Deoki Nandan, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's second appeal. The appellants, three in number are the Manager, the President and the Managing Committee of the Agarsen Kanya Uchjafar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Azamgarh. They will be compediously referred to as the Management of the appellant institution. The first respondent was the plaintiff in a suit. Being suit no. 316 of 1968, which he filed in the court of the Munsif City, Azamgarh, for a declaration that the order of his removal from service dated December 11,1967 (communicated on 12th December, 1967) was nullity and be contents to be in the service of the defendant institution, against the management of the institution and its Principal, who has been arrayed as the second respondent to the appeal. According to the findings of the trial court the plaintiff was a permanent peon of the institution and his services were wrongfully terminated under the directions of the Management of the institution when in law only the Principal could have done so and that too in violation of the principles of natural justice without affording him an opportunity to corss-examine one of the witnesses examined by the subcommittee appointed by the Management to inquire into the charges against him. The learned Munsif held that the impugned order of termination was illegal and void and decreed the suit for the declaration prayed for with costs. The management of the institution appealed to the court of the District Judge. The appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 1242 of 1969, was assigned to the court of the Civil Judge, Azamgarh for hearing. The learned civil judge dismissed the appeal with costs and the present second appeal is directed against the same. The findings of the courts below to the effect that the plaintiff respondent was a permanent peon of the institution has not been assailed before me. The only points that have been urged before me by the learned counsel on behalf of the management of the institution are; firstly that the decree appealed from amounts to a specific enforcement of a contract for personal service against the management of the institution which was not permissible in law; secondly, that there has been no violation of any statutory provision of law and as such the declaration granted in the case could not have been granted; and thirdly, that there was no violation of any principle of natural justice. In respect of first contention learned counsel principally relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vaish Degree College y. Laxmi Narain (A. I. R. 1976 SC 988). The question raised before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the Vaish Degree College was a statutory body and could not, therefore, terminate the services of the plaintiff-respondent in that case without the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor of the Meerut University to which the said College was affiliated. The Executive Committee of the Vaish Degree College was registered under the Societies Registration Act as an institution for imparting education. Its affairs were managed by its executive committee. The college was affiliated to the Agra University and had agreed to be governed by the provisions of the Agra University Act and the Statutes and Ordinances made there under. After the establishment of the Meerut University It was affiliated to that University and agreed to be governed by the statutory provisions of that University. Under the relevant statutes the services of the Principal of the college could not be terminated without the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. However, the executive committee of the college terminated the services of the respondent Laxmi Narain without obtaining the approval of the Vice-Chancdlor. Laxmi Narain instituted a suit claiming that after his appointment he entered into an agreement with the executive committee of the college in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the University and the executive committee of the college was bound by the provisions of statutes under which his services could not be terminated without the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The Vaish College was not a creature of either the Agra University or the Meerut University Act, nor did the statutes and Ordinances framed there under apply of their own force to the Vaish College, but depended for thair application on the agreement, which was entered into at the time for the affiliation of the college. The statutory provisions did not also apply to their own force to the contract of seivice between the Vaish College and its Principal Laxmi Narain. There too their applicability depended upon contract between the two, and as a matter of fact the prescribed agreement had not been executed at all. On these facts the Supreme Court held that the executive committee of the Vaish Degree College was not a statutory body nor did the case of its Principal Laxmi Narain fall within any of the excepted categories and, therefore, the contract of personal service could not be specifically enforced in his case. In the present case, however, the management of the institution is a creature of the Intermediate Education Act, having been created under and in accordance with the Scheme of administration framed and approved under sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C of that Act. The conditions of service of the respondent including the appointment and termination of service are also directly governed by regulations framed by the State Government under section 8 (1) of the Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958. Regulation 22 of Chapter III of the said regulations provides that the Principal or the Headmaster is the appointing authority in respect of the inferior servants, while regulation 10 of Chapter I of the said regulations provides that:- '10. The Headmaster or the Principal shall be solely responsible and shall have necessary powers for the internal management and discipline of his institution including:- (i)......appointment, promotion, control and punishment including removal and dismissal of the inferior servants......" It is not disputed that the plaintiff was such an inferior servant of the institution. The Vaish Degree College case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable and the present case seems to me to be squarely covered by tie principles enunciated in the decision of the House of Lords in Vine v. National Dock labour Loard ((1956) 3 All E. R. 939.). As also those enunciated by the Supreme Court in the cases of S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra (A. I. R. 1964 SC 1680) and Prabhakar Ramkrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pandey((1965) 2 SCR 713). Learned counsel for the management of the institution, however, cited certain other decisions before me in support of his contention that the relief of declaration could not have been granted by the Civil Courts. The decisions were, U. P. State Warehousing Corpn., Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi( A.I.R. 1970 Sc 1244); Kurrari Regina v. Smt. Aloysius Higher Elementary School and another(A.I.R. 1971 SC 1920); and Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee. Shri Jai Narain College(A.I.R. 1972 SC 1450). The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, on the other hard, relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 of its decision in the case of Dr. S. Dutt. v. University of Delhi (A.I.R. 1958 SC 1050); Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi and others v. Kondurun Seshu Reddi and others (A.I.R. 1967 SC 1050); Sirsi Municipality v. Cecalia Kom francies Tellis (A.I.R. 1973 SC 855); and the decision of Division Bench of our own Court in Western India Match v. Rameshwar Prasad (1971 ALJ 822). In the U. P. Warehousing Corporation's case (supra) it was held as follows:- "...the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals,(3) A statutory body when it has acted In breach of mandatory obligation, imposed by statute." It could not be disputed that the present case did not fall under the first two of the excepted categories of cases. The question was whether the management of the institution was a statutory body and whether it had acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. It may be that the mar aging committee of the institution in the present case was originally registered under the Societies Registration Act, but on the enforcement of the provisions of the Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958 and the framing of the regulations by the State Government, the management of the institution must have been vested in a committee of management appointed in accordance with the Scheme of administration framed under the provisions of sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C of the Act. Further, the conditions of service of all the employees of the institution were required to be governed by the regulations, the necessary regulations having been framed by the State Government. The provisions of the regulations, which had statutory force, governed the conditions of service including the appointment and removal of the plaintiff respondent. On the other hand, U. P. Warehousing Corporation was constituted under the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act, 1956, and was even deemed to be a company for the purpose of Income Tax and Super Tax under the provisions of section 49 of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act, 1956. The Corporation constituted under that Act was a body corporate and have separate jurisdiction existence. It was created by a notification of the State Government in accordance with and under the provisions of the Act and was more like a company constituted under the provisions of the Companies Act, and the regulations govering the services" of its employees were made by the corporation in exercise of the power reserved to it under section 54 of the Act. But the making of the regulations by the corporation under section 54 of that Act did not give any statutory force to the regulations, inasmuch as they could not be said to have been made in the exercise of any delegated legislative power. They were more in the nature of orders issued by an employer, which he had the power to issue. The legislative power of making rules was delegated to the appropriate Government by section 52 of that Act and not to the Corporation. In the present case, however, the regulations governing the conditions of service of the plaintiff-respondent have been made by the State Government in exercise of legislative powers delegated to it by section 8 (1) of the Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958, read with section 16-G (1) which was inserted in the Intermediate Education Act by that Amendment Act. The U. P. State Warehousing Corporation's case is, therefore, in my opinion, distinguishable. In Kumarl Regina's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "The mere fact that such a school has obtained recognition and aid from the education department would not mean that the relationship between its management and its employees has ceased to be governed by the contracts of employment under which the employees are recruited and by the law of master and servant unless there is some provisions in the Act overriding that law as one finds in statutes dealing with industrial disputes and similar other matters. There is in fact no such provision in the Act and none was pointed out to us. The result is that the relations between the management and the teachers even in a recognised elementary school have to be regarded as being governed by the contracts of employment and the terms and conditions contained therein." On the other hand, as pointed out above, the conditions of service of the plaintiff respondent in the present case were directly governed by regulations having statutory force. The position in Vidya Ram's case (supra) was similar to that in Vaish Degree College case(supra), the managing committee of Shri Jai Narain College which was the respondent in that case, was found by the Supreme Court not to be a statutory body and the services of Shri Vidya Ram Misra appellant in that case were found to be governed by contract. For reasons already elaborated herein above I am of opinion that this case also does not help the management of the institution in the present case. In the view that I have taken above it is not necessary for me to discuss the cases relied upon by the plaintiff-respondent. In order, however, to establish that the plaintiff-respondent's case fell within one of the excepted categories it has to be seen whether there was a violation of any of the statutory provisions. It has been found as a fact by the two courts below that although the Principal of the institution formally communicated the order terminating the services of the plaintiff-respondent. She did soon the dictates and directions of the management of the institution and it was not an order passed by the Principal, who had, on the other hand, reported favourable on the plaintiff-respondent's conduct and character. Regulation 22 of Chapter 1II makes the Principal the appointing authority in relation to inferior servants like the plaintiff-respondent. Regulation 10 of Chapter I make the Principal solely responsible and confers all the necessary powers for the internal management and discipline of the institution including the powers of appointment, promotion, control and punishment including removal and dismissal of inferior servants. It was urged by the learned counsel for the management institution that under Regulation 9 of Chapter I the Principal was to perform the duties of his office and was made responsible to the committee of management through the manager of the institution for the due discharge of all his duties. On the other hand, Regulation 11 of Chapter I makes it clear that in financial and other matters for which the Principal is not solely responsible, he shall follow the directions of the committee of management as issued to him through the Manager. Reading the provisions of the three regulations together, I am of opinion that the Principal is the sole appointing authority and solely responsible for the appointment, punishment, removal and dismissal of inferior servants and is not under the control of, or responsible to the committee of management in respect thereof. He must exercise his duties and powers in such matters according to his own discretion and not on the dictates of the management of the institution. Under the circumstances, the finding of the two courts below that the plaintiff respondent was in the present case not removed by the authority competent to remove him appears to be correct. The management of the institution has no powers under the regulations to remove an inferior servant. The Principal alone could do so. The Principal had instead of recommending the removal of the plaintiff-respondent reported favourable on his conduct and character and it appears that left to herself, she would not have removed the plaintiff respondent frorn the service of the institution. He had long been in serviae of the institution and bad an unblemished and unimpeachable character. Not having been passed by the authority competent to do so the order of removal of the plaintiff respondent must be held to be a nullity in the eye of law; and on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it cannot be held that the discretion in granting the declaration was wrongly exercised by the two courts below. In view of the above findings, no other point survives for consideration. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.;