K.N.SETH,J. - (1.) THE petitioner filed an application under sec. 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Pent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of respondent No. 1 on the ground that he bona fide needed the premises for his use. The case set up by the petitioner was that he was the tenant-in chief of the premises, a portion of which he sub-let to Smt. Pushpawati Devi. The application was contested principally on the ground that it was not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. The Prescribed Autho­rity dismissed the application on the reasoning that only the owner of the building could take recourse to the remedy provided by section 21 and since the petitioner was only a tenant, he was not entitled to main­tain the application. The learned Additional District Judge also took the same view. He further held that the petitioner as tenant-in-chief may be treated as landlord in the technical sense but since the contract of sub-tenancy was without the consent of the landlord he had no locus standi to maintain the application.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the view taken by the Prescribed Authority and the learned Judge that only a real owner of property can maintain an application under section 21 is erroneous and the remedy provided under that provision is available to a tenant against his sub-tenant. There appears to be considerable merit in the contention. Under the Act, a 'tenant' in relation to a building means a person by whom its rent is payable and the 'landlord' in relation to a building means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be payable and includes, except in clause (g) the agent or attorney of such person. There is no dispute that one Hashim Ali is the owner of the building. He let it out to the petitioner who in his turn sub-let a portion to Smt. Pushpawati Devi who paid the rent of the portion let jut to her to the petitioner. The petitioner is the person to whom rent is payable in respect of the portion occupied by Smt. Pushpawati Devi. There is no privity of contract between Smt. Pushpawati Devi and the owner of the building. It cannot possibly be disputed that Smt. Pushpawati Devi comes within the definition of the 'tenant' and the petitioner has the character of 'landlord' in relation to the premises, in occupation of Smt. Pushpawati Devi. The word 'build­ing' used in the definition of 'tenant' and 'landlord' does not necessarily mean the entire building. A part of the building, treated as a separate entity, is also a building within the meaning of the Act. The word 'building' has been used in that sense in several other provisions of the Act. I am not prepared to accept the contention raised by the respondent that the word 'building' implies only the entire structure and not a part of it even if it is let out as a separate and distinct entity, in view of the definitions of the words 'landlord' and 'tenant' there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner is a landlord and Smt. Pushpawati Devi is a tenant of the premises in dispute. It was next urged that since there was no consent in writing by the landlord and by the District Magistrate no valid contract of tenancy came in existence, between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. In section 7 of Act No. III of 1947, as it originally stood by explana­tion it was provided that the word 'let' shall include the word' 'sub-let' by U. P. Act No. 24 of 1952 the section was amended and by sub­section (3) it was provided that no tenant shall sub-let any portion of the accommodation in his except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained. Admit­tedly Smt. Pushpawati Devi was taken in as a sub-tenant while Act No. III of 1947 was in force. Whether she was taken in prior to the amendment introduced in 1952 or after it is not of any consequence. There is no allegation that the contract of sub-tenancy was entered into with prior permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate. In the absence of a valid permission of the District Magistrate could treat the premises vacant and open for allotment. However, between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 a valid contract came into existence and they are bound by it. That act may have been in violation of section 7 of Act No. III of 1947 but it would not result in rendering the contract between the parties void or illegal. This view finds support from the rule laid down in Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash and another A.I.R. 1964 All. 1. The principle laid down in this case was approved by the Supreme Court in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. and others A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924. It is therefore, not possible to contend that no valid contract of tenancy came into existence between the petitioner and respondent No. 1.
(3.) SECTION 21 authorises the Prescribed Authority on an applica­tion of the landlord to order eviction of the tenant from the building under his tenancy or any specified part thereof, if he is satisfied that the building in its existing form is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family. In such a case the applicant need not be the owner of the building. It is enough if he satisfied the requirement of being the landlord. Where, however, the building is required for the use of the landlord after demolition and new construction or eviction of the tenant is sought on the ground that the building is in a dilapidate condition, the landlord must also com­bine in him the rights of an owner for only such a person has the right to demolish the building and re-construct it. In a case where demoli­tion and re-construction is not involved an application by a person who qualified to be the landlord but is not the owner of the building would be maintainable. Quo the sub-tenant the tenant would be the landlord within the meaning of the Act. There appears to be no justification for narrowing down the provisions of section 21 to the case of an owner of the building only.;