Head of the Department of Agronomy in the same college with effect from October 11, 1960. On April 6, 1971, the respondent No. 2 moved an application to the Principal praying that he may be declared senior to the petitioner as he had worked for nine months and 19 days as Head of the Department in another college in district Saharanpur and for a period of two months and 20 days in a college at Bijnor. The Principal rejected the application of the respondent on July 7, 1971. Against that order the respondent No. 2 filed an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, Meerut University and the Vice-Chancellor also rejected the appeal by an order dated March 13, 1973. It was alleged that later the respondent No. 2 filed an appeal to the Chancellor, respondent No. 1 but did not service any copy of the same to the petitioner nor was any notice received by him from the Chancellor. It was on July 29, 1974 that the petitioner received a letter from the Chancellor showing that the appeal of the respondent No. 2 was allowed and he had quashed the orders of the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal and declared the respondent No. 2 to be senior to the petitioner. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that this order is void firstly because the Chancellor had no jurisdiltion to hear any appeal or representation against the order of the Vice-Chancellor which was final and secondly because it was passed without giving any opportunity to show cause. The Chancellor, respondent No. 1 filed no counter-affidavit. Respondent No. 2 however, filed a counter-affidavit. It was alleged that the order passed by the Chancellor was quite legal. It was pointed out that on June 12, 1976, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued an Ordinance, known as U.P. State Universities Ordinance, which provided for a reference to the Chancellor against any order of any officer of the University and thus the Chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the representation against any order of the Vice-Chancellor. It is also alleged that though copy of the representation filed by him not given to the petitioner yet the petitioner knew about the same. He had submitted the original representation to the Principal of the College for onward transmission to the Chancellor and an advance copy was sent to the Chancellor as well as the Vice-Chancellor. The original representation was not forwarded by the Principal to the Chancellor in spite of reminders and so the Chancellor took action on his representation suo moto. It was also alleged that the petitioner was all along aware that be had made representation to the Chancellor against the decision of the Vice-Chancellor and the same was pending. It was rather at his instance that the representation was not forwarded by the Principal to the Chancellor. It was also urged that as the parties had already said what they wanted to say in support of their respective points involved in the case, further giving of an opportunity by the Chancellor was a mere formality and no failure of justice could be said to have occurred by his not inviting the petitioner to give any reply to the representation. The petitioner filed a rejoinder-affidavit. He denied that he had any knowledge of any representation having been made by respondent No. 2 to the Chancellor or that he ever persuaded the Principal not to forward his representation to the Chancellor. He reiterated that he was grately prejudiced by not being given an opportunity to represent his case before the Chancellor. Under the amended Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ can, be issued under any of the following condition: - " (a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; (b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reasons of the contravention of any other provision of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or other instrument made thereunder; or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason or any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice." Obviously, clause (a) does not apply because the writ petition is not for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. As regards clause (b), the contention of the petitioner is that at the time when the order in question was passed by the Vice-Chancellor, i.e., on March 12, 1973, there was no provision for reference to the Chancellor. The order of the Vice-Chancellor was said to be final. Section 47 of the Meerut University Act, which was then applicable did not provide for any reference to the Chancellor against the order of the Vice-Chancellor because the Vice-Chancellor was not included as one of the Officers of the University. The contention of respondent No. 2, on the other hand, is that at the time when, the order in question was passed by the Chancellor, the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, had come into force, with effect from June 12, 1973, and S. 68 of the said Act authorised the Chancellor to pass any order on a reference made to him against the order of any authority or an officer of the University. Under the amended definition of the officers, Vice-Chancellor was included in the Officers of the University and so a reference entertainable by the Chancellor. We need not. however, express any opinion on this aspect of the case because from the view which we are taking about clause (c), the matter has to go to the Chancellor for a fresh decision and the petitioner can take up this point before him if he is so advised. For the application of clause (c), the following three things have to be established: - (1) The writ is for the redress of any injury (2) The injury has been caused by reason of any illegality in any proceeding, and (c) Such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. Obviously, the petitioner has got an injury inasmuch as he has been declared junior to respondent No. 2. About the second point he alleges that as the Chancellor passed the order in question without giving any opportunity to show cause against the representation made to him by the respondent No. 2 it was clearly against the principle of natural justice and as such the order was void. It is urged on his behalf that the action of the Chancellor in making order under Section 68 of the aforesaid Act is of the nature of a quasi-judicial act and, therefore, a hearing to both sides involved in the dispute was necessary. The respondent No. 2 contends that this act of the Chancellor was not a quasi-judicial act but was administrative in nature and, therefore, no hearing needed to be given to the petitioner. It was also said that giving an opportunity of hearing by the Chancellor was not necessary in the circumstances of the case and as such no illegality was committed by him. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the case of Murlidhar v. State of U. P. (A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 148.) to show the various tests on the satisfaction of which an administrative authority can be said to be quasi-judicial one. It was a case on the point whether the State Government acted quasi-judicially while taking action under Section 7-F of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. We need not go into the details of this case because the view taken in this Division Bench case has not been upheld by a Full Bench of this Court in P. P. Virmani v. State Government (1970 A.L.J. 1197.). In this case the various principles which may be considered for deciding the question have been mentioned but so far as the revisional or appellate authority is concerned it has been held following the Supreme Court in Shivaji Nathubhai v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 606.), P. L. Lakhan Pal v Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1507.) and State of Assam v. Hari Singh (Civil Appeal No. 1066 of 1966, decided on July 16, 1969.) that they act quasi-judicially in exercise of such powers. They had further elucidated that point by giving four facts in para 20 of their judgment at page 1207 and then held that the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act acted quasi-judicially. In this case also the same facts existed as follows: - (1) The power under Section 68 is a supervisory power to cancel, modify or affirm the order of the Vice-Chancellor made in favour of respondent No 2; (2) that as a result of the order of the Vice-Chancellor, the petitioner had acquired a right of being senior to respondent No. 2 and this right was disputed and challenged by respondent No. 2 before the Chancellor by a representation made to him; (3) that the dispute is a private dispute between the two parties which the Chancellor had adjudicated upon; and (4) that the matter has to be decided on merits and objectively and not on grounds of policy or expediency. So, the Chancellor clearly acts quasi-judicially when passing an order under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. This is one of the cardinal principles of judicial exercise- of power that nothing should be done without hearing the other side. Admittedly, no notice was issued to the petitioner by the Chancellor before passing the order in question. Thus, there was clearly an illegality in the proceedings while exercising powers under Section 68 of the Act by the Chancellor. Even if the order in question may be said to be an administrative act of the Chancellor, that does not make any practical difference. The Supreme Court in A, K. Kraipak v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150.) had observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. They further observed: - "In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures, which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power, are merely those which facilitate, if not ensure, a just and fair decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power." At page 157 of the same cast it has been held: - "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." In Bhagwati Devi v. President of India (1974 A.L.J. 43.) a Division Bench of this Court, relying on State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269.) and A. K. Kraipak's case (supra) held: - "It is now well settled that the principles of nature justice apply to administrative proceedings if they affect a person's civil rights." In the present case it is clear that the Chancellor was to decide the conflicting claims of the petitioner and respondent No. 2 as to the seniority inter se. It would not be possible for him to decide this, matter effectively without hearing the versions of the two sides. It may be that the petitioner's version might have been found in the reply which he made before the Principal or the Vice-Chancellor but that was not enough. The respondent No. 2 had made a further represenstation challenging the order of the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal. So the petitioner was entitled to answer those points which were raised by the respondent No. 2 in his representation before the Chancellor. Hence the principle of natural, justice that an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner before the Chancellor gave his order will be applicable in this case. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited some cases to show that the rule of personal hearing was not observed in those cases. The cases are Murlidhar v. State of U. P. (supra, University of Ceylon v. Fernando (1960(1) All. England Law Reports 631.) and R. S. Agarwal v. Chancellor (1971 A.L.J. 1294.). So far as the case of Murlidhar (supra) is concerned, the parties had already been given an opportunity to file their representations. Only oral hearing was not given because it was not even demanded. In the case of University of Ceylon v. Fernando (supra) also a notice was issued to the other side. It was only at some other stage of the hearing that one of the parties was not present. It was held in those circumstances that his absence at that stage did not vitiate the proceedings. In the case of R. S. Agarwal v. Chancellor, cited above, no conflicting claims were to be decided by the Chancellor. The appointment of the petitioner in that case made by the Selection Committee was, as specifically mentioned in the appointment order subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The papers were accordingly forwarded to the Vice-Crancellor and he, after consulting the Selection Committee consisting of experts, disapproved the appointment. In those circumstances it was held that he was not required to hear the claimant before disapproving his selection. These cases are clearly distinguishable. Thus, there was clearly an illegality in the proceedings made by the Chancellor in the present case. As regards clause (c) it has further to be seen whether this illegality is of a nature as has resulted in any substantial failure of justice. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that inasmuch as the petitioner was 'not given any opportunity, his case has gone by default and there 4rfs been complete failure of justice, not to say of, substantial failure of justice. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that without going into the merits of the order in question, it will not be possible for this Court to say that there has been really any substantial failure of justice in the case of the petitioner. We, however, do not wish to enter into this larger question whether under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court can re-appreciate the reasonings of Chancellor to find out whether the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected, because the matter can be disposed of otherwise. In some cases of violation of principles of natural justice, the consideration that there has been no substantial failure of justice will be a good ground for refusal to exercise the discretionary and extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. No. exhaustive list of such cases can be made but it would be pertinent to give certain illustrations. If a patently wrong order or order without jurisdiction was passed and it has been set aside and the effect of quashing the later, order would be to restore the earlier order, this Court will refuse to interfere under Article 226 even if it may be established that in passing the earlier order principles of natural justice were violated. Likewise if an ex parts order or decree has been set aside on a finding that sufficient cause was made out and the person aggrieved by such order has not been able to present a plausible ground to show that the finding about sufficient cause was otherwise manifestly illegal or without jurisdiction, it would be a fit case for refusal to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution even if principles of natural justice were violated in passing the order. As a consequence of the setting aside of the ex parte order or decree the parties will have an opportunity of having their dispute decided" on merits and it cannot be said that the illegality in proceedings has resulted in substantial failure of justice. But can it be said that there has been no substantial failure of justice even if, as in the instant case, an order passed in favour of one party by a subordinate authority has been once and for all been reversed by a higher authority on the representation of the other party without giving any opportunity to show cause? In our opinion it is not possible to take such a view. If the order remains, the person aggrieved has to suffer the consequences which are of serious nature inasmuch as he has been deprived of valuable civil rights. Had the petitioner been given as opportunity to show cause he could put forward before the Chancellor certain points which may have persuaded him not to interfere with the order of the Vice-Chancellor but may be unable to raise those very points before this Court in view of the nature of jurisdiction which can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution. As such we are of opinion that in the instant case there has been a substantial failure of justice and the impugned order deserves to be quashed. In the result, we allow the petition with costs and quash the order of the Chancellor dated July 4/15, 1974. He would now rehear the case after giving the petitioner an opportunity to show cause.;