K.N. Singh J. - (1.) PADAM Singh, Dharmvir Singh, Sheo Singh and Sahab Singh, Respondents, filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the relief of issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents, which included the Superintendent of Police, Agra, the District Magistrate, Agra, and the State of Uttar Pradesh to act in accordance with law and to close their history sheets and further not to interfere with the freedom of movement and personal liberty of the Respondents. The writ petition was contested on behalf of the State authorities. A learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Superintendent of Police not to take any measure against the Respondent Petitioners under Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 of Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations. Aggrieved, the State authorities, including the Superintendent of Police, Agra, have preferred this appeal against the order of the learned single Judge.
(2.) LEARNED Standing counsel contended that none of the Respondents' fundamental rights were violated by any action of the police or other authorities and the learned single Judge was not justified in issuing the mandamus. It appears that there was serious suspicion against the Respondents to the effect that they had been harbouring dacoits and enjoying bad reputation of criminality. The police opened a history sheet against the said Respondents in the year 1962 and since then it had been keeping confidential surveillance over their activities. The Respondents challenged the action of the police and asserted that their privacy was interfered inasmuch as the police made domiciliary visits in the night and they shadowed them and followed their activities. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the police authorities it was clearly stated "that history sheet had been opened against the Respondents" but no domiciliary visits were made to the Respondents, their privacy was not disturbed and they were never required to report their movements at the police station. History sheet is opened in accordance with Regulation 228 of the Police Regulations. Regulation 236 defines 'surveillance' which runs as under: Without prejudice to the right of superintendence of police to put into practice any legal measures, such as shadowing in cities, by which they find they can keep in touch with suspects in particular localities or special circumstances, surveillance may for most practical purposes be defined as consisting of one or more of the following measures: (a) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to the house of suspects; (b) domiciliary visits at night; (c) through periodical enquiries by officers not below the rank of Sub -Inspector into repute, habits, associations, income, expenses and occupation; (d) the reporting by constables and chaukidars of movements and absences from home; (e) the verification of movements and absences by means of inquiry slips; (f) the collection and record of a history sheet of all information bearing on conduct. The question as to whether the surveillance as defined under Regulation 236 is violative of fundamental right of a citizen was considered by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 1963 ALJ 711, wherein it was held that the domiciliary visits at night contemplated by Clause (b) of Regulation 236 of the U.P. Police Regulations constituted infringement of the citizen's fundamental right of personal liberty and as such the authorities were not entitled to make domiciliary visits at night to disturb a citizen. The Supreme Court, however, held that so far as the surveillance contemplated by Clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) are concerned, no citizen can invoke the aid of fundamental rights against the police authorities because the right of privacy was not a guaranteed right under the Constitution and, therefore, any attempt made by the police authorities to ascertain the movements of an individual was not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The instant case is squarely covered by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh's case (supra). As already noted, in paragraph No. 15 of the counter affidavit, there is a clear denial about the domiciliary visits. The Respondents though challenged the correctness of the same but we see no reason to discard the averment contained in the counter affidavit. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no domiciliary visits are made by the police to disturb the Respondents' peace at night. We are further of the opinion that the police authorities are entitled to have surveillance on the Respondents as contemplated by Clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 as this does not involve violation of any of the Respondents' fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
(3.) THE learned single Judge referred to a number of cases and placed reliance on certain Articles of the International Covenants on Civil and Political rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 21st Session on December 16, 1966. We have considered the question anxiously but in our opinion the declarations contained in the International Covenants on Civil and Political rights, which may have been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, are not enforceable in a court of law specially when we have a written constitution and various statutory laws. No citizen has a right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of any declaration made by any international institution or for violation of any Article of International Covenants on Civil and Political rights. The grievance of a citizen must be tested in the light of the provisions contained in the Constitution and the statutory laws made by the Central and State Legislatures. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned single Judge erred in granting the relief to the Respondents with the aid of the declarations of human rights at the International Covenants on Civil and Political rights. No material was placed before the Court to show that the declarations made by the International Covenants on Civil and Political rights were ever adopted by the Union Government as contemplated by Article 253 of the Constitution. In view of the above discussions we hold that the Respondents were not entitled to any relief of mandamus.;